

The EU and the challenges of Civil-Military Coordination at the strategic level

Bjørn Olav Knutsen

Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

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Approved by

Annika S. Hansen

Project Manager

Espen Skjelland

Director of Research

Jan Erik Torp

Director

English summary

The purpose of this report is to analyse the practical framework for effective planning and coordination between different EU actors (both intra-pillar and inter-pillar) for EU crisis management. This has to do with a development during recent years where the focus of international crisis management is shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status-quo, to peace building which has to do with managing transitions. Within such a context, the overarching approach is to describe and analyse the EU's ability to address complex crises in a coherent manner by drawing on examples from two recent EU operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo in 2006).

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) and comprehensive planning are three concepts that frame the debate on what kind of security actor the EU is. While CIMIC is confined to the tactical and operational levels of command and relates to practical cooperation between actors in the field, the CMCO-concept is an internal EU measure for closer cooperation and coordination between different EU actors at the strategic level. CMCO addresses the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU's response to the crisis. Hence, central to CMCO is enhanced intra-institutional complementarity between the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Therefore, within an EU context, CMCO should be regarded as synonymous with a comprehensive approach towards the security challenges now facing the international community. However, when analysing the EU's comprehensive approach, there is an important distinction to make between the Commission's long-term involvement and the Council's more operationally driven approach which focuses on stabilisation and thus rapid reaction. Comprehensive planning refers in this respect to the systematic approach designed to address the need for effective intra-pillar and inter-pillar coordination of activity by all relevant EU actors in crisis management planning.

Central to the build-up of better coordination is further institutional strengthening of the EU's common foreign and security policy apparatus, including autonomous planning and command and control facilities. The further development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the newly founded Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) are key elements in this. While parts of the research literature have underlined the difficulties the EU faces in connection with civil-military cooperation and coordination, the present report, by basing itself upon a social constructivist approach, emphasises that a "culture of coordination" is emerging, as is also a European strategic culture. The main impediment towards such a culture of coordination is, as always, the British-French disagreement on how the EU should relate to NATO and the greater Euro-Atlantic security community.

Sammendrag

Formålet med denne rapporten er å analysere det praktiske rammeverket for effektiv planlegging og koordinering mellom ulike EU-aktører (både intra-pilar og inter-pilar) i forbindelse med gjennomføringen av EUs krisestyringsoperasjoner. Dette har først og fremst å gjøre med viktige utviklingstrekk de senere år hvor fokuset har skiftet fra fredsbevaring som tar sikte på å opprettholde status-quo, til fredsbygging som har med styring av endringsprosesser internt i de land og områder man griper inn i å gjøre. Innenfor en slik kontekst er den overordnede tilnærmingen å beskrive og analysere EUs evne til å håndtere komplekse kriser på en samstemt måte ved å vise til to EU-operasjoner i Bosnia-Hercegovina (EUFOR Althea) og i Kongo (EUFOR RD Congo i 2006).

Sivil-militært samarbeid (CIMIC), sivil-militær koordinering (CMCO) og helhetlig planlegging ("comprehensive planning") er tre begreper som i stor grad er med å på å forme debatten om hva slags sikkerhetspolitisk aktør EU er. Mens CIMIC omhandler sivil-militært samarbeid på det taktiske og operasjonelle nivå og har med samarbeid mellom sivile og militære aktører på bakken å gjøre, er CMCO en intern EU-mekanisme som skal sikre nærmere samarbeid og koordinering mellom ulike EU-aktører på strategisk nivå. Innenfor et CMCO-perspektiv understrekes behovet for effektiv koordinering mellom alle relevante EU-aktører i forbindelse med EUs håndtering av en internasjonal krise. Derfor omhandler CMCO i første rekke en forbedret samhandling mellom Europakommisjonen og Unionsrådet. I EU-sammenheng betraktes CMCO som synonymt med en helhetlig tilnærming ("comprehensive approach") til krisestyringsoperasjoner i møtet med de sikkerhetsutfordringer som det internasjonale samfunn i dag står overfor. Det er imidlertid viktig å fremheve forskjellen mellom Europakommisjonens mer langsiktige tiltak og perspektiver og Unionsrådets mer operative og kortsiktige engasjement med vektlegging av stabilisering og hurtig reaksjonsevne. Begrepet helhetlig planlegging innebærer i denne sammenheng systematisk intra-pilar og inter-pilar koordinering mellom alle relevante EU-aktører i forbindelse med planleggingen av krisestyringsoperasjonene.

Det viktigste elementet for å etablere sivil-militær koordinering, er en videre institusjonell styrking av EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske apparat, som også inkluderer autonome planleggings-, kommando- og kontrollfunksjoner. I denne sammenhengen er den videre utviklingen av den sivil-militære cellen innenfor EUs militære stab (EUMS) og den nylig etablerte Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) sentrale elementer. Mens deler av forskningslitteraturen har fremhevet de vanskelighetene EU står overfor i forbindelse med sivil-militær samarbeid og koordinering, peker denne rapporten som baserer seg på en sosialkonstruktivistisk tilnærming, på at en "kultur for koordinering" kan være i ferd med å etableres. Den viktigste hindringen mot en slik utvikling er, som alltid, den britisk-franske uenigheten om hvordan EU skal relatere seg til NATO og det større euroatlantiske sikkerhetsfellesskapet.

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List of Acronyms

ACO	Allied Command Operations (NATO)
AJP	Allied Joint Publication (NATO)
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CCM	Civilian Crisis Management
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMCO	Civil Military Coordination
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COREPER	Permanent Representative Committee
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CPM	Civil Protection Mechanism
CRCT	Crisis Response Coordination Team
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DG E	General Secretariat External
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EBAO	Effect Based Approach to Operations
EBG	European Battle Groups
EC	European Community
ECHO	European Humanitarian Aid Office (European Commission)
EDA	European Defence Agency
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Force
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy

FHQ	Force Headquarter
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Committee
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
HQ	Headquarter
ICG	International Crisis Group
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
IST	Information Strategy Team
LOT	Liaison and Observation Teams
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan
MONUC	Mission de l'ONU en RD Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO JFC	NATO Joint Force Command
OHQ	Operations Headquarter
OpCen	Operations Centre
OPLAN	Operations Plan
PJCC	Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SG/HR	Secretary General/High Representative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers Europe
SIEPS	Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies
SITCEN	Joint Situation Centre
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union

1 Introduction

The purpose of this report is to assess the EU's ability to address complex crises in a coherent manner and to analyse the practical framework for effective coordination between different EU actors for EU crisis management. This approach is linked to developments during recent years where the focus of international crisis management has shifted from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing transitions. In order to ensure that all the different dimensions of these peacebuilding operations work together as one coherent mission (political, security, development, human rights, etc.), the need developed to establish dedicated mechanisms and modalities that would facilitate coordination and cooperation.¹

Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) and comprehensive planning are two concepts that form the basis for the EU's crisis management and to an increasing extent the debate on what kind of security actor the EU is.² In 2005, the Council of the European Union defined CMCO as the "... need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to the crisis".³ In the same document, comprehensive planning is described as a "systematic approach designed to address the need for effective intra-pillar and inter-pillar co-ordination of activity by all relevant EU actors in crisis management planning".⁴

This must be seen in relation to the new security framework at the beginning of the 21st century, which requires a wide range of means in the collective effort to face the challenges of globalisation. In this new security framework, Nicolle Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi foresee a world which is becoming both globalised and multipolar.⁵ In such a world, structured by seven or eight poles (great powers), the capacity of individual nation-states in Europe to exercise direct influence on global or regional outcomes will be increasingly limited.⁶ At the same time the rest of the world will increasingly see the EU as an ever more homogenous entity, but also as an entity, which is in need of a more unitary approach towards these challenges.

¹ Cedric de Coning (2008): *Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations & African Peace Operations*. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). See p. 20.

² See e.g. Hans-Georg Ehrhart & Gerrard Quille (2007): *Civil-Military Co-operation and Co-ordination in the EU and in Selected Member States*. Directorate General External Policies of the Union. European Parliament.

³ *Civil-Military Co-ordination: Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU Crisis Management Operations*, 8926/06. Brussels, 2 May 2006, p. 3.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Nicolle Gnesotto & Giovanni Grevi (2006): *The New Global Puzzle – What World for the EU in 2025?* Institute for Security Studies, European Union. Paris. These poles or great powers comprise countries like USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Japan, South Africa and the EU.

⁶ Jolyon Howorth (2007): *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. Palgrave & Macmillan, p. 243.

The EU has in fact developed a number of structures and processes to improve its civilian and military crisis management capabilities within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) through second pillar mechanisms.⁷ Whilst this has advantages for the conduct of short-term, high profile diplomatic or crisis management actions, it also means that these actions are institutionally and practically divorced from longer term conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities supported by the European Commission. Catriona Gourlay points out that this institutional disconnect between the Commission and the Council means that complementary conflict prevention programming, often implemented by partners, including other institutions, is not integrated into the strategic and operational planning of crisis management operations.

Therefore, within the EU foreign policy debate, it is often argued that the EU is suffering from a “strategic deficit” in conflict prevention and peace building.⁸ This is to a large extent the result of the existing pillar structure, simply because when it comes to tackling a crisis, many policy areas – such as trade, aid, assistance, financial, political, and military measures – may be involved that fall under separate pillars.⁹ One of the main challenges in EU foreign policy is therefore the coordination between the different pillars.

Additionally, within a more traditional realist and intergovernmentalist approach to EU foreign policy, it is emphasised that the primary reason why the EU is unable to deliver the foreign and security policies expected, is a lack of decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent. Hence, it is far from obvious that EU members share sufficient foreign policy interests. This approach argues that there is a consensus-expectations gap and that the EU is likely to remain a partial, weak and inconsistent foreign policy actor.¹⁰ Central to such a consensus-expectations gap is that the EU Member States lacks common foreign policy interests, traditions, goals and outlooks to automatically generate substantive common policies.¹¹ Accordingly, the lack of a defined self is a primary problem, since it makes self-interested behaviour difficult.

This report, however, suggests that a “culture of coordination” is emerging, as is also a European strategic culture. Such a culture expresses itself through institutions strong enough to provide for better effectiveness and predictability in EU-foreign policy making, which also includes joint exercises in norm-setting and institution building. Each new step in European integration, each new policy, has brought along its own sets of institutional requirements.¹² Security and defence will inevitably do the same, only in a specialised institutional setting will a European security and defence culture, including a “culture of coordination” between civil and military means, solidify.

⁷ See Safer World International Alert (2004): *Strengthening Global Security through Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict: Priorities for the Irish and Dutch Presidencies in 2004*, p. 5-6.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Agnieszka Nowak (2006): “Introduction”; in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.): *Civilian crisis management: the EU way*. Chaillot Paper, nr. 90. Institute for Security Studies: Paris: 11.

¹⁰ Asle Toje (2008): The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy; *Security Dialogue* 39(1): 121-141.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 125.

¹² See e.g. Gilles Andréani (2000): “Why Institutions Matter”, *Survival*, 42(2): 81-95.

Accordingly, this report will be based upon insights from a social constructivist approach, and will try to explain how this so-called consensus-expectations gap is narrowing due to the emerging coordination culture and the increased emphasis on intra-pillar and inter-pillar coordination (CMCO and comprehensive planning). The further development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the new Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is key to the development of the EU's CMCO and comprehensive planning.

When analysing these institutions, the CMCO and comprehensive planning concepts, the report draws on examples from two recent EU operations – EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC). The aim is to take a closer look at CMCO and comprehensive planning in practice. Through these two examples, the report aims to see how far the EU has come as a “comprehensive security actor”, and how practice and conceptual developments inform and influence each other.

Building upon a social-constructivist approach, the report first describes what kind of security actor the EU is. Thereafter the CMCO and comprehensive planning concepts are presented followed by an analysis of the different means the EU has at its disposal with special emphasis on the planning procedures, including the organisation of the Civil-Military Cell and the new CPCC unit. The EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RD Congo operations are dealt with as empirical examples. The last part summarises the findings and points in the direction of future research on this topic.

2 What Kind of Actor

2.1 The Theoretical Approach

When analysing the development of the EU's ability to plan and coordinate military and civilian operations, it is important to have in mind that ESDP from 1999 and onwards signalled the arrival of the EU as a military actor after more than forty years as a civilian entity. In 2003, the ESDP became operational, when the EU initiated its first operation, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH.¹³ In the same year, the EU agreed on a European Security Strategy (ESS 2003) setting up guidelines for the future elaboration of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP in which the most quoted statement was that the aim of the EU was to lay the foundation for an international system characterised by “effective multilateralism”. Effective multilateralism entails striving for a stronger international society, including well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order.

Even before that, the European Council expressed in Nice in 2000 what kind of actor the EU aimed to be: “In response to crises, the Union's particular characteristic is its capacity to mobilise

¹³ Annika S. Hansen (2004): “Security and Defence: The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, in Walter Carlsnaes & Helene Sjursen and Brian White: *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*. SAGE Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli.

a vast range of both civilian and military means and instruments, thus giving it an overall crisis management and conflict prevention capability in support of the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.”¹⁴ In the wider security debate, the EU is often labelled a “comprehensive security actor”.¹⁵ In addition to its civilian instruments the EU now has troops assigned to it, and is constantly developing their skills through means such as the Battle Group concept. It has been and is involved in several civilian and military crisis management operations, and has put in place a cooperation agreement with NATO for the use of NATO assets and capabilities in such actions (the so-called Berlin-plus agreement).¹⁶ As of May 2008, the EU has conducted all in all 21 different crisis management operations under the aegis of ESDP in Europe, Africa, and Southeast-Asia.¹⁷

However, the development of a common European security and defence policy seemed to come as a surprise to many analysts working in the field of security and defence studies. Traditionally, realists, and especially neo-realists, tended to disregard European security and defence integration all together, underlining that such a development was highly unlikely. Intergovernmentalism, the realist strand of integration theory, introduced by Stanley Hoffmann in 1966, argued that integration was only possible in issue areas where state gains constantly outweighed losses.¹⁸ This, he predicted, would not happen within the sphere of security and defence, a policy area that he labelled “high-politics” as opposed to “low-politics” where integration processes would be much more likely. The liberal strand of intergovernmentalism found in Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, argues along the same lines of thought, namely that foreign, security, and defence policy are issue areas where coordination and integration will not happen.¹⁹ Liberals have traditionally only focused upon politico-economic cooperation and analysing why states chose cooperation in an anarchic system.²⁰ The liberal approach does not explain why the EU is entering the sphere of security and defence.

In recent years, a shift towards social constructivism has taken place in the field of international relations research. This school of thought emphasises that the state preferences underlined by realists as well as liberals, are in fact socially constructed phenomena such as identities, normative beliefs, and socialization. These phenomena are, according to social constructivists, in a constant state of evolution. John Gerard Ruggie, a leading social constructivist, holds the view that social constructivists see the building blocks of international reality as ideational as well as

¹⁴ See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm

¹⁵ Pernille Rieker (2006): “From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy”, *Security Dialogue* 37(4): 509-528.

¹⁶ Hanna Ojanen (2006): “The EU and Nato: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy”; *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(1): 57-76.

¹⁷ For an oversight over past and present ESDP operations, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=EN&mode=g

¹⁸ Stanley Hoffmann (1966): “The European Process at Atlantic Cross-Purposes”; *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4(2).

¹⁹ Andrew Moravcsik (1998): *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

²⁰ Robert O. Keohane (1984): *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press: Princeton: New Jersey.

material; ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; and they express not only individual but also collective intentionality.²¹ Jolyon Howorth, a scholar influenced by a social constructivist approach, underlines in this respect that discourse – the ability to change preferences by altering actors’ perceptions of the available options – has proven to be an immensely powerful factor in driving forward the ESDP process.²²



Figure 2.1 SG/HR Javier Solana (to the left) and the Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. © NATO

At the same time, Christoph O. Meyer, also a scholar within the social constructivist realm, investigates how a European strategic culture is evolving through three different processes: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialization, and crisis learning.²³ According to Meyer, the combined effect of these mechanisms is a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms prevalent in current EU countries. Meyer further holds the view that what we might see more of in the time to come is, firstly, converging attitudes on humanitarian intervention abroad. This development also includes a de-prioritizing of territorial defence. Secondly, a more solidified European consensus on how force is used, namely with maximum restraint against civilian targets and a preference to exhaust non-military means first. Thirdly, a growing European consensus on multilateralism and international law in accordance with the ESS of 2003. Finally, we will see a fading attachment to neutrality as well as to NATO.²⁴ This last development has been reinforced by the neo-conservative turn in US foreign policy and the US’ break with the principle of multilateralism.²⁵

²¹ John Gerard Ruggie (1998): *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, New York: Routledge, p. 33.

²² Howorth (2007), p. 31.

²³ Christoph O. Meyer (2005): “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(4): 523-549.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ See e.g. Michael Cox (2005): “Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia”; *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2): 203-233.

Furthermore, since a substantial increase in European defence spending seems unlikely, the quest to modernise the European defence forces seems to be feasible only within the context of enhanced European defence integration within the EU framework.²⁶ In that way, the survival of NATO largely depends on the development of credible European military capabilities. As underlined by Hanna Ojanen, such a development might take place by developing a centralized defence bureaucracy in support of supra-national decision-making and a supra-national approach is possible only through the EU.²⁷

The main reason why the social constructivist approach is applied here is, on the one hand, that neither realism nor liberalism are able to explain the progress in European defence integration during recent years, as social constructivism is in fact able to do.²⁸ On the other hand, our research must be based on an empirical approach with a focus upon institution building and how such institutions like the EUMS and the CPCC plays a role in the development of the above-mentioned “culture of coordination”. Therefore, in the following an empirical-inductive approach will be applied where theoretical conclusions are drawn from empirical findings. In this respect, social constructivism’s main contribution is that it depicts strategic cultures as less resistant to change than commonly thought, and hence offering a perspective where it is far more feasible for the EU to develop its capacity as an actor in the field of security and defence.²⁹

2.2 Security and Defence: The Most Contentious Issue in European Integration Politics

Historically, the debate on whether the EU should also encompass security and defence issues has been one of the most contentious issues in European integration politics.³⁰ Great Britain has traditionally been of the opinion that such a move would undermine NATO and weaken the transatlantic link. France saw the integration of security and defence as a central part of building a true European political union, and a Europe, which could stand for itself and speak with one voice as, principally speaking, an equal partner with the USA and Russia. Germany was a country with one leg in the Atlantic fold and the other leg in the European fold, but increasingly leaning towards France in seeing the EU as a future security and defence actor.³¹ Consequently, as long

²⁶ Ojanen (2005), p. 73.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ According to one of the leading scholars in European integration studies, Ernst B. Haas: “Constructivists can easily subsume NF’s [neo-functionalism] concern with political community formation under their more general interest in processes of international co-operation and value integration” (Ernst Haas 2001: “Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?”, in Thomas Christiansen, Knut Erik Jørgensen & Antje Wiener (ed.): *The Social Construction of Europe*. SAGE Publications. See page 29). Neo-functionalism maintains that European integration is driven forward by spillover processes, so that integration in one sector is likely to trigger off integration in other sectors. Martin Sæter considers neo-functionalism an outstanding theoretical achievement, having probably contributed more than any other approach to the understanding of supranational and transnational processes in the modern world in general and as regards regional communities like the EU in particular. See Martin Sæter (1998): *Comprehensive Neofunctionalism – Bridging Realism and Liberalism in the Study of European Integration*. NUPI: Oslo.

²⁹ Meyer (2006).

³⁰ Sæter 1998: 11

³¹ France and Germany did in fact sign a bilateral treaty comprising security and defence issues in 1963 (the Elysée Treaty). The aim of the Treaty was to give Europe the necessary impetus to develop its own security

as there was no agreement on the inclusion of security and defence policies into the European integration process, the US-led NATO would in practice remain the main instrument for dealing with questions of defence and military security.³²

The wider debate on the EU's role in security and defence filtered down into the discussion on the EU's planning capacity. Even though the ESDP was initiated in 1999, the issue of whether the EU should develop its own planning and command facilities making it a more independent security actor remained contentious. The debate on the EU's own prospective planning capacity is still a rather contentious issue and is directly linked to one of the oldest lines of conflict within the European integration debate, that between "Atlanticism" on the one hand, and "Europeanism" on the other.³³ The so-called Tervuren initiative by Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg in April 2003, seeking to establish an EU operational planning cell at a Belgian army base in Tervuren in Brussels, created a storm amongst the more Atlantic-minded EU-member states. Great Britain, on the one hand, resisted the initiative because she feared duplicating NATO and undermining the transatlantic link. France, on the other hand, had always been keen to develop autonomous EU operational planning facilities. Tony Blair, the then British Prime Minister, out of a need to mend fences with his European counterparts after the US-led invasion of Iraq, later sought a compromise.³⁴ In the compromise, three different solutions to EU operational planning facilities were proposed.

Firstly, at NATO Headquarters in Mons (Allied Command Operations; ACO), a EU planning cell was created for EU operations involving common NATO capabilities (under the Berlin-plus umbrella).³⁵ Similarly, a NATO representation was established at the EU's Military Staff (EUMS) in Brussels. Secondly, for crisis management operations without recourse to the Berlin-plus framework (autonomous operations), five national operation headquarters (OHQ's) were prepared in Potsdam (Germany), Northwood (Great Britain), Mont-Valérien, Paris (France), Larissa (Greece), and Rome (Italy). Finally, an EU Civil-Military Cell within EUMS was to be created which specifically was intended to assist in strategic planning and operational tasks for the conduct of autonomous EU operations across the range of the military, civil-military and civilian activities (see figure).

and defence competencies. Article 2 in the Treaty foresees coordination between the two states "on all important questions of foreign policy and primarily on questions of common interest with a view to reaching as far as possible parallel positions". The Franco-German relationship has often been described as an "axis" in the sense that the relationship is qualitatively different from all other relationships the two countries might have. This treaty played an important role in connection with the founding of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the embryonic foreign policy coordination in the then EC. See Werner Weidenfeld (1988): "25 Years After 22 January 1963", *Aussenpolitik*, nr. 1, p. 6.

³² Sæter (1998), p. 85.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Howorth (2007), p. 112.

³⁵ See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1041&lang=en&mode=g




Figure 2.2 The EU's Command and Control structure (C2). Source and copyright WEU Assembly (2005)

Jolyon Howorth has also in this respect underlined that any military operation envisaged under ESDP will be conducted, where relevant, in consistency with NATO, a body with which the EU now has a comprehensive understanding concerning the EU's "assured access" to common NATO capabilities like planning facilities and command structures.³⁶ Civilian operations will in most cases also be coordinated with the United States.³⁷ Nevertheless, a more autonomous EU in security and defence affairs, including autonomous planning facilities, will stimulate the European integration process. Whether such a development will harm NATO and the transatlantic security community remains to be seen.

2.3 The Pillar Structure and the Challenges Of Coordination

Ever since the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, it has been rather evident that the pillar structure, established by this treaty, is not the optimal architecture for a coherent and integrated approach to conflict prevention and crisis management.

Pillar 1 is the EU's supranational organised cooperation and includes policy areas like the common agricultural policy (CAP), competition, internal market, and the monetary union. The Commission implements its external relations responsibilities through five Directorates-General

³⁶ In this respect, one refers to the Berlin-plus agreement in 2002. In the agreement, the EU received "assured access" to common NATO capabilities as the integrated command structure and NATO's planning facilities. See Howorth (2007) p. 102.

³⁷ See Howorth (2007), p. 12.

(External Relations, Trade, Enlargement, Development, and Humanitarian Aid) headed by four commissioners currently Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Peter Mandelson, Olli Rehn, and Louis Michel. Together they constitute the Group of Commissioners for External Relations, which is chaired by President Jose Manuel Barroso, with Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner as vice chair.³⁸ The Commission is also responsible for humanitarian aid and the Commission's Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM) as well as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). The CPM was established in 2001 to support and facilitate European civil protection assistance in the event of major disasters (either natural or man-made) within or outside the EU. RRM is designed to allow the Commission to rapidly disburse funds with the explicit purpose of promoting political stability. It can be used to finance non-combat, civilian activities aimed at countering or resolving emergency crisis and serious threats or outbreak of conflict. The RRM is managed by the conflict prevention and crisis management unit within DG RELEX.³⁹

According to the treaties establishing the EU, the Commission has a relatively unchallenged role in trade, development cooperation, and humanitarian assistance but a more modest one in CFSP, which is the domain of intergovernmentalism. Still, Article 27 of the Treaty on European Union (the Nice Treaty) confirms that "the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security field". This means that Commission officials are involved at every level of the CFSP, with the overall objective of ensuring consistency in the external relations of the EU as a whole, safeguarding the *aquis communautaire* and the EC Treaties.⁴⁰ Under Article 22 of the Treaty, the Commission shares the right, alongside the member states, to refer to the Council any questions relating to the CFSP and to submit proposals. Furthermore, according to Article 28, the administrative costs arising from the CFSP are borne by the EC budget line. Operational expenditure is covered either by that budget or by member state contributions at the Council's discretion. Hence, the Commission's management of the CFSP budget gives it significant influence also on this intergovernmental matter. The Council and the Commission are thus jointly responsible for ensuring consistency in the EU's external activities as a whole, in the context of its external relations, security, economic, and development policies.⁴¹ According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report on CFSP of 2005, the Commission's comparative advantage is in conflict prevention and management in areas closely linked to long-term structural issues or immediate humanitarian needs.⁴² The same report submits that the Commission will continue to be the main, sometimes exclusive, purveyor of EU foreign policy in those regions of the world member states do not consider strategic priorities.

³⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG)(2005): *EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited*. Europe Report, nr. 160, 17 January 2005: 12.

³⁹ Catriona Gourlay (2006): "Community instruments for civilian crisis management", in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.): *Civilian crisis management: the EU way*. Chaillot Paper nr. 90. Institute for Security Studies (ISS): Paris: 51-53.

⁴⁰ Pernille Rieker (2008 forthcoming): "The EU – A Capable Security Actor? Developing political and administrative capabilities" (Working paper submitted to the peer-reviewed magazine *Journal of European Integration*).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² ICG (2005), p. 13.

Pillar 2 encompasses the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The pillar is mostly of an intergovernmental nature, also including ESDP. The main bodies within this pillar are the General Affairs and External Relations Committee (GAERC), the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) of CFSP, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The GAERC meets at least monthly and is also attended by the High Representative for CFSP (SG/HR) and Commission representatives. The Presidency Foreign Minister chairs the meetings. The Council is furthermore supported by a Secretariat headed by the SG/HR. This Secretariat is divided into nine Directorates-General, one of which deals with External Relations (DG E) and is further divided into nine directorates for geographic and functional areas.⁴³ The main function is to prepare meetings of the Council in its many formations and its preparatory bodies such as the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Staff (EUMS). The SG/HR assists the Council in foreign policy matters, by contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of European policy decisions. He acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties.⁴⁴

There is some rivalry between the PSC and COREPER not least due to the PSC's ambassadors close contacts with their respective foreign ministries.⁴⁵ Consequently, the COREPER's influence has waned somewhat. In addition, the PSC plays an important role in the formulation of EU foreign policies. In Article 25 in the Nice Treaty it is emphasised that this committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by CFSP and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council. The Committee shall also exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. Under the auspices of PSC, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the "designated forum for consultation and cooperation between the member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management." The EUMS then functions as a General Directorate within the Council Secretariat and under the auspices of the European Council (via PSC) and under the military direction of EUMC.⁴⁶

Even though intergovernmental in nature, Christoph O. Meyer emphasises the PSC's socialising effects. He underlines the large differences in meeting frequency between the PSC (at least twice a week) and the GAERC (once a month) and the European Council (four times a year). This makes the PSC the "work-horse" in ESDP decision-making and control, as well as the most likely place

⁴³ These are: I Enlargement; II Development; III Multilateral Economic Affairs; IV Transatlantic Relations, UN and Human Rights; V Mediterranean Basin, Middle East, Africa, Asia; VI Western Balkans Region, Eastern Europe and Central Asia; VII European Security and Defence Policy; VIII Defence aspects; IX Civilian Crisis Management and Coordination. According to the ICG Report (2005) it is stressed that as part of the preparations for setting up the External Action Service (as decided upon in the Lisbon Treaty), there seems to be a progressive merger of some DG E staff with the Policy Unit. ICG (2005), p. 16 and footnote 87.

⁴⁴ See

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/index.asp?lang=EN&cmsid=256

⁴⁵ ICG (2005), p. 19.

⁴⁶ Howorth (2007), p. 75.

to expect effects arising from social influence which is linked to the proximity and intensity of interactions.⁴⁷



Figure 2.3 From the Inauguration Ceremony for the European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 15 January 2003. Sven Frederiksen (in uniform), the High Representative and the EU's Special Representative Paddy Ashdown (in the middle) and SG/HR Javier Solana (to the right). Photo: Annika S. Hansen

In addition, scholars outside the realm of social constructivism, like Antonio Missiroli and François Heisbourg, emphasise the importance of the PSC and the Brussels-based institutions overseeing the CFSP and ESDP developments. Missiroli underlines the steady enhancements of the significance of the Brussels-based institutions in CFSP and ESDP matters, which he labels “Brusselisation”. Furthermore, he describes a development characterised by pooling (rather than handing over) the sovereignty of member states – of not only their foreign but also their security and defence policies.⁴⁸ Heisbourg describes a development of CFSP and ESDP which is driven forward by the same logic that drives forward the European integration process as a whole. In this respect he underlines the following: “Although ESDP is intergovernmental in nature, it faithfully follows the “Jean Monnet” method of European integration: first one establishes a *solidarité de fait* – the new defence and security institutions and the headline force – and then, but only then, does one approach the issue of what it is for, the *finalité stratégique* as it were”.⁴⁹ Therefore, unlike realism’s and liberalism’s emphasis on the intergovernmental nature of Pillar 2, these scholars take a broader view and place the development of this pillar into the framework of the European integration process as such.

⁴⁷ Meyer (2006), p. 116.

⁴⁸ Antonio Missiroli (2000): *CFSP, Defence and Flexibility*, Chaillot Papers 38. Institute for Security Studies (ISS): Paris. P. 27.

⁴⁹ François Heisbourg & Rob de Wijk (2001): “Is the Fundamental Nature of the Transatlantic Security Relationship Changing?” *NATO Review* 49 (1): 15-19.

Much of the same could be emphasised when it comes to Pillar 3 – Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). The aim of this pillar is to strengthen the EU as an area of freedom, security, and justice as stipulated in the Amsterdam Treaty which came into effect in May 1999. Furthermore, the cooperative measures under this pillar traditionally included the free movement of persons with regard to border controls, asylum, immigration, and the prevention and combating of crime. The Amsterdam Treaty, however, transferred several policy areas from the third to the first pillar, including the Schengen acquis. According to Article 29 in the Nice Treaty, the objective of the cooperative measures in this policy area is “... combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud”.

The European Commission has admitted that there are some coordination problems caused by the pillar structure (between Pillar 1 and 3). Good progress has been recorded in Pillar 1, which covers areas like fundamental rights, citizenship, civil justice, the European strategy on drugs, asylum and migration, visa rights and border policies, as well as in the fight against global terrorism. However, “Justice, Freedom and Security policy is currently divided and there were delays in the areas covered by the 'Third Pillar' (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters). Here recurrent difficulties and blockages held back progress.”⁵⁰

Therefore, different decision-making procedures within this policy area make up a rather complicated system, and prevent well-functioning coordination and cooperation measures. However, even though formal coordination measures are lacking to some degree, in practice different coordination measures often exist within a specific operation. The EU’s Police Mission in BiH (EUPM) is an example of the EU’s aim to create an area of freedom, security and justice, in practise comprises the fight against organised crime (Pillar 3) and peacekeeping in the Balkans (Pillar 2).⁵¹

Nevertheless, Pernille Rieker has underlined that in order to become an efficient comprehensive security actor, the EU still needs important improvements. In this respect, she argues, a bridge between the different policy areas is still lacking. As Rieker further highlights, the issue of coherence is not purely confined to the integration of security policy tools, but also touches on the relations between the community pillar and the intergovernmental pillar within the EU, between the EU and its member states, and the EU and other organisations.⁵² At the same time, the EU’s joint efforts to fight terrorism, can be regarded as the first ‘cross-pillar’ test of the Union’s role as a security actor, involving not only the second and third pillar, but even the first as the fight is

⁵⁰ See http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/intro/fsj_intro_en.htm

⁵¹ See Annika S. Hansen, Laila Bokhari, Anders Kjølberg, Bjørn Olav Knutsen, Øyvind Østerud & Ola Aabakken (2006): *Bekjempelse av internasjonal terrorisme – fra militærmakt til utviklingshjelp*, FFI/Rapport-2006/01763. Kjeller: Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI), p. 23.

⁵² Rieker (2006), p. 47, see also Monica den Boer & Jörg Monar (2002): “11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor”, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(1 Supplement The European Union, 2001/2002 Annual Review of the EU): 11-28.

also against the financing of terrorism.⁵³ The adoption of the ESS in 2003 indicates a clear desire to have this further reflected in the functioning of the EU:

“The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.”⁵⁴

When it comes to tackling crises, many policy areas may be involved that fall under the separate pillars.⁵⁵ The pillar structure, which gives rise to coordination challenges as well as to turf battles between the European institutions, also fuels the arguments made by many that the EU is a rather incoherent and ineffective foreign policy actor. Scholars working within a realist and intergovernmentalist approach tend to argue that the substantial difference between CFSP and European Political Cooperation (EPC)⁵⁶ is very small.⁵⁷ Furthermore, they often criticise the ESS 2003 for not offering even the roughest guideline as to how economic and military tools might be applied in order to exert influence.⁵⁸ Therefore, they argue that a consensus-expectation gap exists. In such a gap, there is a discrepancy between what the EU promises to deliver, and what the EU is actually able to agree on.

Due to the institutional build-up during recent years around the CFSP/ESDP frameworks, this capability-expectations gap has narrowed considerably. Although several of the new bodies are underfunded and understaffed, the EU currently possesses institutional structures through which policies can be implemented.⁵⁹ According to a realist and intergovernmentalist approach, institutions are necessary but not sufficient preconditions for an effective and coherent foreign policy by the EU. They argue that the EU member states are the main actors in the integration process, which makes it difficult for the EU to develop into a self-sustaining political actor with its own interests. The EU consequently still lacks a foreign policy self and the institutions that oversee the CFSP/ESDP developments are not strong enough to overcome dissent. Therefore, the realists and intergovernmentalists claim that the EU still is an “economic giant and a political dwarf”.

⁵³ den Boer & Monar (2002), p. 11.

⁵⁴ European Council (2003), p. 11.

⁵⁵ Nowak (2006), p. 11.

⁵⁶ European Political Cooperation (EPC), initiated in 1970, was the first attempt made by the European Community (EC) to coordinate foreign policy issues among the then six member states. It did not, however, encompass security and defence issues, only the “economic aspects” of it. The cooperation framework of EPC did take place outside the treaties establishing the EC until the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 codified it and made it a “normal” part of the EC. As Joseph Weiler and Wolfgang Wessels wrote in 1988, the EPC has been most successful in its coordination reflex function, a mixed success in its ability to build up a *communaauté de vues* and a relative failure in attaining a *communauté d'action* (Weiler & Wessels 1988: 231).

⁵⁷ Toje (2008), p. 125.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

In an intergovernmentalist perspective, all the arguments and debates during recent years within the EU on the importance of civil-military cooperation and coordination (CIMIC and CMCO) as well as on comprehensive planning conceal the real world of power politics and states as the primary actors in international affairs. Accordingly, all the talk of the necessity of better coordination efforts within and between the pillars will not necessarily strengthen the EU as a foreign policy actor. The EU will still be dependent upon the modern world of power politics where the European integration process in no way will alter the anarchic nature of international politics. In contrast, the view of the EU as a system transforming entity, held by leading social constructivist scholars, does not correspond to the realist and intergovernmentalist claim that the existing international system will not change.

And still, social constructivists also acknowledge the problems of coordination. In this respect Christoph O. Meyer underlines the rather modest aspirations the EU has demonstrated in its ESDP operations. Meyer further argues that the military missions in Macedonia (CONCORDIA), Congo (ARTEMIS), and BiH (ALTHEA) were primarily justified in terms of bringing an end to, or preventing inter-ethnic violence within weak states which do not pose a serious security threat to the EU member states. None of these missions, perhaps with the exception of the operation in Bunia (Congo) in 2003,⁶⁰ represented a high-risk environment for the troops deployed. According to Meyer, even the then 6,200 troops deployed in ALTHEA in BiH, operated in a rather benign environment, so benign in fact, that the US initially wanted the presence of the EU to be much smaller and primarily civilian in nature.⁶¹

Here, Meyer concurs with the realist-minded scholar Asle Toje who underlines that when examining the list of EU missions, it becomes clear that the EU favours small-scale, low-intensity, pre- and post-crisis management in response to issues low on the international agenda.⁶² Therefore, the EU prefers issues that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagements and huge sums of money.⁶³ Hence, the consensus-expectations gap which is making the EU a rather weak foreign policy actor is "... apparent in virtually all great foreign policy questions of the day, from the humanitarian crisis in Sudan's Darfur region to the building of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, to curbing Iranian nuclear aspirations, Turkish accession and the handling of Russia".⁶⁴

However, it is here the apparent agreement between Meyer and Toje ends. While underlining the emerging European strategic culture, Meyer emphasises the weakening attachment to the US/NATO and the growing support for the EU. Furthermore, the institutional set-up of institutions like PSC, EUMC, EUMS, and DG E under the CFSP proper, promotes more common strategic thinking and an *esprit de corps* is reinforced by

⁶⁰ Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay & Catriona Mace (2004): "Operation *Artemis*: The Shape of Things to Come?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11 (3): 508-525.

⁶¹ Meyer (2006), p. 173.

⁶² Toje (2008), p. 127.

⁶³ Steven Everts as quoted in Toje (2008), p. 127.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

the provision of common sources of information and procedures to exchange views.⁶⁵ We might in this respect even talk about the possibility for an emerging “strategic culture” within the EU on this matter.⁶⁶

From a more institutionalist perspective, Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Gerrard Quille, find that the rivalry found between the European Commission and the Council is mainly structural and culturally conditioned. According to them, both carry out foreign policy, but on different contractual bases, according to different procedures and methods. In political-cultural terms, they are two different ‘tribes’, with the result that the EU risks pursuing a bifurcated instead of a comprehensive approach to security.⁶⁷ However, they emphasise that complex crisis-management makes a high degree of inter-institutional co-ordination necessary. Nevertheless, the question is where the limits of willingness and ability to coordinate lie and how these can be overcome. The Commission’s influence on ESDP is rather small.⁶⁸ Its activities are mainly geared towards medium- and long-term structural crisis prevention. As further emphasised by Ehrhart and Quille, day-to-day implementation often falls to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which – once funds are granted – act largely autonomously. That is also true for ECHO, the agency responsible for humanitarian aid, which sees itself as an apolitical actor and not as an instrument of crisis management. Furthermore, the Commission often sees itself in direct competition with the civilian actors in the second pillar, especially where civilian protection is concerned. In fact, there was no cooperation between the Commission and the EUMC/EUMS until 2004 when the EU initiated EUFOR Althea in BiH.⁶⁹

At the same time, we can also identify enhanced attempts of coordination as underlined e.g. by Kenneth Glarbo in his article on “Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy”.⁷⁰ Here he describes what he labels “co-ordination reflexes” in which the basic political convictions of agents are shifted in a convergent direction. Ben Tonra cites an anonymous EU official who notes that “if a country has a very real problem very few people will fail to try to come to terms with this ... I think that is a very strong principle”.⁷¹ Also within a CFSP context, a social integration process is taking place “as the natural historical product of the day-to-day practices of political cooperation”. He further underlines that “diplomats and national diplomacies have internalized, in particular, the formal requirements of a CFSP. On the level of foreign policy substance, a fully-fledged European identification is not yet discernible. But an institutionalized

⁶⁵ Meyer (2006), p. 38.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Policy Department External Policies (2007); p. 10.

⁶⁸ Ibid. But also in accordance with the author’s interview with an official in the European Commission’s External Relations Directorate-General, 14 November 2007.

⁶⁹ Interview in DG RELEX, 14 November 2007.

⁷⁰ Kenneth Glarbo (2001): “Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy”; in Thomas Christiansen, Knut Erik Jørgensen & Antje Wiener (ed.): *The Social Construction of Europe*. SAGE Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli.

⁷¹ Ibid. (2004), p. 150.

imperative of ‘concertation’ is vividly evident from the interaction within political co-operation”.⁷²

Even though the EU is far from being a nation-state, member states have indeed made serious efforts during the last ten years to streamline and make the foreign policies of the EU more effective. Even though the institutional aspect of ESDP was toned down in the early debate on European security and defence, it soon became clear that institutions indeed matter.⁷³ In fact, one of the deepest insights derived from the social constructivist approach is that institutions act as socialising actors and that discourse can change state preferences through what neo-functionalists label “learning processes”.⁷⁴

Jolyon Howorth, a leading expert on ESDP, underlines that policy framers to an increasing extent will resist interagency-battles and stresses the importance of coherence, coordination and increasing synergies among EU actors.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, he points out that: “However strongly ministers word their exhortations on synergies and coherence, the existing institutional mechanisms of the Commission and the Council constitutes so many fundamental obstacles to the implementation of those precepts”.⁷⁶

Moreover, despite signs of increased proactivism in EU foreign policy, the EU still lacks anything resembling a strategic approach to intervention. Hence, there is a need to take proactivism to its next stage and try to identify the types of situations and circumstances where the EU might act prevently in a strategic fashion. It is here one of the challenges to EU foreign and security policies are found. And it is within this setting, that we must assess the recent debate on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), including the need for comprehensive planning.

2.4 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)

A wide range of concepts and new approaches have been developed to deal with the complex challenges of current crises. “Civil-military cooperation”, “security and development”,

⁷² Ibid. (2004), p. 155.

⁷³ According to Gilles Andréani institutions matter for the EU in a unique way since the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norm setting and institution building. Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability and inspire EU countries with a set of purpose and belonging: “Since the 1980s, each new step in European integration, each new common policy, has brought along its own set of institutional requirements.... Defence will inevitably do the same, all the more so because EU is currently devoid of any defence culture: only in a specialised institutional setting will such a culture hopefully be imported into it, and solidify”. The development of institutional wiring-diagrams, common procedures, and plans for the conduct of civilian and military missions, will therefore have great impact on the EU’s actor capability in security and defence affairs. A description of the concepts and plans for how the EU approaches security challenges and risks will therefore explain what kind of actor the EU is in this policy-area. See Andréani (2000).

⁷⁴ Sæter (1998). See also footnote 28 on how social constructivism subsumes neo-functionalism especially regarding political community formation.

⁷⁵ Jolyon Howorth (2007): *Security and Defence in the European Union*; Palgrave & Macmillan: London.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 132.

“comprehensive approach”, “integrated missions”, “whole-of-government approach”, and “effect-based approach to operations” (EBAO), are all current concepts being applied in the debate on EU peace operations. As underlined by Cedric de Coning, this has first of all to do with the fact that international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peace building, which has to do with managing transitions. With the development from peacekeeping to peace building, civilian dimensions were added to traditional military peacekeeping mandates. De Coning explains that: “These new dimensions were aimed at assisting the host country to sustain the momentum of the peace process by: supporting transitional arrangements; establishing new or reforming existing national institutions such as the defence force, police service, and the judiciary; assisting with the organising of elections; supporting constitution drafting processes; and facilitating restorative justice initiatives”.⁷⁷

This description reflects the gradual development from the early 1990’s, as for example envisaged in the UN report “An Agenda for Peace” from 1992, which underlined the increased complexities in peace operations.⁷⁸ This is also reflected in the views presented by the first Chairman of the EUMC, the Finnish general Gustav Häggglund when he underlined the following at a conference in Helsinki in 2002:

“... Whenever military forces are tasked to take part in the resolution of a specific crisis, their involvement will extend in most cases beyond the traditional separation of warring parties, for which they are trained for. Indeed, the military operations has become more and more multi-functional and is carried out alongside a wide range of civilian actions.... All this has highlighted the need for a systematic approach for the co-operation and co-ordination between the military and civilian actors involved in the resolution of a specific emergency situation and the EU’s first crisis management exercise, ..., has underlined the need to take the issue forward as a matter of urgency. The EU civil-military co-ordination must ensure an effective response to a crisis by employing all necessary instruments from the full range of civilian and military instruments that are available within the EU in a comprehensive, coherent and co-ordinated manner”.⁷⁹

The EU has adopted several documents on civil-military cooperation and coordination. This section takes a closer look at the CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (2002), the GAERC’s Action Plan (2002), and its follow up documents and the concept on Civil-Military Coordination of 2006.

One of the first documents was the “CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations” which the EU issued in 2002.⁸⁰ The EU definition of the term CIMIC is “Co-ordination and co-

⁷⁷ De Coning (2007), p. 20.

⁷⁸ See <http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html>

⁷⁹ Intervention of General Gustav Häggglund, Chairman European Union Military Committee, at the Seminar on Crisis Management and Information Technology, Helsinki, 30 September 2002: “EU’s challenge to guarantee civil-military co-ordination in its future field operations”.

⁸⁰ *CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations*, Council Doc. 7106/02, 18 March 2002.

operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies”. Jari Mustonen points out that this EU concept borrows heavily from the NATO-concept, but is more extensive and highlights the selection of civilian and military instruments at its disposal in crisis management operations.⁸¹ The similarities are revealed in NATO’s CIMIC concept which describes CIMIC as “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies”.⁸² The EU CIMIC approach reflects the EU’s ambition to be a more comprehensive security actor. As part of enhancing the EU’s role in both civilian and military crisis management operations, the EU therefore elaborated on the CMCO concept as an internal measure for closer cooperation and coordination between different EU actors.



Figure 2.4 Most ESDP operations to date have been civilian crisis management operations. © O. A. Brekke 2004 HR

As an integral part of this effort, the “Action plan for further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis management” was issued by GAERC in November 2002.⁸³ This document constitutes a check-list of practical measures to be pursued in order to further strengthen civil-military coordination in EU crisis management. It proposes a refinement of the Crisis

⁸¹ Jari Mustonen (2008): *Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels. Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies. Volume 1: Number 1/2008. See page 5.

⁸² The new version of NATO’s CIMIC concept is described in MC 411/1 (p. 1-2) and the Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-9. Quoted in Ehrhart & Quille (2007), p. 13.

⁸³ *Action plan for further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis management*; Council Doc. 13480/02, 29 October 2002.

Management Concept (CMC) template, the development of a clearer and mutual understanding of the role (what), the composition (who) and the working methods (how) of the Crisis Response Co-ordinating Teams (CRCT), its working teams, other inter-pillar teams (including the Information Strategy Team (IST)) including clarification of their relationship with the Presidency. The document also includes recommendations on training issues like aspects focusing upon civil-civil and civil-military coordination in EU exercises and exercise related activities and on the establishment of a civil-military coordination training programme that encompasses civilian and military actors at both the political-strategic and operational-tactical level. This programme should according to the Action Plan include an element of joint military/police/civilian mission-specific pre-deployment training.

At the overarching institutional level, the Action Plan also underlines the necessity of improving the institutional coordination in Brussels. It recalls the Nice Treaty, and proposes that a “pragmatic solution ensuring this [the Commission’s integration into CFSP] should be sought”. It further considers whether the existing modalities for ensuring appropriate advice on humanitarian issues to the Council Secretariat are sufficient. The aim is to strengthen the contacts between the military and civilian actors of the Council Secretariat and the Commission. This should start with staff-staff contacts and visits aiming to achieve routine and systematic liaison and better working level contacts between respective military/police/other civilian planning teams. According to such a comprehensive approach within a CMCO-framework, the Council also underlines the need for strengthening the planning and coordination capabilities. In this case it considers the need for and identifies the specific skills and expertise required for possible short-term secondments to the Council Secretariat or the Commission during the conduct of a crisis management operation with a view to enhance their planning capabilities. The Action Plan also advocates a joint approach to the preparation of ESDP documents which is an integral part of the Council planning procedures. It encourages closer cooperation between the DG E and the EUMS in preparation and presentation of military and civil papers to the PSC. Additionally, it underlines the necessity of closer co-operation between the Council Secretariat and the Commission in areas of mutual interests. This includes areas like joint fact-finding mission reports and Crisis Management Concepts.

Two follow-up documents complemented this Action Plan. The first resulted in the development of a template for an EU Crisis Management Concept identifying both EU political objectives and a comprehensive course of action in a given crisis. The second document presented a pragmatic solution for participation of the Commission in the work of the EUMC thus granting its full association as envisaged at Nice.⁸⁴ This last document outlines how the Commission in a “pragmatic” manner should be associated with the work of the EUMC. This includes sharing of information and participation in meetings. It emphasises that “.... In order to enable the full association of the Commission, the distribution of all EUMC agendas and those documents related to agenda items in which it would participate could be envisaged”. However, the Commission would not participate in the EUMC for agenda items of a purely military nature.

⁸⁴ *Follow-up the Action Plan for further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU Crisis-Management: Participation of the Commission in EUMC Meetings*, Council Doc. 15407/02.

Representation by the Commission would initially be ad hoc and low profile in nature and the Commission would not participate with the representatives of the non-EU European NATO-members and other countries, which are candidates for accession to the EU, or with the NATO Military Committee.

All these planning documents aim at developing procedures and a culture for cooperation and coordination between the different EU actors. Additionally, different national approaches to civil-military relations of EU member states (as for example British, French, German, and Scandinavian) further complicate the creation of a common model for civil-military coordination at the EU-level.⁸⁵ However, even though different types of cultures exist, Sven Biscop emphasises that the following concepts binds these different cultures together: integration, prevention, global scope, multilateralism, and a “new definition” of power.⁸⁶ These different concepts can be related to the content of the ESS 2003 where e.g. the integration aspect relates to the conscious mobilization of an entire panoply of policy instruments in a coordinated whole where this approach lies at the heart of the EU’s approach to civilian crisis management. Even though the very concept “power” is not found in the ESS 2003, the EU could, according to Ian Manners, be labelled a “normative power” which in turn forms the basis for the EU’s forthcoming strategic culture.⁸⁷

In 2006, the Council adopted a framework document on Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) which outlines possible solutions for the management of EU crisis management operations. It states that “effective co-ordination of all instruments the EU has at its disposal is necessary for the EU to achieve maximum impact and exert maximum political leverage through its crisis management operations”.⁸⁸ CMCO in the context of CFSP and ESDP addresses “... the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU’s response to the crisis”.⁸⁹ In this respect, the EU regards CMCO as synonymous with the comprehensive approach⁹⁰ and comprehensive planning is an integral part of CMCO. It is suitable for all types of possible EU-led operations involving more than one EU instrument, including fully integrated operations (civil-civil or civil-military), parallel operations, civilian operations with military support and/or protection, and missions transitioning from military to civilian elements. In the draft EU Council Document on comprehensive planning, it is underlined that this planning approach is applicable to all phases of crisis management including conflict prevention and post-conflict activities, and the full range of tasks foreseen in Article 17 of the Nice Treaty.⁹¹ These tasks comprise the so-called Petersberg

⁸⁵ Khol (2006), p. 127.

⁸⁶ Sven Biscop (2005): *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

⁸⁷ Ian Manners (2002): “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”; *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(1): 45-60.

⁸⁸ *Civil-Military Co-ordination: Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU Crisis Management Operations*. Council Doc. 8926/06, 2 May 2006, para. 1.1, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO)*, Council Doc. 14457/03, 7 November 2003, para. 1.

⁹⁰ Interview in the European Commission (RELEX), 14 November 2007.

⁹¹ *Draft Concept for Comprehensive Planning*, Council Document 13983/05, Brussels, 3 November 2005.

missions which include human and rescue tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

Comprehensive planning relates to the EU's ability to address complex crisis in a coherent manner. Jolyon Howorth underlines that the stress on coherence, coordination and synergies is a welcome sign that inter-agency battles will be strongly resisted by policy-framers.⁹² The Council defines comprehensive planning as a systematic approach designed to address the need for effective intra-pillar and inter-pillar coordination of activity by all relevant EU actors in crisis management planning.⁹³ It furthermore contributes to the development and delivery of coordinated and coherent response to a crisis based on an all-inclusive analysis of the situation, in particular where more than one EU instrument is engaged. It includes identification and consideration of interdependencies, priorities, and sequence of activities, and aims to harness resources in an effective and efficient manner through a coherent framework that permits review progress to be made. According to this document, the Council and the Commission will work together to this end. Therefore, CMCO serves primarily as an EU internal function facilitating successful planning and implementation of the EU's response to a specific crisis. Its aim is to encourage and ensure coordination among relevant EU actors in all phases of the operation. However, as Catriona Gourlay has underlined on several occasions, the different ESDP missions embarked on to date have all revealed serious problems of inter-agency rivalry. In particular, she argues that, the lack of any significant agreement on a natural division of labour between the Commission's many responsibilities for civil crisis management (CCM) and those recently embraced by the Council remains an obvious failure which demands urgent attention.

As underlined by Radek Khol, it is important to make a clear distinction between CMCO on the one hand and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) on the other. CIMIC relates to cooperation between actors in the field at the operational and tactical level. CMCO on the other hand looks beyond the operational and tactical level issues dealt with by CIMIC and takes into account the unique features of the EU at the political-strategic level. CMCO should accordingly be regarded as an intra-pillar and inter-pillar tool within a single EU institutional framework.⁹⁴ Even though CIMIC is confined to the operational and tactical level, it is important to note that in current EU thinking CIMIC should also be regarded as conceptually integrated in the overall CMCO approach. CIMIC, within such a perspective, has to perform three different core-functions to be executed at all levels: Civil-military liaison (CML); support to the civil environment (SCE); and support to the military force (STF).⁹⁵

Neither CIMIC nor CMCO are confined to the immediate conflict and post-conflict situation only. A study elaborated for the European Parliament (EP), emphasises that there is also "... a mid- and long-term need to combine military and civilian skills, instruments and concepts,

⁹² Howorth (2007); p. 132.

⁹³ Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning; Council of the European Union, 13983/05, Brussels, 3 November 2005.

⁹⁴ Khol (2006), p. 123.

⁹⁵ Ehrhart & Quille (2007), p. 13. They are also referring to EU Military C2 Concept, p. 21, Council Doc. 11096/03.

especially in the realm of security sector reform (SSR)".⁹⁶ In such a setting, it becomes even more important to develop what is labelled in the CMCO as "a culture of co-ordination".⁹⁷ Such a culture is more important to develop than detailed structures and procedures. CMCO as a culture of co-ordination is an essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU's response to a crisis. The Council's aim is therefore to encourage and to ensure the coordination in the actions of relevant EU actors in all phases of an operation. This CMCO culture needs to be "built into" the EU's response to a crisis at the earliest possible stage and for the whole duration of the operation, rather than being "bolted on" at a later stage. The Council's CMCO-document further underlines that "...This culture of co-ordination is based on continued co-operation and shared political objectives, and relies to a very large extent on detailed preparations at working level involving relevant Council General Secretariat/Commission services. Working closely together is an essential element also during the "routine" phase of EU crisis management (i.e. prior to the identification of a crisis) as evidenced for example in the global overview/watchlist exercise".⁹⁸

The CMCO and the comprehensive planning concepts are one way of gauging how effective the EU has become in combining the different tools it has at its disposal. The extent to which the CMCO and the comprehensive planning concepts are followed in practice could also be called a measure of effectiveness, first of all related to the ability of the EU to both intra- and inter-pillar coordination in and between the Council, the Commission and to an ever higher extent the European Parliament (EP).

3 Bringing Together the Instruments in Practice

3.1 The EU Autonomous Planning Debate

Planning for EU crisis management operations is, as noted earlier, still a contentious issue in European integration politics. It relates to the overarching question of what kind of security actor the EU is, and to how independent the EU should become of the US-led NATO in European security issues. During the French presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008, the Presidency will put forward proposals on how the EU should enhance its role in this policy area.⁹⁹ The proposal includes the establishment of the first permanent operational headquarters in Brussels for the planning of crisis management operations abroad. It furthermore includes common EU funding of military operations, a European fleet of military transport aircraft, European satellites, a European defence college, and exchange programmes for officers among EU states. The French Presidency also wants to rewrite the ESS 2003 and promote a common European market in military equipment through the European Defence Agency (EDA).

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 1.

⁹⁷ Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO); Council Doc. 14457/03, 7 November 2003, p. 2.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 2-3.

⁹⁹ "French push for EU military integration", *The Guardian Weekly* 13 June 2008, p. 9.

Ever since the Tervuren initiative in 2003, the British government has resisted the autonomous headquarters idea, seeing it as a French ploy to undermine NATO and boost common European defence by establishing a European rival to NATO's ACO planning headquarters at Mons, Belgium. However, the US' resistance towards a European headquarter is waning because the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, at the NATO summit in Bucharest (Romania) in April 2008, stated that France would like to return to the integrated command structure of NATO.¹⁰⁰ France has been absent from that since 1966 when the then French President, Charles de Gaulle, decided to withdraw France from the command structure and force NATO's headquarter in Fontainebleau to move to Brussels.¹⁰¹ A French defence planner stated to *Guardian Weekly* that "The US is positive. But the UK is the key".¹⁰² According to the same article, the US is pressing the British to reach agreement in order to hasten France's reintegration into the Alliance.

Nevertheless, the US would also like to see European integration within the realm of "high politics" to take place within an Atlantic (NATO) framework.¹⁰³ Obviously, the US view is that even a stronger EU in the security and defence area will not challenge the US' position as the global security and defence actor. From this perspective "constructive duplication" of common NATO assets and capabilities will not weaken the transatlantic link.¹⁰⁴ A stronger EU actor capability with a combination of stronger common institutions and joint assets, will narrow the consensus-expectations gap, and make the EU a more autonomous security actor.

As Gilles Andréani pointed out several years ago, European integration is a joint exercise in norm setting and institution building.¹⁰⁵ He underlined that institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability and inspire EU countries with a set of purpose and belonging. The introduction of a defence policy and an EU focus on crisis management operations will inevitably do that. Only in a specialised institutional setting will a development of a common European security and defence policy be consolidated. Therefore, there is a causal link between stronger institutions and an enhanced ability for the EU to act more autonomously in security affairs.

When we in this setting assess the ability of the EU to bring together the different instruments that the EU has at its disposal (civil-civil and civil-military cooperation and coordination), it is important to have in mind what Stanley Hoffmann wrote over 40 years ago. In his article on "The European process at Atlantic cross-purposes" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, he wrote that a battle between the different actors on procedural matters often concealed a battle of

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. <http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-06-17-voa31.cfm> for an analysis of this "new" French approach towards NATO and the United States.

¹⁰¹ See e.g. http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/article.php3?id_article=181 for an overview of de Gaulle's NATO policies.

¹⁰² *Guardian Weekly*, 13 June 2008, p. 9.

¹⁰³ See e.g. Geir Lundestad (1998): *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁰⁴ Kori Schake (2003): "The United States, ESDP and Constructive Duplication", in Jolyon Howorth & John T. S. Keeler (eds.): *Defending Europe: NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 107-132.

¹⁰⁵ Andréani (2000).

substance.¹⁰⁶ In other words, disagreements between European powers on e.g. the set-up of the different European institutions, voting procedures and the integration of “high politics” into the European integration process, had a direct link to the fundamental debate on what kind of power the EU is and how independent the EU should become from the US-led NATO.

His prediction back in 1966 was that Europe through the EU would become more “gaullistic” in the years to come, especially after Charles de Gaulle left his position. Time has proven Hoffmann correct, through almost ten years of ESDP the British and the French still battle about how “independent” and “autonomous” the EU should become when it comes to both the development of an autonomous planning capacity and how crisis management operations should be conducted. This debate has had a direct effect upon the concrete organisation of the planning capacities in the EU and thereby had an impact on the development of the CMCO including the aim to enhance a “culture of coordination” between different EU actors.

3.2 The Concrete Steps

3.2.1 The Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty signed on 13 December 2007 intends to bring to an end several years of negotiations about institutional matters.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, the debate on the treaty is strongly connected to how the EU can become a more effective actor with enhanced democratic legitimacy on the one hand, and a more coherent actor with a coordinated set of tools to meet the challenges of the 21st century on the other. As such by this Treaty, if ratified, the EU would bring the different instruments of the Union closer together, making it a more effective and coordinated security actor. The treaty is the EU’s “Plan B” after the defunct Constitutional Treaty, which proved to be impossible to ratify.¹⁰⁸ The overarching aim of the Treaty is to make the EU more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. The last element includes simplified working methods and voting rules, “streamlined and modern institutions for an EU of 27 members and an improved ability to act in areas of major priority for today’s Union”.¹⁰⁹ The Treaty defines the function of President of the European Council elected for two and a half years; it introduces a direct link between the election of the Commission President and the results of the European elections; it provides for new arrangements for the future composition of the European Parliament and for a smaller Commission; and includes clearer rules on enhanced cooperation and financial

¹⁰⁶ Hoffmann (1966).

¹⁰⁷ The institutional reform process in the EU started with the European Council meeting in Laeken (Belgium) in December 2001. At the meeting, the European Convention was convened under the leadership by the former French president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The Convention paved the way for the Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) leading to the Constitutional Treaty which was signed by the member states in October 2004. However, the referenda in France and in the Netherlands made the treaty impossible to ratify. The present Lisbon Treaty is a watered down version of the previous Constitutional Treaty, but even this treaty is in jeopardy after the “No” majority in the referendum in Ireland. In addition, the Czech Republic might have some problems with their ratification process too.

¹⁰⁸ Even though the electorates in Spain and Luxembourg approved it in their referenda in February and June 2005 respectively, as did also most of the other member states, a treaty cannot enter into force before all the member states have ratified it.

¹⁰⁹ See http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm

provisions. From 2014 and onwards, the calculation of qualified majority will be based on the double majority of member states and people. A double majority will be achieved when a decision is taken by 55 % of the member states representing at least 65 % of the Union's population.

However, the ESDP will still be based upon unanimity among the member states as stipulated in Article 28A of the Treaty which states that "Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State".¹¹⁰ According to the Lisbon Treaty, member states are called upon to further develop specific provisions for implementing the ESDP, including future steps towards framing of a common Union defence policy. These steps could lead to a common defence, when the European Council acting unanimously, declares it is in accordance with the member states' respective constitutional requirements.

Most importantly, however, the Lisbon Treaty will strengthen the EU as an actor at the global level, including enhanced efforts to bring together the different means the EU has at its disposal. When it comes to the issue of coordination, the new High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will also become Vice-President of the Commission. The aim here is to increase the impact, the coherence and the visibility of the EU's external action. A new European External Action Service will furthermore provide back up and support to the High Representative. Additionally, a single legal personality for the Union will strengthen the Union's negotiating power, making it more effective on the world stage and a more visible partner for third countries and international organisations. With these measures, the institutional framework for the establishment of a "culture of coordination" within a CMCO framework will fall into place. It should also be underlined that this merger between the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President position in the Commission in reality implies coordination at the top level. However, the pillar structure will not disappear and many of the coordination challenges and turf-battles between different EU actors will continue.¹¹¹

In the sphere of ESDP there will still be special arrangements. The most important decision is the provisions for *permanent structured cooperation*. The Treaty envisages in Article 28A, 6 that those member states whose military capabilities "fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework". The Protocol on permanent structured cooperation underlines that the member states will harmonise the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specializing their

¹¹⁰ Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Conference Of The Representatives Of The Governments Of The Member States, Brussels, 3 December 2007).

¹¹¹ Interview in DG RELEX, November 2007.

defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics. They will also take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment to forces. This can include reviewing their national decision-making procedures. In this respect, member states should provide the EU with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets “outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”. This provision must furthermore be seen in the light of the common provisions on the civilian and military tasks of the Union as seen in Article 28A, 1.

The outcome of the Irish referendum on 12 June 2008 may have put the treaty into jeopardy, as it cannot enter into force until all the member states have ratified it. But Ulrich Petersohn and Sibylle Lang from *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (SWP), argue that neither the Constitutional Treaty nor the Lisbon Treaty was a prerequisite for the further development of the ESDP.¹¹² First, they argue that the institutional structures (the PSC, EUMC and the EUMS) are already in place and treaty-based in the existing Nice Treaty. Secondly, the tasks of the Union, which are the extended Petersberg missions, include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilisation, are also almost in place in the existing treaty structures.¹¹³ Therefore, the EU could continue to further develop the ESDP even without the Lisbon Treaty instruments. Another analyst, Daniel Korski, argues that lawyers should decide whether some of the provisions in the Lisbon treaty could be introduced without a ratification of the treaty.¹¹⁴ As an example, he suggests that the Commission President could appoint the High Representative for CFSP as Vice-President in the Commission.

Nevertheless, challenges remain, because the Lisbon Treaty diminishes the pillar structure, which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The pillar structure is, as described above, one of the most serious impediments when it comes to coordinate the different instruments of the EU. The pillar structure together with “weak” institutions within the realm of foreign and security policy are two of the main reasons why many analysts consider the EU to suffer from a “strategic deficit”.¹¹⁵ However, even this strategic deficit must be connected to the overarching “battle” between Britain and France on what kind of security actor the EU is and how autonomous it should be in its relations with NATO and the United States. This is evident in the development of

¹¹² Ulrich Petersohn & Sibylle Lang (2005): *The Future of ESDP in the Wake of the Negative Referenda*, *SWP Comments*, German Institute for international and Security Affairs. This study is referred to in Heinz Gärtner (2008): *European Security, the Use of Force, and the Treaty of Lisbon*. Austrian Institute for International Affairs. Unpublished paper.

¹¹³ Article 17(2) of the Treaty of Nice states the following: “Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. The extended Petersberg tasks here referred to is therefore “joint disarmaments operations and post-conflict stabilisation”.

¹¹⁴ See Daniel Korski (2008): “Ireland’s Creative Destruction”; http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_irelands_creative_destruction/

¹¹⁵ *Strengthening Global Security ...* (2004); p. 5-6.

the EUMS in recent years and especially so in the development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff.

3.2.2 The EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civil-Military Cell

The EUMS is the only integrated military structure in the EU and consists of six divisions: Policy and Plans, Intelligence, Operations and Exercise, Logistics and Resources, Communication and Information System, and the Civil-Military Cell.¹¹⁶ The EUMS forms an integral part of the Secretariat General of the Council. It is directly attached to the SG/HR and operates under the military direction of the EUMC which it assists and to which it reports.¹¹⁷ The tasks of the EUMS include early warning, situation awareness and strategic planning over the full range of EU-led crisis management operations, with or without recourse to common NATO assets and capabilities.

In the wake of the Tervuren summit in April 2003, the Civil-Military Cell was established within EUMS as a compromise between the United Kingdom, France and Germany.¹¹⁸ This compromise was reached in the European Council meeting in Brussels on 12 and 13 December 2003.¹¹⁹ The Cell consists of 25 personnel with the capacity to rapidly set up an Operations Centre (OpCen) for any particular operation. Its concept has been elaborated on the basis of the experiences gained from ESDP's operations, in particular in the Balkans, and is meant to be distinct from national and multinational capabilities.¹²⁰

Formally, the Cell was established in the fall of 2005 and has been fully operational since 2006. The tasks of the Cell are to enhance the EU's capacity for crisis management planning, to link work across the EU, to assist in planning, support and conduct of civilian operations, and to generate the capacity to plan and to run an autonomous EU military operation once a decision on such an operation has been taken. According to the former Director of the Cell, Brigadier General Heinrich Brauss, the creation of the Cell was clearly intended as a step in the EU's efforts to harness the wealth of civilian and military instruments at its disposal in responding to crises, and should lead to greater coherence of the civilian and military structures under the SG/HR. The Cell can rely on secure lines of communication and has access to intelligence and analyses by the EU's Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN).

At present, the Cell functions side by side with the five other divisions in EUMS. Still there is some confusion as to whether the Cell would only be used for operations that have civil and military components: "Its Terms of Reference (ToR) underline its role in the civil-military

¹¹⁶ See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=1041&lang=en&mode=g>

¹¹⁷ See

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ConsiliumJournalNo7DECEMBREpage10_11.pdf

¹¹⁸ Howorth (2007), p. 111-112.

¹¹⁹ See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/78364.pdf. See point 90 in this summit document.

¹²⁰ Gerrard Quille, Giovanni Gasparini, Roberto Menotti, Nicoletta Pirozzi (2006): *Developing EU Civil-Military Co-ordination: The Role of the New Civilian Military Cell*. Joint Report by ISIS and CeMiSS; Brussels, June 2006.

interface, and it was used in connection with planning for the Aceh and Sudan missions which are both civil-military operations”.¹²¹ Brigadier General Heinrich Brauss remarked in front of the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence in March 2007, that this cell was the first standing EU body that fully integrates military and civilian expertise, including staff members from the European Commission and that his job was to nurture a “culture of coordination” between the civil and military instruments at the disposal for the EU.¹²²

The Cell consists of two distinct branches: the Operations Centre Permanent Staff (eight persons), and a Strategic Planning Branch that comprises eight military and seven civilian experts, including two Commission officials on a permanent basis. Notably, the Operations Centre (OpCen) is not a standing HQ. Instead, it is a permanently available capacity to set up a HQ for a particular operation. According to Brigadier General Brauss, that means that the Cell has the necessary technical infrastructure, procedures as well as a permanent core staff capable of activating the OpCen at any time. Furthermore, Brauss emphasises that the Cell has also worked successfully, and those who initially might have feared a ‘clash of cultures’ were proven wrong – this shows that civil-military cooperation works, and proves that combining the professional experience from such diverse backgrounds in an integrated structure can actually deliver added value.¹²³

Hence, this Cell plays an important role in the development of the CMCO and comprehensive planning concepts. The staff that make up the Cell are fully aware of the need to further develop “the culture of coordination” which is also revealed in how the Cell is staffed and structured. As part of the so-called Hampton Court process, named after an informal European Council meeting in October 2005, four so-called Hampton Court Consolidated Papers were issued in December 2005.¹²⁴ One of the papers underlines that the establishment of the Civil-Military Cell has been a step in the correct direction, but that it does not go far enough.¹²⁵ It states instead that it should be seen as a pathfinder, leading the way to a more complete integration of civilian and military expertise within the Council’s structures. A more integrated framework must remain fully capable of military operations, including cooperation with national headquarters and international organisations. There are therefore still coordination and cooperation challenges, which need to be met.

¹²¹ Annika S. Hansen (2006): *Against All Odds – The Evolution of Planning for ESDP Operations. Civilian Crisis Management from EUPM onwards*. Center for International Peace Operations. Berlin: Germany. See page p. 27.

¹²² See Remarks to the European Parliament Sub-Committee on Security and Defence. By Brigadier General Heinrich Brauss, Director Civ/Mil Cell. Roland Zinzius, Deputy Director Civ-Mil Cell, 1 March 2007. The remarks are available on <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070227BriefingCCMBrausstoEP.pdf>

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Hampton Court Consolidated Papers, 14 December 2005: Brussels. See http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5494_en.htm

¹²⁵ The paper on “Ensuring our crisis management structures can meet the new demands on them including for responding to natural disasters”. For references to this paper, see *ibid*.

As an official in the Cell stated in February 2008, “we are not walking with the CMCO-papers in our hands. We have to be innovative on the practical level”.¹²⁶ The official identified two types of coordination challenges: First, political challenges in connection with the handling of a crisis before or during an EU crisis management operation. The second challenge stems from treaty-based challenges linked to civil-military coordination and especially the issue of financing crisis management operations. The first kind of challenge, political challenges, is far easier to handle than treaty-based challenges. During a crisis “when people are dying on us”,¹²⁷ it becomes easier to reach practical arrangements on the ground and in Brussels on how to tackle such a situation. In contrast, funding regulations are an impediment in that “Operating expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise”. As a result, funding from the Commission can only cover the civilian aspects of a crisis management operation.

The problem arises in borderline cases such as the EUSEC RD Congo operation. This operation, launched in June 2005, is a security sector reform (SSR) operation that provides assistance to the successful integration of former rebels in the Congolese army.¹²⁸ Additionally, EUSEC RD Congo develops special programmes to improve the funding of the new brigades with a focus upon restructuring and redeveloping the armed forces. It is a very small operation consisting of 35 military and civilian experts in particular in the financial field. However, since this is a borderline operation, a civilian operation also consisting of military expertise, there were several problems connected to how this operation should be financed through the EU budget line. The same was the case with the operation conducted by the EU in the Aceh province in Indonesia (Aceh Monitoring Mission; AMM) which lasted from September 2005 until December 2006. For example, in this operation, the staff members had to pay for their own equipment (PCs, office furniture etc), during the initiation phase of the operation, and were later reimbursed by the EU.¹²⁹

The Athena mechanism initiated in 2004 is a major step forward.¹³⁰ With Athena, the EU can more rapidly launch operations, by removing the need to adopt a Council Decision establishing a mechanism for every mission. Instead of bringing budgetary concerns to the European Council each time a new military mission is proposed, Athena oversees the “common cost” decision-making process on its own. The mechanism covers common costs like incremental costs for deployable or fixed headquarters for EU-led operations. Additionally, it also covers transport costs to and from theatres of operation. In short, Athena covers the common costs only, not the

¹²⁶ Interview by the author in the Civil-Military Cell on 6 February 2008.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ See Hans Hoebeke, Stéphanie Carette & Koen Vlassenroot (2007): *EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Centre d'analyse stratégique. Premier Ministre. République Française.

¹²⁹ Interview with an analyst affiliated with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in Paris on 7 February 2008.

¹³⁰ For an analysis of the common cost challenge, see e.g.

http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061000_cscp_art_homan.pdf

military personnel where the principle of “costs lie where they fall” still applies. The mechanism does not cover civilian aspects of crisis management operations. It makes, however, the decisions on the military aspects of crisis management far more flexible, and in that way contributes to an enhanced EU actor capability in the field and to better conditions for civil-military coordination.

In conclusion, there are still important challenges connected to how to bring the different instruments of the EU closer together. Therefore, the civil-military interface is still a problem and especially so the gap between the Council and the Commission activities. So far the complementarities between conflict prevention and humanitarian aid activities have not been fully developed where the necessary complementarities between the Commission’s long-term and the Council’s short-term perspectives have not been fully developed. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Civil-Military Cell was a major step to handle the different coordination and cooperation challenges. Should the French EU Presidency become successful in their attempt to establish a permanent HQ for EU autonomous crisis management operations, a further step would be taken in this direction.

3.2.3 The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

While the aim of the Civil-Military Cell is to assist in strategic planning for autonomous EU operations across the range of the military, civil-military and the civilian spectrum, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) establishes a civilian command structure aimed at planning and leading EU-led civilian operations. These operations include operations like the different police missions and security sector reform (SSR) operations within the framework of ESDP. The EULEX operation in Kosovo, the EUPOL operations in Afghanistan, BiH and in Congo, and EUSEC RD Congo, are examples of such operations. The Director of CPCC exercises command and control at the strategic level for the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management operations. The CPCC is co-located together with EUMS in the Cortenbergh building in Brussels but it is not organised as a division within EUMS. In fact, it responds directly to the SG/HR and is not a part of the General Secretariat’s Civilian Crisis Management Directorate (DG E IX).

As is the case in other operations under the aegis of ESDP, the PSC has strategic control and strategic direction of the operations. The CPCC shall also provide assistance and advice to the SG/HR, the Presidency and the relevant EU Council bodies and to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian operations.¹³¹ In that way, the CPCC is involved at all levels in the planning and conduct of operations from the development of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC), via the development of Strategic Options to the concrete operational planning of operations. CPCC also works in close cooperation with the Commission and shall support CIVCOM in the planning and implementation of civilian operations. The CPCC draws on expertise and staff from the DG E IX. After the take-over of mission planning and conduct by the CPCC, DG E IX remains tasked with political and strategic guidance functions.¹³² As pointed out

¹³¹ See http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1487&lang=EN&mode=g

¹³² See http://www.zif-berlin.org/Downloads/Analysen/Veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Presentation_ESDP_12.07.pps

by a German official, with military and civilian ESDP expertise, the “CPCC now provides an upper command level to the Head of Mission on the ground; this enables us to finally have eye-to-eye contact with our military ESDP counterparts and facilitates situations where two missions are deployed in the same theatre or when planning or conducting integrated civilian/military missions. This is a real improvement and has long been needed.”¹³³

Consequently, the establishment of CPCC, the military chain of command is now paralleled by a more solid civilian chain of command.¹³⁴ Giovanni Grevi explains that the two lines of command are now bridged at two levels. First, the Civil-Military Cell contributes to integrated civil-military planning. Second, an upgraded watch-keeping capability will monitor crisis areas in permanent touch with both civilian and military operations. This capacity will include the EUMS and the CPCC. The Council Secretariat foresees the creation of new crisis management and early warning structures, including a ‘capacity’ responsible for the drafting the civilian and military strategic options and the Concept of Operations, as well as for supervising the drafting of the Operation Plan. Consequently, crisis management documents will be drafted in close cooperation with, respectively, the Operation Commander for military operations, and the Civilian Operation Commander for civilian missions.¹³⁵

The CPCC was established by a Council decision on 18 June 2007 and consists of two units, a Mission Support Unit and a Conduct of Operations Unit.¹³⁶ The CPCC is organised in such a way that it resembles an ordinary Operational Headquarters (OHQ), but due to British resistance, it did not formally receive that status.¹³⁷ This unit does not have an ordinary planning unit, but a Planning Methodology Unit consisting of eight persons as of February 2008.¹³⁸ This unit supports the development of a crisis management concept (CMC) for an operation as well as the development of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). In total, the CPCC consists of 64 persons, where 13 persons are affiliated with Mission Support Unit and 39 with the Conduct of Operations Unit. The Conduct of Operations unit is further divided into three sections dealing with Europe/Balkans, Africa, and Asia/Middle East respectively. This organisation reflects the actual deployment of civilian operations conducted by the EU.

Since missions differ considerably in terms of scope, duration, location and size, there is also a need for flexibility when it comes to civil-military coordination. While the CMCO-documents underline the need for a “culture of coordination”, it is also important to emphasise that there is a risk of too much responsibility placed on the goodwill of the actors involved.¹³⁹ The establishment of the CPCC is therefore, on the one hand, definitely a step towards strengthening

¹³³ Quoted in Kees Klompenhouwer (2008): “Introducing CPCC”, *ESDP Newsletter*, #6, July 2006.

¹³⁴ Giovanni Grevi (2007): *Pioneering foreign policy. The EU Special Representatives*. Chaillot Paper, nr. 106. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies; see pp. 38-39.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹³⁶ Presidency Report on ESDP, Council of the European Union, 10910/07; Brussels 18 June 2007.

¹³⁷ Interview in the CPCC unit on 6 February 2008.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Sophie Vanhoonacker & Hylke Dijkstra (2007): “Beyond Note-Taking: CFSP Challenges for the Council Secretariat”, *FORNET CFSP Forum*, 5(6): 1-5.

civil-military coordination. On the other hand, it must be underlined that it is important to find the “correct” balance between institutionalisation and flexibility to face new challenges and the specific character of each ESDP mission. It is important, again, to emphasise the need for not only intra-pillar coordination, i.e. coordination within different branches of the Council Secretariat and between the civil and military personnel and structures, as well as inter-pillar coordination. How the CPCC unit coordinates its tasks with the Commission (e.g. DG RELEX) is an important element in the assessment of how the CPCC contributes to enhance civil-military coordination and thereby the EU’s comprehensive approach.

3.3 Example 1: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 2004)

The Western Balkans has been the cradle of ESDP. Giovanni Grevi points out that a strong motivation to develop a serious EU crisis management capacity resulted from years of impotence in the face of the civil wars in former Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁰ ESDP took its first steps in BiH with the launch of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in January 2003. The EUFOR Althea mission, the second ESDP mission in the country, was initiated on 2 December 2004 when it replaced NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which had been in-theatre since 1997.¹⁴¹ The EUFOR Althea mission must be seen in the context of the overarching EU presence in the country. The EU “family” in the field also includes the Commission Delegation and the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). As was the case with SFOR, the objective of EUFOR Althea is to continue to ensure compliance with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and to contribute to the safe and secure environment in BiH. Accordingly, EUFOR Althea continued to undertake the SFOR operation’s previous tasks, and established its military credibility early on.¹⁴² Hence, EUFOR Althea’s mission is to deny conditions for a resumption of violence, manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and thereby allow all EU and international community actors to carry out their responsibilities.¹⁴³

The function of the EU’s Special Representative (EUSR) is significant, not least because this post is double-hatted and combines the role of EUSR with that of the High Representative (HR) charged with overseeing the implementation of the GFAP. The EUSR’s mandate in the country is to promote overall EU political coordination in BiH and among several other tasks to “... (c) Promote overall EU coordination of, and give local political direction to, EU efforts in tackling organised crime, without prejudice to the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)’s leading role in the coordination of policing aspects of these efforts and to the ALTHEA (EUFOR) military chain of command”.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Grevi (2007); p. 81.

¹⁴¹ SFOR replaced the Implementation Force (IFOR), which was in theatre from December 1995 until 1 January 1997.

¹⁴² David Leakey (2006): “ESDP and Civil/Military Cooperation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005”, in Anne Deighton, with Victor Mauer (ed.): *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy*. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich.

¹⁴³ For more information about EUFOR Althea’s mission see

http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=28

¹⁴⁴ Council of the European Union Joint Action, 2007/87/CFSP, 7 February 2007.



Figure 3.1 Ceremony at Camp Butmir marking the end of NATO's SFOR operation and the establishment of the EU operation Althea on 2 December 2004. © NATO

In the research literature on EUFOR Althea,¹⁴⁵ it is underlined that the operation contributes significantly to the EU's political engagement; its assistance programmes (its ongoing police and monitoring missions) with a view to help BiH make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).¹⁴⁶ As such, EUFOR Althea is far more of a civil-military mix than a purely military operation and exemplifies the increasing demands for European soldiers to have a broad range of skills and training, in line with the comprehensive approach to operations.¹⁴⁷ As underlined by Lord Ashdown, the former HR and EUSR to BiH, Bosnia was now reaching the end of the road from Dayton and was now at the beginning of the road to Brussels,¹⁴⁸ which implies a future Bosnian membership of both EU and NATO.

EUFOR Althea continues to be the largest military operation conducted by the EU to date. It originally consisted of approximately 6,200 troops from 22 EU member states and eleven other countries, which was later on reduced to 2,500 in February 2007.¹⁴⁹ The structure of EUFOR Althea also resembled that of SFOR with three regional Multinational Task Forces covering the entire county, a Force Headquarter (FHQ) and an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) situated in the main camp in Sarajevo. Under the Multinational Task Forces, Manoeuvre Battalions and Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) "... formed the eyes and ears of EUFOR Althea on the ground."¹⁵⁰ EUFOR Althea is a Berlin-plus operation in the sense that it is based upon common NATO assets

¹⁴⁵ See e.g. Howorth (2007), pp. 235-238. See also Leakey (2006), Hansen (2006), Mustonen (2008).

¹⁴⁶ See http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=28

¹⁴⁷ Howorth (2007), p. 236.

¹⁴⁸ Leakey (2006), p. 60.

¹⁴⁹ The decision to deescalate the size of EUFOR Althea was taken by the EU on 28 February 2007. It is important to underline, however, that both the EUSR and COMEUFOR in their statements underlined that "the European Union will not put this country's hard-won security at risk". See Jim Dorschner (2007): "Endgame in Bosnia", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 44(16): 24-29.

¹⁵⁰ Mustonen (2008), p. 18.

and capabilities. Therefore, NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) in Naples is the operation's OHQ.

Even though this operation was a follow-up to NATO's SFOR operation, one EUFOR Althea task seemed to be rather different from NATO's mandated task. That task was to "support the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan" (MIP) in close cooperation with other International Community actors, especially with the EU family of instruments under the coordination of the EUSR. According to Lt. General David Leakey, the first commander of EUFOR Althea (COMEUFOR):

"Most surprising to me as military commander was that this task was not a 'key supporting task', but rather one of the 'key military tasks'. As is normal in military operations, my mission was broken down by the authorities in Brussels into 'key military tasks' and 'key supporting tasks'. Key military tasks are those to which the commander has to give priority." 'Key supporting tasks' was in this respect fight against organised crime which was another new and rather different task for the military in BiH".¹⁵¹

He goes on to state that "These two tasks 'supporting in the fight against organised crime' and 'supporting the MIP' were two sides of the same coin in BiH".¹⁵²

At first, however, EUFOR Althea's involvement in the fight against crime was not welcomed by the EUPM, and some EU member states which remained sceptical about the use of soldiers in policing tasks and the fight against organised crime. Lt. General Leakey underlines in this respect that the EU ministers who decides upon an ESDP-mission, have to be clear on what they expect the military to undertake.¹⁵³

The role of the EUSR is, as stated above, to coordinate the different EU actors. However, coherence of EU action in the field starts with coherence in the planning phase, where, taking into account the EU political aims and strategic objectives, a clear delineation and articulation of the different mandates and tasks of EU actors in-theatre remains to be developed.¹⁵⁴ But practice shows that coherent planning is especially difficult when different components are launched at different times. In the Bosnian case, the EUPM was launched in January 2003 while EUFOR Althea was launched almost two years later. The Council Document on CMCO, coordination in the initial planning phase should also be followed by coordination in all subsequent planning phases, including when developing the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN).¹⁵⁵ In this respect, the coordination between the EUFOR Althea mission and the EUPM proved to be difficult, first of all due to a lack of coherence concerning how to approach the mandates given, but also when it came to civil-military cooperation on the ground (CIMIC)

¹⁵¹ Leakey (2006), p. 61.

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 62.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁵⁴ Civil-Military Co-ordination: Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU Crisis Management Operations, 8926/06. Brussels, 2 May 2006, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

and coordination at the strategic level in Brussels (CMCO).¹⁵⁶ Hence, from the EUPM's point of view, EUFOR Althea exceeded its mandate and its action interfered with the EUPM mandate.¹⁵⁷ At present, however, the relationship between EUFOR Althea and EUPM is considered to be "excellent".¹⁵⁸ The preparation of Common Operational Guidelines, a living document that is renewed every six months, and the strategy to fight organised crime forms the basis for the coordination between EUFOR Althea and EUPM. Although the CMCO and the comprehensive planning concepts are applied both in Brussels and on the ground in BiH, there are still challenges.¹⁵⁹

Lt. General Leakey underlines that the relations between EUFOR Althea and the EC Delegation have been and still are good both at the personal and the institutional level. EUFOR Althea cooperated with the EC Delegation on a number of high value CARDS projects (e.g. infrastructure and engineering projects, funded by the EU and using EUFOR Althea engineers to implement them).¹⁶⁰ However, Leakey underlines that the EC Delegation was bound by their particular role and EU treaty position, and kept itself at arms length from a closer synergy and engagement with EUFOR Althea and even with other EU actors in BiH. One of the main reasons why the different EU actors at times acted relatively independently from each other is a reflection of their supervising "compartments" within the EU institutions in Brussels. Nevertheless, Lt. General Leakey concludes that during his time as COMEUFOR (during 2005) civil-military cooperation and coordination within the EU family was a success from which some helpful lessons for coordination in the future can be drawn.¹⁶¹ Since then, the coordination efforts have improved further. This is underlined by the EUSR himself who meets with the Head of the Commission Delegation once a week and participates in exchanges with the national Heads of Mission at least once a week.¹⁶² Giovanni Grevi underlines that EUFOR Althea became part of a

"closely coordinated EU presence in BiH [...], with a view to promoting coherence, the EUSR would chair a coordination group involving all EU actors on the ground, including not only ESDP missions but also the Commission and the rotating Presidency. Thus, the catalytic role of the EUSR was confirmed and enhanced when setting up EUFOR Althea. It was envisaged that he would be, together with the SG/HR, the primary point of contact with BiH authorities, and that the Force Commander should take the EUSR's political advice into account and coordinate closely with the EUSR. As has been the case for EUPM, the EUSR contributed over time to EUFOR Althea mission reviews".¹⁶³

¹⁵⁶ Interview in EUMS, 5 February 2008.

¹⁵⁷ For a deeper understanding of the relationship between EUFOR Althea and other EU actors on the ground in BiH, see Mustonen (2008).

¹⁵⁸ Interview in EUMS, 5 February 2008.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Leakey (2006); p. 66.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 68.

¹⁶² At present, the Slovak Ambassador Miroslav Lajčák.

¹⁶³ Grevi (2007), p. 87.

As stated at the beginning of this paragraph, the Western Balkans has heavily influenced the development and implementation of ESDP. At the same time the EU engagement in the Balkans has illustrated the EU as a comprehensive security actor with a capacity to mobilise a broad range of both civilian and military means and instruments. The debate on CMCO and comprehensive planning reflects this unique quality of the EU as a security actor. In this sense Jolyon Howorth refers to EUFOR Althea as an operation which started out as a military mission based upon the Dayton accords being transformed into a complex civil-military project in which the entire range of EU instruments was brought to bear in a holistic approach.¹⁶⁴

3.4 Example 2: EUFOR RD Congo (2006)

In 2006, the EUFOR RD Congo operation contributed to the transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by helping to maintain a stable environment during the crucial presidential election period. These were the first elections in the country in four decades. The EU had received a formal request from the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations of the UN's Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno on 27 December 2005. In the request, the UN asked the EU for assistance in securing the DRC elections on 30 July 2006. In this respect, the EUFOR RD Congo mission supported the UN-mission (MONUC)¹⁶⁵ in Congo, in case MONUC faced serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities. One month later, in January 2006 a fact-finding mission from the EU was in place to prepare the forthcoming brief (5 months only) EUFOR RD Congo mission.¹⁶⁶ The Council approved the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the EUFOR RD Congo mission on 23 March 2006 and, on 25 April, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006) authorising the mission. The mission was initiated on 6 June 2006 and lasted until 30 November the same year. Several analysts regard the EUFOR RD Congo mission as a further step in the evolving relationship between the EU and the UN.¹⁶⁷

Contrary to the EUFOR Althea mission, EUFOR RD Congo was an autonomous EU operation without recourse to common NATO assets and capabilities. It was the second military ESDP operation outside Europe. The first was Artemis, also an autonomous operation, in DRC in 2003. According to some analysts, Artemis was “the shape of things to come” and consequently a precedent for EU intervention in Africa, especially in view of US reluctance to engage in that continent.¹⁶⁸ EUFOR RD Congo was led by the OHQ in Potsdam under the leadership of the German Lt. General Karl-Heinz Viereck, with a Force Headquarter (FHQ) in Kinshasa. The operation consisted of more than 2,400 personnel with an advance force deployed at Kinshasa airport and an over-the-horizon force stationed in Gabon. The force consisted of personnel from 21 EU countries plus Turkey. The bulk of the force came from France and Germany.

¹⁶⁴ Howorth (2007), p. 237.

¹⁶⁵ Mission de l'ONU en RD Congo (MONUC) is by far the largest UN operation comprising more than 18 000 personnel (16 600 military personnel). The operation was initiated in 1999 as a result of the Lusaka armistice. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/90508.pdf

¹⁶⁶ Interview in EUMS, 5 February 2008.

¹⁶⁷ Hoebeke, Carette & Vlassenroot (2007), p. 11-12.

¹⁶⁸ Ulriksen, Ståle, Catriona Gourlay & Catriona Mace (2004): “Operation *Artemis*: The Shape of Things to Come?”; *International Peacekeeping*, 11(3): 508-525.

As is the case with BiH, the DRC is also a testing ground for the ESDP developments. This also includes promoting a coherent overall EU approach in the region and in the DRC itself, in accordance with the mandate to the EU Special Representative in the Great Lakes Region.¹⁶⁹ According to the mandate of the EUSR, the task is among several others to “...(c) ensure coherence between CFSP/ESDP actors and, to this effect, provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC”.¹⁷⁰ Within such an overarching and comprehensive approach to the security and development challenges in the region, the EUFOR RD Congo mission must be seen in connection with the other engagements by the EU in DRC. These engagements included EUPOL Kinshasa,¹⁷¹ EUSEC RD Congo, and Operation Artemis taking place in Bunia in the Ituri province and therefore within the framework of the EU’s support to the DRC peace process.



Figure 3.2 SG/HR Javier Solana and Lt. General Karl-Heinz Viereck. © Council of the European Union

The Commission is also represented on the ground with a Commission Delegation. This delegation has been stationed in Kinshasa since 1960 and was reopened again in 2002 after the civil war. The Delegation is responsible for following up all initiatives, projects and actions financed by the Commission. Based on its presence in the field and its regular contacts with the

¹⁶⁹ See Council Joint Action 2007/112/CFSP, 15 February 2007 as referred to in Grevi (2007), p. 109-111.

¹⁷⁰ The EUSR for the Great Lakes Region is Roeland van de Geer. He replaced Aldo Ajello in 2007. Mr. Ajello was appointed EUSR in 1996 and is the longest serving EUSR ever.

¹⁷¹ The EUPOL Kinshasa mission has later on received a new mandate and has been renamed EUPOL RD Congo. The mandate of this operation is nation-wide and it includes mentoring, monitoring and advising with a view to reforming and restructuring the Congolese national police and to improving the interaction between the police and the criminal justice system. For the new mandate of EUPOL RD Congo, see Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP, 12 June 2007. The EUPOL mission provides assistance and guidance to the Congolese Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in support of the transition process in DRC. The EUSEC-mission provides advice and assistance for the reform of the security sector (SSR). Its primary focus is on restructuring and redeveloping the Congolese armed forces.

Congolese and international actors, the Delegation performs a key role in development as well as the reform of the security sector (SSR).¹⁷²

In a report issued by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) on “Institutional Competences in the EU External Action”, the authors find that in the DRC case, inter-institutional consensus among different EU actors led to discrete cooperation between the different pillars (Pillar 1 and Pillar 2).¹⁷³ They underline that whereas a fundamental distinction was maintained between the Commission and military crisis management, there is a grey zone between the Commission development programme on the one hand, and Council-based civilian crisis management in specific cases on the other. On the military side, however, there was no mention in EUFOR RD Congo’s mandate of the need to coordinate between the Commission and the EUFOR RD Congo operation. In a CMCO and comprehensive planning perspective, it is important to underline that such a distinction between the civilian and military missions, must be avoided. The SG/HR Javier Solana, has on several occasions insisted that all ESDP missions involve both elements and that the distinctiveness of ESDP derives precisely from its ‘civ-mil’ synergies.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, the CPCC unit underlined that although the CMCO perspective was present in the planning and conduct of the missions, it was done so in a rather mediocre manner.¹⁷⁵

As also emphasised in the SIEPS Report, democratisation and stabilisation interfaces with rehabilitation efforts, making it difficult to distinguish categorically between the political work of CFSP and the economic work of DG Development.¹⁷⁶ The presence of a number of EU components, including the EUSR, several ESDP operations and Commission assistance programmes, also demonstrates the increasing importance of the developments in Africa for the EU. In this respect, a number of key policy documents exist: the European Security Strategy (ESS 2003); the Common Position on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa; the Action Plan for support to Peace and Security in Africa; and, lastly, the Strategy for Africa, adopted on 19 December 2005.¹⁷⁷

Giovanni Grevi is of the opinion that a clear lesson learned from the Balkans and the DRC is that the permanent presence of a coordinating authority on the ground is essential to improve cooperation between different EU actors and, in particular, between ESDP instruments and Commission-run programmes. Grevi cites the example of Congo and the cooperation that took place between the Commission and the EUSEC RD Congo to secure the demobilisation and

¹⁷² For further information about the European Commission’s presence in DRC, see <http://www.delcod.ec.europa.eu/>

¹⁷³ Aggestam, Lisbeth, Francesco Anesi, Geoffrey Edwards, Christopher Hill & David Rijks (2008): *Institutional Competencies in the EU External Action: Actors and Boundaries in CFSP and ESDP*. Report nr. 6-7, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS). See p. 144.

¹⁷⁴ Howorth (2007), p. 212.

¹⁷⁵ Interview in the CPCC-unit, 6 February 2008.

¹⁷⁶ Aggestam et. al. (2008), p. 141.

¹⁷⁷ See Hans-Georg Ehrhart (2007): “EUFOR RD Congo: a preliminary assessment”, *ISIS European Security Review*, March 2007. The article is available on: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_esr_46_esr32final.pdf

reintegration of combatants (DDR) in the East of the country.¹⁷⁸ However, there were also some disagreements between these two EU actors on who should be in the lead and on which actor would be best suited to implement reintegration programmes in dangerous areas. As Grevi points out: “In the absence of clear and consistent guidelines for all relevant EU actors, ‘coordination by objective’ can prove hard to achieve”.¹⁷⁹

The EU’s own assessment so far generally point in a positive direction. In the Council Document on Lessons from Operation EUFOR RD Congo it is stated that the mission “... has been a success, facilitating the first free and fair elections in DRC Congo in over 40 years. It has demonstrated the capacity of the EU to successfully conduct an autonomous military operation in a politically and militarily complex and challenging environment”.¹⁸⁰ The comprehensive character of the mission is also reflected in the document when it states that “... Although primarily a military operation, the execution of EUFOR’s mission has involved the full spectrum of EU crisis management activity working in conjunction with other EU instruments in support of a clear political objective. In order to build on this experience, the Council General Secretariat has coordinated a comprehensive lessons learned process”.¹⁸¹

In spite of these positive assessments by the Council, there were still some challenges, especially with respect to coordination of both intra-pillar and inter-pillar character. Especially, the coordination between the FHQ in Kinshasa and the OHQ in Potsdam were difficult, primarily due to the late build-up of the FHQ, which resulted in a rather poor coordination between the strategic and operational commands. Furthermore, the OHQ and FHQ were held by two different lead-nations, namely Germany and France causing some tension between these countries. In an article on EU Lessons Learned, Clémence Ducastel underlines that these two headquarters should have been built-up at the same time and conducted simultaneous “parallel planning” to ensure cohesion, while preserving their prerogatives.¹⁸² Being located in different places, Clémence Ducastel proposes a system of exchange of liaison teams, which ensures communications between the main troops contributing nations through a secure communication and information system. It is also important to underline that the force generation process has been characterised as difficult and certainly not an example of European rapid reaction.¹⁸³

Another challenge was the national caveats stipulated by the German Bundestag which had placed geographical restrictions on the German troops on the ground. France and Belgium wanted to extend the operation by several weeks in order to address the danger that new disturbances might break out during, or shortly after, the delayed second round of elections. The results of

¹⁷⁸ Grevi (2007), p. 116.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ See “Analysis of Lessons from Operation EUFOR RD Congo”, Council of the European Union, 7633/07, Brussels, 22 March 2007.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Clémence Ducastel (2007): “Roles and Lessons Learned from European Union’s Military Operations”, *Doctrine* # 13, October 2007. See

<http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine13/us/retex/art1.pdf>

¹⁸³ Ehrhart (2007), p. 10.

these elections were not announced until 29 October, only a week before EUFOR RD Congo was scheduled to withdraw. However, Germany's Defence Minister Franz-Josef Jung, who had promised that German troops would be home for Christmas, opposed this.¹⁸⁴ Another critical aspect was that the EUFOR RD Congo troops were overwhelmingly based in Kinshasa which had essentially been quiet for some time. None were deployed to the eastern part of the country where troubles were likely to occur in towns such as Goma, Bukavu or Kisangani. This is why Jolyon Howorth is of the opinion that this operation is unlikely to go down in the annals as an ESDP success story.¹⁸⁵

However, the operation did fulfil its mandate and it supported MONUC during the crucial election period. Furthermore, the EUFOR RD Congo mission passed the test three weeks after the first round of the presidential election when riots broke out in the capital on 20-22 August. The EU managed to coordinate its different tasks and missions during the riots when the EUSR directly participated in the efforts to curb the tensions.¹⁸⁶ Information exchange and coordination between the EUFOR RD Congo mission and the two other ESDP missions (EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo) also contributed considerably to the handling of the riots. What these incidents illustrated is the importance of coordination when decisions have to be made rapidly. As the SG/HR Javier Solana stated before the UN Security Council on 9 January 2007, the force did in fact function as a deterrent and thereby limited the number of incidents. He further underlined that by keeping an over-the-horizon force in Gabon, the force avoided an unnecessarily heavy presence in Kinshasa.¹⁸⁷

Lastly, when analysing the EUFOR RD Congo mission in DRC in 2006, it is essential to understand this operation within the comprehensive approach contributing to the enhancement of the security situation in the country. However, when analysing the EU's comprehensive approach, it is also important to emphasise that there is a distinction between the Commission's long-term involvement and the Council's more operationally driven approach with an immediate interest in stabilisation and thus rapid reaction. As underlined by analysts affiliated with Centre d'analyse stratégique at the French Prime Minister's office, the concrete reality encountered in the DRC brought both strategies together, allowing for the development of more effective actions.¹⁸⁸

4 Conclusions

The purpose of this report has been to describe and analyse the EU's ability to address complex crises in a coherent manner and to analyse the practical framework for effective coordination between different EU actors for EU crisis management. One of the most important concepts in this respect is Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) and comprehensive planning. Central to

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Howorth (2007), p. 239.

¹⁸⁶ Grevi (2007), p. 115.

¹⁸⁷ United Nations Security Council. Presentation by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR, New York, Tuesday, 9 January 2007.

¹⁸⁸ Hoebeke, Carette & Vlassenroot (2007), p. 14.

CMCO and the comprehensive planning concept is enhanced cohesion between the tasks of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Hence, this report has described a development where practice (ESDP operations) and conceptual developments (in the form of formal Council documents and plans) inform and influence each other. It is therefore possible to argue that a “culture of coordination” as envisaged in the CMCO and comprehensive planning concepts is developing. However, the further development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the new Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) are keys to the development of the EU’s CMCO and comprehensive planning.

Therefore, this report has underlined how CMCO and the comprehensive planning concepts are one way of gauging how effective the EU has become in combining the different tools it has at its disposal. The extent to which the CMCO and the comprehensive planning concepts are followed in practice could also be called a measure of effectiveness, first of all related to the ability of the EU to both intra- and inter-pillar coordination in and between the Council, the Commission and to an ever higher extent the European Parliament (EP).

Nevertheless, there are still important challenges related to bringing the different instruments of the EU closer together. The civil-military interface is still a problem and especially so the gap between the Commission and the Council activities. So far the complementarities between international development activities and crisis management, that is, between the Commission’s long-term and the Council’s short-term perspectives have not been fully developed.

Since missions differ considerably in terms of scope, duration, location and size, there is also a need for flexibility when it comes to civil-military coordination. While the CMCO-documents have underlined the need for a “culture of coordination”, it is also important to emphasise, that there is a risk of too much responsibility placed on the goodwill of the actors involved. The establishment of the CPCC is therefore, on the one hand, definitely a step towards strengthening civil-military coordination. On the other hand, it must be underlined that it is important to find the “correct” balance between institutionalisation and flexibility to face new challenges and the specific character of each ESDP mission. It is important, again, to underline the need for not only intra-pillar coordination, i.e. coordination within different branches of the Council Secretariat and between the civil and military personnel and structures. It must also be taken into consideration how the CPCC unit as well as the EUMS coordinates its tasks with the Commission (e.g. DG RELEX) where this is an important element in the assessment of how the CPCC contributes to enhance civil-military coordination and thereby the EU’s comprehensive approach.

This report has illustrated how the Western Balkans, on the practical level, has influenced the development and implementation of ESDP. The EU engagement in the Balkans has shown the EU as a comprehensive security actor with a capacity to mobilise a broad range of both civilian and military means and instruments. In this sense the debate on CMCO and comprehensive planning reflects this unique quality of the EU as a security actor. EUFOR Althea started out as a military mission based upon the Dayton accords and has later on been transformed into a complex

civil-military project.¹⁸⁹ The EUFOR RD Congo mission in DRC in 2006 is also essential within a comprehensive approach when it contributed to the enhancement of the security situation in the country. However, and to a higher extent than in BiH, there has been a distinction between the Commission's long-term humanitarian and development involvement, and the Council's more operationally driven approach, with an immediate interest in stabilisation and thus rapid reaction.

Finally, future research on ESDP and the EU as a security actor, should take into consideration that the social constructivist approach has proven to be powerful in explaining the ESDP process. However, the development of the ESDP must also be described and analysed empirically. It is on the basis of these empirical developments, that it becomes possible to draw theoretical conclusions. Such an empirical-inductive approach is a useful analytical point of departure when analysts working in the theoretical field analyse the preconditions for and the components in the process of political community formation. With social constructivism as a theoretical approach, the empirical research shows how the EU is moving well beyond intergovernmentalism also in the sphere of security and defence, and into the sphere of governance and the development of security and defence governance structures at the EU-level.¹⁹⁰ The natural consequence of such a process is a more autonomous EU security and defence policy. Future research on this topic could analyse how a political community formation process such as the EU, could influence the character of the wider transatlantic security community.

Such a research question should be of great interest since it is related to the debate on the build-up of autonomous planning facilities, which traditionally has been one of the most contentious areas within the European integration debate during recent years. For the Atlantic-minded EU members, and especially so for Great Britain, the fear has been that an EU autonomous planning facility, would undermine NATO and consequently weaken the transatlantic link. Nevertheless, recent developments has shown that the traditional British scepticism towards autonomous EU planning and command facilities is diminishing, perhaps helped along by the French rapprochement towards NATO and the integrated military structure of the Alliance. As the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband put it recently, Europe must not wait "impotently" until America and NATO are ready to intervene in trouble spots.¹⁹¹ Such a statement runs contrary to previous British statements on this issue. The task for the analyst is then to try to reach a better understanding of how and why changes in the different actor preferences takes place and how this is linked to a gradual development towards a common European strategic culture.

¹⁸⁹ Howorth (2007), p. 237.

¹⁹⁰ Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen (2008): *Beyond Intergovernmentalism: The Governance Approach to the European Security and Defence Policy*. Paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics. Riga, 25-27 September 2008.

¹⁹¹ David Blair (2008): "David Miliband backs French plans for stronger EU defence role", *Telegraph News*, 2 July 2008. See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/2235931/David-Miliband-backs-French-plans-for-stronger-EU-defence-role.html>

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