

# **The unrealised case of NATO-CSTO cooperation**

## **Explanations and Prospects**

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard & Morten Jeppesen

Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt/Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

22 June 2007

FFI-rapport 2007/01671

1010-01

ISBN 978-82-464-1202-3

## **Keywords**

NATO

CSTO

Regionalt samarbeid

Realpolitik

Liberal institusjonalisme

## **Approved by**

Tor Bukkvoll

Project manager

Espen Berg-Knutsen

Director of Research

Jan Erik Torp

Director

## Sammendrag

Den kollektive sikkerhetsorganisasjonen Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO, bestående av Russland, Hviterussland, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgisistan, Tadsjikistan og Uzbekistan) har ved flere anledninger foreslått strukturert samarbeid med mellom CSTO og NATO. NATO har imidlertid ikke svart på denne invitasjonen, og det kan virke som om NATO ikke er interessert i å samarbeide med denne organisasjonens medlemsland utenfor de strukturer som allerede eksisterer, gjennom NATOs bilaterale samarbeidsprogrammer. NATO ønsker å holde seg til det Euro-Atlantiske Samarbeidsrådet og Partnerskap for Fred, heller enn å samarbeide med CSTO på et institusjonelt nivå.

Denne rapporten vil studere grunnene til at CSTO ønsker å inngå et slikt samarbeid med NATO. Den vil også undersøke hvilke grunner som kan finnes for at NATO ikke ønsker dette. Den vil først beskrive hvilke motiverende faktorer som ligger bak CSTOs initiativ til samarbeid. Hovedårsaken til dette initiativet er de felles trusler NATO og CSTO står overfor i Sentralasia og i det sørlige Asia (Afghanistan). Men også andre faktorer har motivert CSTO til å ta dette initiativet. Russlands ønske om å dominere regionen sikkerhetspolitisk er en viktig årsak. En annen faktor er dette landets ønske om å ha kontroll, gjennom CSTO, med NATOs aktiviteter i den samme regionen. En tredje årsak kan være et reelt ønske om å utvide samarbeidet med ulike organisasjoner for et bedre institusjonelt grunnlag for internasjonalt samarbeid.

Liberal internasjonal relasjonsteori kan forklare hvorfor stater søker sammen for å samarbeide om felles utfordringer. Slik teori kan også bidra til å kaste lys over hvilke prosesser som ligger bak CSTOs invitasjon. En nøye analyse av hvordan det empiriske grunnlaget passer teorien viser imidlertid at det ikke er liberale, men heller realistiske kalkuleringer som best forklarer CSTOs ønske om et institusjonelt samarbeid med NATO.

Slik realistisk teori skal også kunne forklare hvorfor aktører, og da også NATO, ikke ønsker å inngå samarbeid med andre aktører i det anarkiske internasjonale samfunnet. Dette anarkiet utgjør et tøft miljø der bare de sterkeste overlever og der aktører ikke ønsker å samarbeide fordi de vil bevare sin uavhengighet. Samarbeid materialiserer seg ikke fordi alle stater lever i konstant frykt for å bli utslettet dersom man overgir en del av sin suverenitet. Selv om NATO er en organisasjon basert på liberale verdier viser analysen av denne organisasjonens motiver at det i dette tilfellet er realpolitiske vurderinger som ligger til grunn for avgjørelsen om ikke å inngå et samarbeid med CSTO. Fremtidig samarbeid mellom de to organisasjonene virker ikke sannsynlig. Foreløpig er det et geopolitisk null-sum spill for makt og innflytelse i Sentral-Asia som dominerer forholdet de to organisasjonene imellom. Dette null-sum spillet setter en effektiv stopper for samarbeid for felles måloppnåelse. Aktivitetene som allerede gjennomføres i det felles operasjonsområdet vil være ofre for denne realpolitiske tenkingen som fremdeles karakteriserer forholdet mellom CSTO og NATO, mellom øst og vest.

## English summary

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (the CSTO, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) has on numerous occasions proposed structured cooperation between the CSTO and NATO. However, NATO has not responded to the CSTO's invitation in any significant way. It seems that NATO is not interested in engaging with the Central Asian states beyond the bilateral cooperation that already exists, through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. NATO has shown no willingness to address common threats and challenges in Central and South Asia together with the CSTO.

This report seeks to investigate the reasons for the CSTO's wish to cooperate with NATO, as well as why NATO is reluctant to engage in such cooperation. In doing so, it firstly describes the motivating factors for engaging in such cooperation on part of the CSTO. The primary factor is the common threats faced by NATO and the CSTO in the Central and South Asian region. But also other factors have induced the CSTO to invite NATO to cooperate. Russia's dominance of the organisation and this country's wish to control the relationship other CSTO members develop with NATO might be just as strong a motivation. Liberal theory of international relations explains why states seek together to gain mutual gains from cooperation. A close study of the CSTO's motivating factors shows, however, that realist rather than liberal consideration dominate the CSTO's agenda in the case of NATO cooperation.

NATO's response, then, should be amply explained by realist theory of international relations, which claims that power is the defining characteristic of international interaction and that the anarchy of the international system creates an environment where only the strongest survive. A constant threat of obliteration prevents cooperation among actors from emerging. Although NATO is an organisation based on liberal values, a close look at NATO's reasons not to cooperate with the CSTO finds that realist calculations are dominant also within NATO regarding this issue. Prospects for future cooperation on bloc level between the two organisations seem dim, at least in the mid term future. The current play for power and influence in the Eurasian continent, and the realpolitik this game provokes, prevents cooperation for mutual gains from emerging. Operations in the area where the two organisations' spheres of interests are overlapping will suffer as a consequence.

## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>The case for cooperation</b>	<b>8</b>
2.1	The CSTO – a brief history	8
2.2	Invitation to cooperate	12
2.3	The case for cooperation (as perceived by the CSTO)	14
2.4	The case for cooperation according to liberal theory of international relations	17
2.5	Realist rejections of cooperation	19
2.6	Does the empirical evidence meet the theory's expectations?	20
<b>3</b>	<b>Explaining the failure</b>	<b>23</b>
3.1	Explaining NATO's reluctance	23
3.2	Does the empirical evidence support realist theory?	27
<b>4</b>	<b>Conclusions and Prospects</b>	<b>30</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>33</b>



## 1 Introduction

The relationship between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has lived through considerable turbulence since 1991 and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Cold War overlay and security thinking in terms of zero-sum games of military power have influenced policies in both Western capitals and in Moscow. At the end of 1999, in the wake of the war in Kosovo, NATO's first round of enlargement and diplomatic confrontation between Russia and the West at the Istanbul Summit, the relationship appeared cooler than ever before since the end of the Cold War. Prospects for deeper cooperation and partnership were dim.

However, in the days following September 11, the events that unfolded suggested that Russia and NATO could move to a qualitatively new level of mutual confidence and cooperation and start working together against new threats and security challenges, such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, non-proliferation and regional instability. At that time, NATO's move into the the Caucasus and the Central and South Asian regions made the prospects for such mutual cooperation seem better, in the case of Afghanistan even acute.

In the spirit of these developments, Russian representatives have frequently raised the question of establishing formalized cooperation or a mechanism for consultations between the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and NATO. On separate occasions, Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, former Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov and CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha have put this proposal forward in talks with their NATO counterparts. In June 2005, the issue was even raised by President Vladimir Putin in his talks with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Moscow. The sustained focus on cooperation displayed the importance which has been attached to the issue in the CSTO and particularly in Russian circles.

This report explores what the motivations behind Russia's initiative might be, and why Russia's proposal to establish formal cooperation or a mechanism for mutual consultations between CSTO and NATO has failed to materialise. It seeks to explain these factors in terms of the theoretical debate on the prospects for cooperation in international relations. In doing this, it seeks to address what the prospects are for the two organizations working collectively to address common security challenges in the future.

According to Russian officials, the rationale for establishing such cooperation is obvious: Since the geographical domain and functional scope of CSTO and NATO overlap, and since the two organizations do not regard each other as enemies or antagonists, they should pool their resources and work together to address common challenges. Or, as in the words of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov: "By pooling their potentials, NATO and CSTO could significantly increase the positive results [of their activities]".[1]

Theoretical perspectives can help us structure the explanations for the unrealised cooperation between NATO and CSTO. According to liberal theory of international relations, states or actors

(such as regional security organizations) will seek to cooperate with others in order to achieve mutual gains. The primary challenge for actors in the international system is overcoming the challenges posed by the anarchic international order, and only by pooling their efforts in institutions and norms will actors survive, thrive and prosper.

However, on a closer look, only some of the expectations of liberal theory are confirmed by the case of NATO-CSTO cooperation. A closer scrutiny of what seems to be the CSTO's motivating factors, indicates that in large, realist calculations rather than liberal ideals lie at the heart of the CSTO initiative to cooperate with NATO to meet current security threats.

NATO's response to CSTO's invitation has at best been lukewarm, and for a long time NATO either ignored Russia's proposals altogether or avoided commenting on them in public. In fact, it was only after Putin raised the issue in talks with NATO's Secretary General in June 2005, that NATO commented on the proposal. In opposition to liberal theory of international relations, realist theory offers a pessimistic view on the prospects for cooperation among actors on the international arena. A close investigation of the reasons for not accepting CSTO's invitation suggests that Matos motives seem to confirm the expectations of realist theory. NATO seems, at least in theoretical terms, to be mostly interested in power projecting and competing with Russia for influence in the post-Soviet space. In an international order increasingly influenced by liberal institutional structures and commonly accepted rules and norms, relations between Russia and NATO continue to be influenced by a heavy dose of *realpolitik* and zero-sum games. This is the main reason cooperation between NATO and the CSTO has failed to materialise.

However, as the report will show, the reality of relations between NATO and the countries of the post-Soviet space is dominated by complex structures that not always sit neatly with the theoretical approaches of realism and liberalism. The differences between the two organisations in idealistic and real terms might be the single most important factor inhibiting cooperation between the two.

## **2 The case for cooperation**

### **2.1 The CSTO – a brief history**

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent dissolution of the Red Army, Russia sought to attach the Newly Independent States to various institutional arrangements under a Commonwealth of Independent States<sup>1</sup> (CIS) umbrella, including in the military and security spheres. Due to substantial differences in the national interests, priorities and threat perceptions of these states, Russia's integrationist efforts produced only meagre results. The aspiration of full independence from Moscow and the related fear of becoming subject to Russia's

---

<sup>1</sup> The Commonwealth of Independent States was created in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union, to "allow a civilized divorce" between the Soviet Republics. Apart from the Baltic states, all former Soviet republics became members of this organisation.



dominance led many of the newborn states to pursue closer relations with the West and western institutions like NATO and the EU. This produced a complex web of relations between states and organizations across the post-Soviet space, with some states leaning primarily towards Russia and the CIS structures; others tilting more towards the West; and with a few states pursuing seemingly incompatible goals and alternately bandwagoning with, and balancing against, the regional hegemon: Russia.[2]<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, the CIS never came close to developing into what the Kremlin sought: a zone of loyal neighbours and the establishment of a politically and militarily integrated space favourable to the advancement of Russian interests.[3] Besides Russia, only five states – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have remained positive to the CIS arrangement in general and to cooperation in the military and security spheres in particular. Today, these states constitute a core of Russian allies in the post-Soviet space. They are also the ones most deeply committed to arrangements under the CIS structure.

The Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed by Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Tashkent in May 1992 and joined by Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 1993 and 1994. It has served as Russia's most important instrument in trying to preserve a level of cooperation among the post-Soviet states on security and military matters. The Treaty's Article 2 prescribes the signatories to "consult with each other on all important matters of international security that affect their interests and coordinate positions on these matters". It also states that if a member state becomes subject to a threat against its security, territorial integrity or sovereignty, mutual consultations will immediately be invoked with the aim of "...coordinating positions and take measures to remove the threat". Building further on this language, Article 4 is in essence a reflection of NATO's article 5: It states that "aggression against any of the Member States will be regarded as aggression against all", and that an "act of aggression" against any Member State will lead the other Member States "...to provide the necessary assistance, including military", in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.[4]

With time, three of the Treaty's original signatories – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan – took steps away from CIS structure's military and security component and also withdrew from the Tashkent Treaty. Since 1999, the six constituent members to the Treaty have been Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined the organisation again in 2006.

The decision to transform the CST into an organization – the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – was taken at the 10 year anniversary summit for the Tashkent Treaty in Moscow in May 2002. The organization was established to try and create a more efficient means

---

<sup>2</sup> Already at the outset, the three Baltic states declined the CIS arrangement altogether and voiced their ambition to seek integration with the West (NATO, EU). Others, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, have sought a balance between their Russian and Western policy orientations and, perhaps with the exception of Uzbekistan and partly also Azerbaijan, have gradually tilted more towards the Western camp. One state – Turkmenistan – has pursued a neutral and partly isolationist policy and declined integration or strong alignments with other states and organizations.

with which to address new threats and challenges. This was to be done through the establishment of a joint military command located in Moscow, a rapid reaction force for Central Asia, a common air defence system and 'coordinated action' in foreign, security and defence policies.[2] In December 2003, CSTO was granted observer status to the UN General Assembly and thus recognized as an independent subject of international law and a regional security arrangement under the UN Charter's chapter VIII. Over time, a comprehensive legal base has been developed that regulates matters within both the organization and its relations with the external environment.

Today, the organization is still in a process of establishing itself as the primary defence and security organization in a region characterized by a complex of institutional arrangements. For instance, the CSTO exists in parallel with, and to some extent complements, military and defence cooperation under the Shanghai organization (SCO), which includes Russia, China and four Central Asian states. In addition, the CSTO works in the margins of, but not under the auspices of the CIS. Typically, high-level meetings between the CIS member states often take place in parallel sessions with CSTO, with representatives of CIS states not member to the CSTO leaving the premises as CSTO issues are to be raised. In an interview, CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha admitted that even he sometimes had problems distinguishing between the two. Following a summit in June 2005, however, the CIS ceased to be a forum for military cooperation, leaving the CSTO as the primary forum for military and security cooperation among the former Soviet republics.[5;6]

Adding to this complexity are the bilateral ties in the military and security sphere between Russia and the other CSTO member states. The security of these states has since the break-up of the Soviet Union been defined largely as a result of their relationship with Russia in military terms. For instance, Russia has had and still has major troop deployments in Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and has traditionally nurtured very close ties with the military establishments of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Formally, the seven member states have equal status and decisions can only be made by consensus. Yet, there is little doubt that Russia plays the first violin and carries much heavier weight in the handling of CSTO affairs than do the other members. Oddly enough, this has even been pointed out by the organization's Secretary General, M. Bordyuzha. In an interview with a Russian newspaper, he argued, "Russia's voice is more significant", since the organization depends primarily on Russia's military potential and military industrial complex. Accordingly, he describes Russia as "the CSTO's backbone".[7]

On the organizational level, several bodies have been established to enable the CSTO member states to coordinate policies and act collectively. The highest organ is the Collective Security Council (Sovyet Kollektivnoy Bezopasnosti), which consists of the countries' Heads of States. The CSC meets annually and has a rotating chairmanship. Also in terms of military integration has the organization developed significantly in the past few years. A Joint Military Staff in Moscow was declared operational as of January 1<sup>st</sup> 2004. The staff consists of some 55 officers representing the member states on a ratio of five to one, with Russia having a 50 per cent and

each of the other states a 10 per cent share. According to official sources, this ratio is also reflected in the distribution of financial expenses between the member states to CSTO activities.

Each CSTO member state has granted one battalion to the organisation, to be on permanent combat readiness. Three combined forces exist within the CSTO: the Russian-Belarusian force consisting of Russian and Belarusian troops, the Caucasian force consisting of Russian and Armenian forces, and the Central Asian combined force, with contributions from Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The latter will consist of some 10 000 troops and be the largest of the three.[8] A Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) has also been established composed of ten battalions with at total 4000 men, on varying readiness levels[9]. Plans are underway to add to this force 9 battalions, which will be dedicated to both peacekeeping tasks but also other types of crisis management.[10]

Still, the extent and depth of CSTO integration remains low or even marginal compared to that of NATO. This fact reflects reluctance on part of several of the organisation's members. Even Russia, traditionally the strongest proponent of closer integration of CSTO military structures, has in recent years failed to provide the resources necessary for such close cooperation and Boryuzha has made no secret of the financial limitations of the CSTO and the challenge of financing the organization's activities. In 2005, the Russian military budget allocated only 61 million RUR to the budgetary post "Collective security and peacekeeping operations".[11] This post then also includes sustaining three peacekeeping deployments in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdnestr. In terms of both military capabilities and institutional strength, the organization cannot be compared to NATO by any measures. The level of integration is low, and cooperation seems more sporadic than as part of a long-term strategy. Still, the challenges facing the CSTO countries with regard to integration are not paramount. It is, after all, only 16 years since the armed forces of these countries were working together, and at least among certain agencies cooperation has remained close ever since. Equipment, weapons and structures are already almost standardized in many of the CSTO member countries. The defining characteristic seems to be Russia's close relations with the armed forces and security agencies of most of the member countries, rather than close ties among the Central Asian countries. Still, the common historical experience facilitates expansive exercise activity, and a number of major tactical and staff exercises, as well as operations, have been carried out in the Central Asian region in the past few years. One good example is the annual Kanal operation, an anti-drug operation in which several of the CSTO and also other states have taken part and Western states have been observers.[12]

Several critics have aired the view that the CSTO is but a continuation of the willed CIS integrated armed force structure envisaged by Russian leaders, and an instrument for the advancement of Russian imperial reflexes. These criticisms were loudly voiced when Russia opened a forward airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan in 2003. This was the first time since the Soviet era that Russia opened a new military base in any of the former Soviet republics. Kant will serve as an air support base for the Rapid Deployment Force of the CSTO. However, the personnel and equipment stationed at Kant forms part of the Russian, rather than the integrated CSTO chain of command, and the 500 troops and 20 airplanes located at Kant form part of the Urals Military

District.[13] Such dual hatting is commonplace within the CSTO, and is one of the reasons it is difficult to measure the military capabilities of the organisation.

Thus, the CSTO can be regarded as something of a mix between a security management institution, which draws on the concept of ‘collective security’ and the idea that security is indivisible and incorporates “soft issues” as well as risks and threats. This differs from a traditional defence alliance, which is more exclusive with regard membership and oriented more towards (hard) military threats and external enemies. NATO is the best example of such a traditional alliance. It was created to counter “hard” security issues, and only in recent years has it moved into the “soft” security field. These organisational differences have consequences for the how the two organisations perceive the possibilities to cooperate in the future.

## **2.2 Invitation to cooperate**

The first invitation to cooperate was extended to NATO by the CST countries as early as 1993, from the so-called Joint command of the CIS Armed Forces. After this, the Staff for Military cooperation proposed to establish contact between the coordinating military bodies in the CIS and the NATO Joint Command. In 1993-94 such contact was established, but in 1995 Brussels declined the invitation to continue cooperation. After this, the Alliance’s approach to the CIS countries radically changed. From dealing with the joint CIS structure, NATO initiated bilateral partnership programs with all the former Soviet republics , with the formation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the North Atlantic Partnership Council, later to be renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).[14]

Officially, the newly formed CSTO again proposed cooperation to NATO in late 2004, following the adoption of a document on how to develop relations with NATO at a CSTO summit in Astana in June 2004.[15;16] There are also some indications that the issue was raised more informally with NATO representatives as early as in 2002 or 2003, in a process parallel to the transformation of the Tashkent treaty, making the CSTO into a full-fledged organization.[17] In an interview in February 2004, CSTO Secretary General Bordyuzha provides evidence to this, stating that contacts are being nurtured “on an unofficial level” awaiting formal go-aheads from the relevant CSTO organs.[18] The rhetoric regarding such cooperation was seen only from CSTO side, and no comments were made about the prospects for cooperation by NATO officials or the allied countries.

Following NATO’s lacking response, statements by Russian officials regarding the potential scope of this cooperation have become more measured and have focused on two main issues: firstly, the rather vague ‘fight against terrorism’ label and, secondly, efforts to rebuild Afghanistan.[19;20] Whereas the first of these is one of the top priorities in Russia’s bilateral dialogue with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the reference to Afghanistan is often made with the additional link to drug trafficking and – as seen from Russia – NATO’s failure to stop the production and outflow of lethal substances across Central Asian borders. In an article addressing NATO-Russian relations in autumn 2005, Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov advocated

the establishment of a link between NATO and CSTO in order to fight what he labelled “drug aggression orchestrated from Afghanistan”. [21]

The lack of response to the Russian initiative resulted in the Russian side bringing the issue to the top level. Putin highlighted the potential for cooperation between the two organizations in a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in June 2005: “If Russia and NATO developed and implemented a pilot project for personnel training for anti-drug agencies in Afghanistan and, let’s say, Central Asia, I think this would be a good contribution to resolving one of today’s most important and serious problems, the fight against drugs”, Putin said on this occasion, connecting the issue with potential cooperation between the CSTO and NATO. [22]

Indeed, the Russian side has been keen to elicit cooperation on anti-terror across the field of armed agencies. In a press conference in 2005, FSB chief Andrei Patrushev explained that when it comes to practical anti-terror work, “We (the FSB) should cooperate not only within the CIS framework, but also with as many special and security services as possible who deal with similar issues and problems.” [23]

The priority attached to the issue is demonstrated by the sustained pressure from the Russian side. In the aftermath of Putin’s comments in Moscow, the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was invited to brief the EAPC and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on the aims and priorities of the Russian presidency in the CSTO. [24] By this time, it might already have been too late. The debate in the Russian press had been going on for several years. Still, there had been no signals that cooperation could materialise.

The CSTO Secretary General Bordyuzha in December 2005 emphasized that CSTO did not see cooperation with NATO as an end in itself. Rather, current realities made such cooperation between NATO and the CSTO highly necessary. [25] But, in connection with the abovementioned brief, he communicated that the CSTO does not consider such cooperation with NATO absolutely vital. “In the world there are enough structures with which the CSTO cooperates.” [26]

Since 2005, the debate has somewhat calmed in the Russian press with regard to cooperation between the CSTO and NATO. In recent months, with the current deterioration in Russian-Western relations, rhetoric about NATO has been focused on the encirclement of Russia by NATO, rather than prospects for cooperation. Even Bordyuzha has focused on the aggressiveness of the NATO bloc in his recent public appearances. [27] However, the issues highlighted by the Russian side are indeed common challenges in the Central and South Asian area of operations. Not only in CSTO member states, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but also in Afghanistan is the CSTO currently stepping up its efforts, targeting drugs trafficking and aiding Afghan authorities with building up capacities of varying sorts. NATO might even be forced to cooperate with the CSTO in Afghanistan, as the CSTO expands its activities in the country. Security sector cooperation between Afghan authorities and the CSTO would be hard to imagine without any interface with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

### **2.3 The case for cooperation (as perceived by the CSTO)**

Let us then further investigate the case for cooperation, as it is perceived from Moscow, Minsk, Astana, Bishkek, Tashkent, Dushanbe and Yerevan. Several reasons to pursue cooperation with NATO can be identified on part of the CSTO.

#### **1) Russia's wish for control in the FSU**

NATO's expansion eastwards and the alliance's increasing activity in what Russia has traditionally perceived as its own "sphere of influence" is not welcome in Russian foreign policy circles. Russian rhetoric about NATO and the encirclement of Russia has recently been particularly sharp in Moscow. Russian discontent with NATO's eastern orientation was evident from the first rounds of enlargement in the late 1990s.

Russia's acceptance for Western eastward orientation was tested in connection with NATO's campaign in Afghanistan, when the US Army was able to utilize bases in Central Asia for assaults on the Taliban in Afghanistan. Putin gained international recognition of his open-mindedness in "allowing" the US Army access to this region. On the other hand, access was not his to grant, but rather a bilateral issue between the US and the Central Asian countries in question (primarily Kyrgyzstan). Chances are Putin had the choice of welcoming American presence or protesting against it and being ignored. This was the most important showdown of the geopolitical power game that has been going on between the US and Russia in Central Asia for some time, the US having been committed economically in the energy-rich region for more than a decade.

This power game lays an important background for the CSTO invitation to cooperate with NATO. NATO has used its bilateral cooperative relationships with the CSTO member states as a way of influencing the domestic development in many of these countries, as much of the content of the Partnership for Peace program focuses on democratisation and human rights. Indeed, complaints have been heard from many quarters in Moscow that the US and the other Western powers are trying to undermine Russian influence in the whole former Soviet space. There have been repeatedly expressed concerns by the CSTO Ministers of Defence over Western meddling in the region. Former Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov accused NATO and the US of meddling in newly independent countries, "using the pretext of democratic values and freedom promotion". Yuri Baluevsky accused the West of trying to weaken Russia-led groupings: "Attempts are being observed to weaken the commonwealth through recruitment of CIS states into NATO. Russia will defend its interests".[28] Cooperation on bloc level could become an efficient control of this NATO meddling in the region that Russia thinks of as its back yard. If NATO were forced to channel all cooperation through the CSTO, this would give Russia unprecedented influence and access to all NATO activity in the Central Asia and Caucasus region, an unprecedented advantage in terms of regional geopolitical power games. Such cooperation would enable Russia to influence relations that now lie beyond her scope, i.e. the bilateral relations between the other CSTO countries and NATO.

Cooperation in bloc formation would also prevent the flirtation some of the member states have with NATO into becoming a romance, or worse, a permanent relationship. Some Central Asian

states, like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, have benefited from playing Russia and the US up against each other over military presence in the region, as seen in the discussions on military bases in these countries. This has provided some of these countries with benefits and concessions from one or both sides.

To what extent this is a Russian proposal and to what extent the initiative reflects Russian interests more than a shared interest of the CSTO states is difficult to determine. Formally, once a letter is sent from this organization to NATO, it represents the interests of all CSTO member countries. There is evidence that Moscow first brought the issue to the CSTO table. Some sources indicate that there has been some reluctance among the other CSTO member states and even resistance from one or more unidentified states against the framework proposed by Russia.[29] These sources give reason to believe that Russia had to negotiate the proposal in order to elicit support from the CSTO, and that consensus was achieved only after some bargaining. This is probably due to the abovementioned balancing between East and West that some CSTO member states have benefited from.

Institutionalised cooperation with NATO would signify less room for manoeuvring for these states, as such bandwagoning leaves open the option of setting the two up against each other in a bid to maximize one's own pay-off. As an example, Kazakhstan's attachment to both CSTO and NATO (through EAPC and PfP activities) has been interpreted as an attempt to keep the main external powers – Russia and the US – in check, and not become too heavily dependent on either of the two.[30] The CSTO as an organisation, rather than Russia, has invited NATO to cooperate one must assume that all member countries stand firmly behind the invitation. However, it seems Russia might be the member country that can benefit the most from such cooperation.

## **2) Benefits of bloc formation**

It seems fair to assume that these states perceive that they are stronger when they act together than when they act separate. The myriad of international institutions that have emerged in this region after 1991 under build the liberal claim that the countries do benefit from cooperating with each other. Not only Russia, but also the other CSTO member states must have identified a number of advantages from this web of regional organizations, particularly in the economic and security spheres.

In many instances, the bloc would see it easier dealing with NATO on an equal footing, rather than on the current bilateral basis. When dealing with NATO on a bilateral basis, most CSTO member countries are on the receiving rather than the demanding end of relations. Russia would find it useful to have the backing of the CSTO member states when dealing with NATO on a number of issues, and the other members would surely appreciate Russian backing. Dealing through institutions would make the process of cooperation between the European and CSTO countries more transparent and structured. The larger the number of countries involved in cooperation, the more standardized and orderly that cooperation will be. This can of course have advantages and disadvantages, but in terms of keeping track of what each member country does

with NATO in the security sphere, standardized cooperation would make the process more transparent, and perhaps also more efficient.

### **3) International recognition of the CSTO**

The wish to collaborate with NATO also stems from the wish of the CSTO to gain international recognition of the organisation as a regional security guarantor. The organization is in the process of expanding into new policy areas, and it has a genuine interest in establishing cooperative relationships with a number of other international organizations and agencies. The CSTO's bid for observer status at the UN, as well as its status as a regional security organisation, which it was granted in 2003, was the initiation of the process of establishing the CSTO as an actor on the world stage. A cooperative relationship with NATO would include the CSTO into the club of defensive alliances, as the CSTO would seek to cooperate on a formally equal footing with NATO. The goal of cooperation would be to increase the CSTO's international standing and to legitimize the organization's role in the region, according to one observer.[31] Gaining such international legitimacy would probably increase the international community's tolerance for operations that might be carried out in the region under CSTO auspices. This is also part of the underlying reasons for establishing a CSTO rapid reaction force and other types of forces. The undemocratic nature of most of the regimes in the CSTO indicates that these countries would like to solve their own problems, rather than have international observers and peacekeepers imposed on them. Such international presence is often accompanied by demands for democratic reform, reform that for now seems unwanted on part of most CSTO leaders.

### **4) Prospects for peacekeeping**

A large part of the issue of international recognition of the CSTO thus concerns the prospects of peacekeeping operations in the Central Asian region. The CSTO makes no secrets of its peacekeeping aspirations. The rapid reaction force that is being developed is mainly envisaged for use in the Central Asian region, in the case of a crisis or hostilities of some sort. A well-established regional security organization would be the natural pool of resources upon which to draw in such a situation.

Too close bilateral cooperation between NATO and CSTO member countries increases the likelihood of NATO troops being deployed to a potential hotspot in this region. Such a scenario is still regarded with grave suspicion by particularly Russian military planners. The establishment of a cooperative relationship between the two organisations, however, would restrict NATO's freedom to act on its own in the CSTO member states territories. NATO would then have to engage on a bloc-to-bloc basis. In the event of an unmanageable crisis for the CSTO, aid could be requested from NATO, but then under strict CSTO auspices. The CSTO would probably like to control its own region much like NATO does in Europe, and this might also entail the possibility of subordinating foreign troops CSTO command. The most important thing is that the CSTO (and Russia, for that matter) is in charge of deployments to the region. Again, this reflects on Russia's wish to be in control of military deployments in the former Soviet space. This is only amplified by the fact that the CSTO only last year determined that any deployment of foreign troops on CSTO soil would have to be approved by all CSTO members.[32]



## **5) Synergies from cooperation**

Real security threats, particularly in the Central Asian region but also in the Caucasus, have perhaps been the single most important factor in the CSTO's wish to cooperate with NATO. The organisation is increasingly geared toward the same kinds of threats that NATO is meeting in its current operation in Afghanistan, an area where also the CSTO is currently engaged. Particularly the issues of terrorism and trans-border crime in the form of drugs and arms smuggling are severe security challenges that must be dealt with on both sides of the afghan border, in Afghanistan where NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is largely responsible for security, and in Tajikistan, where Russian and partly CSTO forces are responsible for maintaining border security. Cooperation between the two organizations would probably entail increased efficiency in fighting drugs-related organized crime, terrorism and insecurity in the Central and South Asian region, as well as in the overall fight against terrorism. These are challenges that all NATO and CSTO members deal with on a regular basis, and approaches to counter the region-wide threats should be as broad as the threats themselves. As the CSTO reasons, both parties would benefit profoundly from e.g. intelligence-sharing, and from cooperation in a number of other areas. One could envisage that NATO countries could share information on modern war-fighting techniques whereas the CSTO countries could share information on local structures and conditions. It seems realistic to predict that cooperation between the CSTO and NATO would lead to the enhanced utility of all (or at least most) of the parties involved.

## **2.4 The case for cooperation according to liberal theory of international relations**

Liberal theory of international relations offers insights into why actors in the international system might decide to cooperate. The theory can help us shed light on what is driving the processes at hand, what might be the reasons for the unrealised cooperation and what the prospects for future cooperation might be.

The liberal approach focuses on the prospects for cooperation and utility maximisation through joint efforts in the international system. The liberal approach to international relations was first introduced by Woodrow Wilson with his idea of a League of Nations in the 1930s. This ideal was based on the realization that the balance-of power among the leading world powers had been insufficient in containing the most disastrous war in world history, World War I. Contemporary scholars and idealists saw the need for enhanced cooperation to check and balance the conduct of states in the anarchic international system.

The ideals of the early liberalists, however, did not produce efficient mechanisms to prevent the Japanese offensive into Manchuria, neither the Italian one in Abyssinia in 1936-7. Already before the Second World War broke out had the League of Nations failed to regulate behaviour on the international arena. After this failure of liberalism to explain current developments, realist accounts of international behaviour gained momentum and continued to dominate the debate throughout the Cold War. In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, the liberal approach to international relations has experienced a revival, as a "zone of peace" consisting of liberal democratic states has expanded. The Kantian democratic peace theory, claiming that democracies

do not wage wars on each other, as well as Fukuyama's End of History theory and theories of regional security complexes have also contributed to this liberal renaissance. Current developments in international affairs, with the strengthening of international institutions and unprecedented international cooperation in spheres ranging from economy to security, under build the case for cooperation advanced by liberal institutionalists.

For current liberals, the main challenge in the anarchic international system is how to overcome the problem of defection under cooperation. Because there is no supranational authority to regulate international interaction, states wishing to cooperate will always risk a defecting partner. Liberals claim, however, that states will cooperate even when facing such defection, because the benefits from cooperation are so attractive. Neoliberal scholars, such as Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, claim that the challenge of defection will be overcome due to factors such as the shadow of the future, the payoff structure and the number of actors in the game.[33] If, for instance, actors are forced to cooperate in recurrent games, this might induce them to change their behaviour. International cooperation offers opportunities for mutual benefit, like the establishment of free trade zones and regimes of common interest. Institutions also contribute to establishing rules and norms for how to interact on the international arena, making relations more stable and predictive, thus evading the resorting to violent means. The liberal international order is one based on commonly accepted rules and norms that regulate interaction among actors.

The liberal theoretical complex has dominated the debate in recent years. One example of this is the theory of democratic peace, which originates in Kantian theory, and which has been developed further by Michael W. Doyle. The democratic peace theory claims that democracies do not wage war on each other, and that the solution to international anarchy is to extend the zone of peaceful democratic states to as many corners of the world as possible. This theory has gained momentum among contemporary policymakers from the mid 1990s, the liberal interventionist US foreign policy under the Clinton administration being the most visible example.

The regional security complex theory is another theory that can serve to explain recurrent phenomena of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It was developed by the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies, and in brief it claims that regional security complexes have emerged in some regions of the world. Where neighbouring states face similar security challenges, they will seek together to meet these challenges, as they are better off facing them together than separately. The common threats faced by the European countries are an example of this according to the theorists Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.[34] Mutual existential threats will forge links among states and cooperation in the security sphere will emerge. The theory emphasises, however, that the emerging asymmetrical threats that dominate the contemporary security debate might not be sufficient to forge close security relations in a region. Countries need to have a common threat perception and face common existential challenges in order to seek together to address security issues.

Liberal theory thus gives reason to expect cooperation between the CSTO and NATO, and that mutual gains can be made from such cooperation.

## 2.5 Realist rejections of cooperation

Realist theory of international relations, on the other hand, seeks to explain why cooperation among states does not come easy.[35] The most obvious reason for this is that states often have conflicting or competing interests. According to Kenneth N. Waltz, the key elements of international politics are those linked to the survival of the state. States are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.[36]

The systemic factors shaping states' actions are vital to understanding realist theory of international relations. The anarchic structure of international society, with no supranational authority protecting actors from each other, makes the international system a self-help system, where states (actors) must look after their own security. This anarchy produces the inevitable collision of states' interests. States are free to use violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave other states.[37] The basic problem for states then consists in the security dilemma, that is, how to preserve their own security without endangering that same security.

Violence thus serves not only as the "ultimo ratio in international politics, but indeed as the first and constant one" This is because, as Kenneth N. Waltz suggests, "the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system"[36] This does not necessarily mean that states are engaged in perpetual war. Part of the realist theoretical tradition explains how states will seek to balance each other out in the perpetual contest for power that characterises international society.

Balance-of-power theory claims that any state or group of states will seek to balance out the power of one or more dominant powers in the international society. This theory had its heyday during the Cold War, when the bipolar world represented a balanced power distribution in the world, a stable equilibrium. Balance-of-power theorists typically claim that unipolar power is not stable, as any state that has the potential will seek to challenge that power. In the words of Kenneth N. Waltz, "In international politics, unbalanced power constitutes a danger even when it is American power that is out of balance"[38] This unchecked American power will thus at some point in the future be challenged, according to realists.

Realists claim that institutions hardly (or rarely) matter and are therefore not worth investing in. The survival instinct of states is so strong that their willingness to relinquish sovereignty for international institutions that can provide mutual benefit is limited. According to realists, states recognize that it may be rational to cooperate in order to realize goals that might not be feasible if pursued alone. The prime example of such cooperation is normally economic cooperation. If states have mutual interests, there may be instances where these can only be pursued by common efforts. However, this represents the exception rather than the rule in international interaction. Moreover, engaging in security sector cooperation entails an insuperable risk to states, as the prize to pay for becoming the "sucker" in such a game will be that same state's sovereignty. The fear of exploitation and defection, according to realists, will deter states from engaging in security sector cooperation.

Such a pessimistic view on the prospects for cooperation stems from the realist focus on relative rather than absolute gains. When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states will ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?” The state will not want to cooperate if the two states will mutually benefit from cooperation. Realist theory of international relations thus explains why actors on the international arena will largely provide for their own security, rather than seeking cooperation and provision of goods through mutual efforts.

## **2.6 Does the empirical evidence meet the theory’s expectations?**

In terms of the CSTO’s wish to cooperate with NATO, liberal provides the normative basis for how and why actors on the international arena choose to cooperate. In testing to what extent the theoretical expectations of liberal theory are met in the case of NATO –CSTO cooperation, the reasons for cooperation listed in chapter 2.2. will be examined, in order to see how they fit in with liberal theory.

Russia’s wish to control the developments in the region does not seem to match up to liberal ideals of why actors on the international arena want to cooperate. Russia’s wish to control all developments in the former Soviet Union seems rather to stem from a realist consideration of zero-sum games in which states are focused on power projection and the ability to influence other states’ behaviour. The geopolitical power game described is a typical realist trait, where two actors compete over power and influence in the region, rather than seeking mutual gains through cooperation. When looking isolated at this motivation, at least, the initiative to cooperate seems to stem from realist calculations. It might seem odd, however, that realist theory, which rejects that states will choose to cooperate, can help us explain why the CSTO wants to cooperate with NATO. The reason for this lies in the realist focus on relative versus absolute gains. Realists claim that actors in the international system will choose to cooperate if they will gain relatively from that cooperation. That is, they will cooperate if they think they can gain more from cooperation than their partner will. Russia thinks that through cooperating, it will increase its influence over NATO’s activities in the CSTO region. Russia (and perhaps the CSTO) will gain more from cooperating than NATO will gain from that same cooperation. NATO is already engaged in the region through bilateral structures, whereas Russia would gain valuable access to processes that until now has been closed. The relative gains argument is the only thing that induces actors to cooperate, claim realist theorists. So realist arguments, rather than liberal ones, can explain the first reason the CSTO has to initiate cooperation with NATO.

The second factor, the benefits of bloc formation, supports the liberal case for the benefits of cooperation among international actors. Cooperation between the two organisations would make the relationship more systematic and well organised. This reflects one of the key claims of liberal theorists: that international institutionalised cooperation will provide an orderly international world based on commonly accepted rules and norms. Current developments point in the same direction; interaction among states has become institutionalised to an unprecedented extent. CSTO and NATO cooperation would further cement institutional security cooperation across the whole Eurasian continent.

The third reason to initiate cooperation, international recognition for the CSTO, also reflects this need for organisational structures to provide for international order. This argument also under builds the liberal case for cooperation. However, the motivation that provides the basis for this wish for recognition does not seem to meet liberal expectations to the motivations that cooperation is based on. The motivation, as mentioned, might be the wish to avoid meddling by the international community into regional authoritarian regimes. That wish severely undermines one of the basic premises of liberal international theory: that of democracy and human rights as the fundament upon which to build an international order regulated by institutions.

This is closely linked to the fourth reason listed, that of internal peacekeeping. The CSTO and Russia especially wishes to maintain a regional capability for peacekeeping. This is based on the premise that the CSTO wants to be in control of security in its own region. The wish to institutionalise this part of security cooperation does in fact correspond to liberal expectations. Cementing cooperation in the two institutions would give any joint operation international legitimacy. This would entirely depend on the case, however. If cooperation between the two blocs were used by the CSTO to exclude NATO or other international actors from accessing the region with independent peacekeepers or observers, it would fit realist, not liberal expectations. When left to take care of themselves, chances for the development of democracy in these authoritarian states remain small. Even though some of the countries in the CSTO at times have flirted with Western alliances and policymakers, most of them ultimately prefer the uncomplex relations they have with another quasi-democracy: Russia. This reflex lies very far from what lies at the heart of liberal theory of international relations: democratic governance, the need for openness and cooperation in the spirit of global norms on such issues as equality and human rights.

The liberal school of democratic peace theory can also be applied to this point. Chances for the extension of the liberal zone of peace might actually be diminished, rather than enhanced, through cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. This is because such bloc formation could make it more difficult for NATO to influence internal developments in the CSTO member countries, as will be elaborated in chapter 3.3. For example, regional security complex theorists Buzan and Wæver claim that the chances are larger for the European security complex to usurp the Eurasian one, rather than the two complexes successfully cooperating. This is because the level of common threat perceptions is relatively low. Buzan and Wæver will not even characterise the Eurasian region as a security complex, but rather call it a centred region around a great power, as part of a weak super complex with the EU-Europe.[34] Because of the weakness of this system, and the strength of the European regional security complex, prospects for cooperation between the two are not good.

The last factor, the synergies that can be obtained through cooperation, is the one motivation that wholly matches the expectations of liberal theory to actors wish to pursue cooperation. This core liberal claim, that the gains to be made from mutual cooperation are larger than what can be obtained alone, is also an important part of the reason for the invitation to cooperate extended by

the CSTO. There should be little doubt to the fact that security challenges could probably be more efficiently tackled if the two organisations worked together.

<b>ARGUMENT</b>	<b>THEORETICAL EXPECTATION</b>
1) Russian control CIS	Realism
2) Benefits of bloc formation	Liberalism
3) International recognition of the CSTO	Realism (Liberalism)
4) Ability to control peacekeeping	Realism (Liberalism)
5) Synergies from cooperation	Liberalism

*Table 2.5. Schematic presentation of the theories' ability to explain the empirical evidence*

According to liberal theory, the drive for mutual gains causes cooperation among actors in the international system. However, the motivations behind the CSTO initiative to cooperate with NATO do not fully fit the expectations of liberal theory as to why states should wish to cooperate. As the table above shows, only two of the five motivations the CSTO has to initiate cooperation with NATO are based on liberal arguments. Two more have at least partial liberal elements in them, although the realist calculations seem to take precedence on these issues. However, the belief in cooperation as the most efficient means of addressing common threats and challenges is nevertheless based in the liberal tradition of mutual gains and the essentially optimistic view of humans as a cooperative animal. Issues such as drug trafficking and other types of trans-border crime, terrorism and separatist militants must be addressed, and they seem difficult to tackle without coordination between the CSTO and NATO. The CSTO still believes in the value of standardized cooperation with NATO and the importance of institutionalizing efforts. However, it seems that pressing security issues and realist assumptions rather than liberal ideals have been the most dominant motivation for CSTO in advocating cooperation with NATO. The motivation that the CSTO has had for initiating cooperation with NATO has essentially been based in the realist consideration for power projection and influence, as three of the five motivational factors show.

## 3 Explaining the failure

### 3.1 Explaining NATO's reluctance

Despite Russia's recurrent proposals and diplomatic efforts on behalf of the CSTO to have the two organizations cooperate on bloc level, NATO has apparently sought to avoid the issue altogether. For a long time, the alliance met Russia's invitations with mere silence, thereby signalling that the question was essentially regarded as a non-issue. If there were some interest in the proposal, but it was being considered in relevant NATO bodies, the alliance would probably have conveyed a message to this effect to the Russians.

Yet there is no evidence that NATO has given the Russians even a glimpse of hope that their proposal might be accepted. Russian officials have expressed discontent with the lack of response from NATO. "They have simply ignored us", the CSTO Secretary General told a group of Russian journalists in July 2005.[39] In other words, more than a year after the first *official* initiative – and even longer after the first *unofficial* consultations were initiated, NATO has failed to courtesy the Russian initiative with a response.

A number of reasons for this failure to respond might be identified. They are NATO's preference for bilateral structures, their wish for promoting democracy through these structures in the region in question, the freedom of action NATO retains by not engaging in cooperation with the CSTO as an organisation through balancing power and the possibilities of peacekeeping in the region in the long-term future.

#### 1) Preference for bilateral structures

Answering questions regarding the CSTO invitation to cooperate, several NATO officials have expressed the organisation's reluctance to engage in such cooperation. The reason for this is primarily the preference for the cooperative structures that already exist in the bilateral relationships between NATO and CSTO member countries.

Following a NATO-Russia meeting on the level of Foreign Ministers, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that NATO prefers the cooperation (between NATO and the CSTO member states) as "we have it now". He said that one might make better use of existing partnerships, rather than initiating new structures, as all the relevant parties already are members of the EAPC.[40] In the extension of the Lavrov brief for the EAPC and the NRC in 2005, the US Secretary of State requested more information on the CSTO, but also stated that for now, the allies preferred the bilateral approach to CSTO member states.[41]

The NATO Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Robert Simmons, also made a statement regarding the issue at a roundtable at the Centre for Strategic Analysis in Yerevan on October 29, 2005. Simmons reportedly dismissed Russia's proposal on NATO-CSTO cooperation as unacceptable and suggested that NATO should direct any cooperation with CSTO member states.[42]

This bilateral approach consists of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as well as the EAPC. The PfP constitutes NATO's outreach program and the alliance's preferred instrument for developing relations with states of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The different countries' level of commitment to, and engagement in, EAPC and PfP activities vary greatly and specific programs for cooperation are developed with each partner country. Some states, like Georgia, see the PfP as a slow and careful preparation for eventual NATO membership. Other countries, like Belarus, have hardly filled their relationship with NATO with anything. Nevertheless, NATO has an arena on which to consult with these states on issues of common interest or concern. Some of the PfP programs, especially with the Central Asian states as well as some in the South Caucasus, have become wide-ranging cooperation programs, including military cooperation through training and exercises.[43] With Russia, NATO has a separate body, the NATO-Russia Council, where the two can consult with each other and even agree to act collectively in a number of specific areas, including the fight against international terrorism. Thus the bilateral approach leaves NATO with a number of options on how to direct their cooperation with the CSTO member countries.

## **2) Democracy promotion**

An important part of NATO's Partnership for Peace is the promotion of democratic values and human rights. The expressed wish of NATO to preserve the current bilateral format for cooperation reflects the continued focus on these issues. NATO probably recognises that this format gives the Atlantic alliance much larger leverage over each individual member country, than if NATO dealt with the CSTO in bloc formation. NATO would like to carefully work together with each CSTO country in order to try and improve relations between them, as well as conditions within each country. The PfP program provides NATO with an opportunity to influence domestic developments in these countries. When meeting the CSTO as a whole, trying to address domestic issues at regional level would prove difficult.

The issue of democracy and human rights is among the main obstacles for former Soviet states wishing to become members of the European organisations. Russia's strong hand in the context of the geopolitical games of influence is exactly this: her un-democratic nature. Russia makes no demands in the democratic or human rights sphere, as Western states might do. Although American demands in this sphere are dwindling these days, NATO has liberal democratic principles as a fundamental element of all its bilateral programs. Russian acceptance and even support for the authoritarian regimes in the region makes its relations in many ways less complex than the balancing act performed by NATO allies wishing access to bases and energy resources from highly undemocratic regimes largely ignorant of human rights.

Recognising the CSTO as a main security actor in the former Soviet space entails a number of problems for the Atlantic alliance. Western recognition of an organisation that consists of almost exclusively authoritarian regimes would be seen as an endorsement of these regimes that have defined 'terrorism' and 'extremism' in disturbingly permissive terms and lack legitimacy in the eyes of many of their own peoples.[44] Especially in the security sphere have some of the CSTO



member states been rather harsh in their clampdown on terrorists and religious extremists. Cooperation in that same sphere could prove difficult to NATO, simply because of differences in methods. Because of the nature of the regimes in particularly the Central Asian region, NATO is committed to a path of cooperation where the prospects for influencing internal developments are high. This seems more important to NATO than the gains to be made from mutual cooperation, at least in the near future.

For now, at least, CSTO member countries favour close and condition-free relations with Russia over NATO membership fraught with demands for democratic and transparent standards. Some of the CIS states that are not members of the CSTO (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) are flirting openly with NATO. But the current CSTO members seem to have chosen their strategic identification with Russia and Russian interests and perceptions of the Central Asian region, at least in the mid-term future. NATO's wish to avoid cooperation on a bloc basis with CSTO could in part be inspired by a wish to keep a Western path open also for these states, should they choose to change their orientation.

In the CIS region, then, there seems to be a difference in interest with regard to democracy promotion, particularly between NATO and Russia. Both wish to maximise their power and influence in the region. NATO attempts to do this through bilateral agreements in support of democratic reform and economic development, whereas Russia best does this through supporting authoritarian regimes and utilizing (at times clandestine) power structures in the region. Russia, with its Soviet past, is still way ahead in terms of power projection and influence in the region. Only through introducing western standards and practices that would lead to profound democratic reform could NATO come close to exerting as much power in this region as Russia does today.

### **3) Freedom of action and over institutionalisation**

The choice of working through existing structures also reflects NATO's disillusionment with some of the existing structures in the bilateral relationships. If NATO-Russia cooperation is indicative of how cooperation between the two organizations would develop, there seems to be no reason to initiate structural cooperation. The NATO-Russia partnership has been ridden with ups and downs, the highlight so far perhaps being the Rome declaration from 2002 in which the two (or 27) parties manifested their willingness to enhance cooperation across 9 fields, including the war on terror, crisis management and peacekeeping operations.<sup>3</sup> The low point can be said to be the Russian boycott of the bilateral structures in the aftermath of NATO's air campaign against Serbia in 1999.

The cooperation efforts within the NRC have thus only been partially successful. NATO allies have constantly complained about the Russian reluctance to fill cooperation structures with real and tangible content. The process of cooperation is, evidently, hostage to internal politics in the

---

<sup>3</sup> The additional security issues of common interest defined in the Rome declaration are non-proliferation; arms control and confidence-building measures; theatre missile defence; search and rescue at sea; military to-military cooperation and defence reform; civil emergencies and new threats and challenges.  
[www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/05-may/e0528a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/05-may/e0528a.htm)

allied countries, as well as the bilateral relationships between Russia and the larger NATO states. The newest NATO members have a historically different relationship with Moscow than the Western allies, and this is increasingly placing a strain on the relationship. Recent incidents such as the Litvinenko case, the American missile defence system and the CFE treaty fallout are some examples that have severe implications for the overall relationship between NATO and Russia. The experience NATO has gained thus far with cooperating with CSTO member countries might not make further institutionalisation look tempting.

NATO might also fear that by recognising the CSTO as the primary regional security organization in the CIS, it risks alienating the large number of CIS states who have remained outside the CSTO. By dealing with security threats together with the CSTO, cooperation with other CIS countries might be pushed into the background. Relatively speaking, NATO probably values the cooperation it has with the CIS countries open to NATO membership higher than with those whose prospects for membership are almost non-existent, like some of the Central Asian countries. In terms of democratisation and development, NATO would like to see more of the CIS countries turning west. It may seem politically attractive to keep the lines as blurred as possible, rather than making a clear distinction between the countries that have chosen a “western” and “eastern” orientation. By recognising the CSTO as a defensive alliance, and a separate bloc, NATO might exclude the possibility of some of its members becoming future members of the Atlantic bloc.

Why has NATO then not politely declined the offer for cooperation? Aleksandr Nikitin, Director of the Russian Centre for Political and International Studies, believes that the fact that NATO does not try to demonstrate its alienation from the CSTO too obviously is positive.[45] This leaves the possibilities open for cooperation at a later stage. This flexibility for action is probably what has been the main argument for NATO not to engage in cooperation with the CSTO up until this point. The flexibility also leaves open the possibility for targeted joint activities in the future, without a necessary cementation in organisational structural cooperation.

#### **4) Peacekeeping**

The CSTO member states are responsible for maintaining security in a complex region with numerous security threats. Institutional cooperation between NATO and the CSTO could entail responsibilities on part of NATO in the case of destabilizing events in this area. As discussed earlier, the CSTO could want to draw on NATO resources in the case of a crisis that the CSTO was not able to contain itself. From NATO’s perspective, however, the organisation has challenges enough in its “out of area” operations (read: Afghanistan) without having to take responsibility for yet another state collapse in one of the Central Asian member states of the CSTO. The current structure leaves NATO without obligations in the region, but with the necessary means to try and influence the countries of its choosing. A formalised cooperation with CSTO would probably be an institutional hinder for NATO to deploy troops to the region without the consent of the CSTO’s most dominant player, Russia.

The reluctance on the part of NATO to engage in wholehearted cooperation with CSTO can be explained through a number of factors. Beyond the political reasoning evident at NATO one might take a more theoretical approach to explaining this lack of enthusiasm in Brussels. Realist theory of international relations explains why cooperation among states in the international system comes difficult, particularly in the security sector. Traditional realist theory, including balance-of-power theory will be elaborated in the following chapter. It will then be discussed whether the reasons NATO have not to engage in cooperation correspond to the realist explanations and expectations of international relations.

### **3.2 Does the empirical evidence support realist theory?**

The realist theoretical expectations that cooperation will be rare should help us highlight the main elements of NATO's strategy in rejecting cooperation with the CSTO. NATO being an organisation based on liberal principles, realist calculations should in essence not be the dominant factor in the unrealised cooperation. This paper will now explore whether realist theory succeeds in explaining NATO's wish not to cooperate with the CSTO on an institutional basis, and whether realist or liberal theory best explain NATO's motivation.

The basic claim of realist theory is that power and interest are the defining characteristics of international relations. In the case of NATO-CSTO cooperation, these factors indeed do seem to dominate the relationship. The reasons NATO has for declining CSTO's offer do seem very much based on realist assumptions about own and other states' power and interest. With regard to NATO's preference for bilateral structures, this preference seems to be based on the assumption that NATO can better further its own interests and project its power through the existing institutions than through institutional collaboration. This is because NATO fears that the CSTO is so dominated by Russia that it would prove difficult for NATO to gain anything from cooperating with the organisation. NATO reasons that it can exert more pressure with regard to e.g. domestic issues when it remains the only bloc of states in the bilateral relationship. This particularly concerns the other CSTO members rather than Russia, to which NATO can offer attractive carrots like military cooperation and other assistance programs.

With regard to democracy promotion, NATO's wish to foster democratic change in many of the CSTO member states stems from liberal democratic theories and the belief that democracies do not wage war on each other. NATO, along with a number of other western organisations, wishes to extend the zone of peace eastwards to include many of the former Soviet states. This is perhaps the main reason the Alliance has initiated complex cooperative relationships with states that are located far from NATO's traditional area of operations. The PfP initiative commenced long before the operation in Afghanistan was even thought of. In this sense, NATO is guided by liberal principles of cooperation among states in order for them to live peacefully together.

However, this wish for democratic change in many of the CSTO member countries might not solely stem from NATO's wish for peace and stability for the populations of the Eurasian continent. Certain realist calculations can also be observed in this pursuit of democratic change. Democratic regimes mean not only peaceful regimes, but also the liberalisation of markets and

new possibilities for foreign direct investment; it means better opportunities for foreign consultants and advisors on how to conduct reform. In the case of the former Soviet states in particular, choosing the democratic path has traditionally been connected with choosing a path away from Russia, as the development in that country these days can be said to be anything but democratic. The issue has been duly elaborated by the American official Zbigniew Brzezinski.[46] This choosing away from Russia essentially means choosing the West, with western advisers, aid and know-how on how to make democracies and free markets work. Georgia is of course the most recent example of such a development. With the western influx of know-how comes, evidently, a certain amount of influence. It would be naïve to think that this reasoning was not part of NATO's decision to try to retain current cooperative institutions. NATO will want to maximise its influence in the region, and has found that this can best be done through its own carefully designed structures. If NATO has chosen the bilateral structures to avoid a Russia-dominated CSTO, this is based on realist zero-sum calculations of losses and gains to the parties from cooperation.

These oppositional interests between NATO and particularly Russia in the former Soviet space can be explained with realist balance-of-power theory. The relationship between CSTO and NATO cannot be understood without a thorough understanding of Russia's relationship with the US, Russia's relationship with NATO, and the geopolitical power game which is currently unfolding in Central Asia. In foreign policy circles in Moscow, relations with the West are often analysed as a general issue, without singling out the Russian bilateral relationships with the US, the EU and NATO respectively. The Russian reaction to the American plans of missile defence deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic clearly illustrates this point. The American plans were very quickly linked to the expansion of NATO; even though the system in principle is an American missile defence. The tendency to see relations with NATO and with the USA as highly interconnected has been particularly strong, and many politicians and observers in Russia tend to assume that NATO is a guise for the advancement of American foreign policy in Europe.

CSTO Secretary General Bordyuzha has attributed NATO's reluctance to engage in cooperation with the CSTO as "political games" and stated, "Behind good intentions, there are political interests that don't allow NATO to start co-operating with the CSTO".[47] The invocation of 'games' clearly alludes to the idea that NATO has a hidden agenda. One frequently made assertion in Russian political and military circles is that NATO is trying to undermine Russian interests in the CIS area by strengthening the bloc's ties with individual CIS states and thereby weakening Russia's own relations with these states.[48]

This geopolitical "game" for Central Asia is a factor that must be taken into account when analysing NATO's approach to Central Asia. Over the last 10-15 years, NATO's political focus and military engagement has gradually moved east, into areas of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The process of enlargement and the involvement of new partners through the EAPC and PfP frameworks have secured a dominant position for the alliance in a Wider Europe. At NATO's Summit in Istanbul in June, 2004, the alliance expressed the ambition to "Further strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, in particular through a special focus on engaging with

our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia“.[49] This new focus can at least partly be attributed to the enhanced focus of the US foreign policy on Central Asia and particularly on the energy resources of that region.

By avoiding the establishment of a formal relationship with the CSTO, NATO (and even some of the CSTO member states) preserves a higher level of freedom and a greater room for political and military manoeuvring than a NATO-CSTO mechanism would allow for. Any kind of formalized relationship between the two would bind NATO politically to consult with the CSTO on matters that affect the CSTO directly or that involve issues where the two have tangent interests or concerns. The power games at play between the two dominant powers, the US and Russia, for geopolitical clout in Central Asia goes a long way in explaining the Western preference for bilateral formats over multilateral ones, as it preserves NATO's room for manoeuvre. This preference is rooted in essentially realist assumptions about the power of interests of states in the international system. An actor in the international system does not want to relinquish sovereignty and freedom of action to supranational bodies that can interfere with their way of dealing with things. Such bodies might not take national strategic interests into consideration.

The issue of peacekeeping is a continuation of the previous argument of flexibility. Again, it reflects NATO's wish to only depend on itself to provide security where and when it sees it fit. However, this argument lies well with the liberal interventionist tradition, as NATO would probably only meddle in the region if and where there were humanitarian grounds for such intervention, preferably also sanctioned by the UN. Not engaging with an organisation in the region would make NATO appear more neutral if humanitarian or other types of intervention were needed. This seems to be the only reason that NATO has for not engaging in cooperation which runs counter realist theory of international relations.

In sum, NATO's reasoning does seem to be well founded in realist rejections of cooperation in international interaction. The schematic presentation below presents a similar picture to the one drawn in chapter 2 regarding liberal and realist explanations for diverging views on cooperation. Some elements seem to contain a certain air of liberal rhetoric to it, but when one digs deep into the motivating factors of the organisation, realist assumptions dominate the agenda.

ARGUMENT	THEORETICAL BASE
Preference for bilateral structures	(Liberal) Realist
Democracy Promotion	(Liberal) Realist
Freedom of action	Realist
Peacekeeping	Liberal

*Table 3.3. Schematic presentation of the theories' ability to explain the empirical evidence*

## 4 Conclusions and Prospects

Russian officials have sent a clear message to NATO that Moscow does not understand why the alliance is not even interested in discussing the issue of NATO-CSTO cooperation. With time, however, the CSTO rhetoric has changed considerably, and in May 2006, Bordyuzha expressed that this was “no tragedy”, and that cooperation with NATO “is not an absolute priority” for the CSTO.[50] He argued that “Overall, CSTO is satisfied with the level of contacts with other alliances”, and that “these contacts enable the organization to address all security problems in Central Asia and the European part of the CIS in a sufficiently effective manner”. This probably goes to show that the CSTO and Russia at some point have given up on the path of CSTO-NATO cooperation.

In a possible reaction to the failure of NATO to respond to numerous CSTO invitations, the CSTO have now decided to conduct activities in Afghanistan without coordination with NATO. At the June 2005 CSTO summit, leaders decided to set up a working group to coordinate work on Afghanistan, and in March 2007 this group held talks in Kabul with senior officials of the Afghan Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and other security and civilian government departments.[51;52] The delegation offered assistance to Afghanistan to help build its army, security agencies, and border protection units and to combat terrorism and the drugs trade. Specific proposals included delivering arms and military equipment and training Afghan military and border-troop officers as well as “special services” personnel. Another proposal from

the Russian side has been to turn the CSTO's annual anti-drug operation in Central Asia, "Kanal", into a "permanent regional operation" to fight the drugs trade, also within Afghanistan.[53] The Russian cooperative approach to NATO, which for some time has been focused on this anti-drug note, has gained a competitive edge. At some point, NATO and the CSTO will be forced to confront each other and cooperate in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the prospects for institutionalised cooperation between the two organisations are as we have seen dim.

The case of NATO-CSTO cooperation provides an interesting case with regard to an organisation based on liberal principles of international cooperation and coordination which rejects an invitation to cooperate, even though this cooperation could potentially produce mutual benefits for the parties involved. As we have seen, it seems both organisations are largely motivated by realist calculations on power and influence in the Central Asian and Caucasus region in their rhetoric and reasoning with regard to cooperation. The CSTO wants to cooperate with NATO to meet current security threats and challenges in a common operational theatre, Central and South Asia. However, the invitation seems to be largely motivated by a Russian insistence on cooperation in bloc formation. Russia wants this to be able to control all NATO's activities in the region, and to make sure that none of the CSTO members develops too close relations with the Atlantic alliance.

The Atlantic alliance, on the other hand, rejects cooperation on a rather traditional realist assessment of relations on the international arena. Although legitimised and inspired by democracy promotion and a liberal agenda, NATO does not seek cooperation in all forms. The nature of NATO's bilateral relations with the CSTO member states is essentially liberal. The PFP program is as much geared toward democratic change, as it is military cooperation. But when Russia is inserted into the equation, calculations suddenly change on part of NATO. When facing a Russia-dominated organisation, NATO would rather prefer not to cooperate. Perhaps it is the hard core realpolitik traditionally conducted from Moscow that provokes new approaches from the Atlantic alliance.

Balance of power theory helps us discern the complex web of relationships that influence these realist calculations that dominate relations between NATO and the CSTO. Power relations within and between the two organisations are essential in explaining their relationship, the main obstacle being the dominance of Russia and the US within each alliance and their already advanced geopolitical game in the Central Asian region. This balance of power between the two dominant powers seems to be the number one inhibiting factor to achieving cooperation between NATO and the CSTO.

In a comprehensive study of the future of NATO-Russia relations published by the RAND Corporation in 2004, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus are singled out as "areas for potential NATO-Russian cooperation".[54] From the findings of this report, such cooperation can still only be achieved within the framework of bilateral cooperation between NATO and the CSTO member states. As for bloc cooperation, NATO is not yet ready to engage with the CSTO, at least

when the common security threats are as marginal as they are today. Any existential threat that the two blocs faced together would probably alter these calculations considerably.

By pushing its way into Afghanistan, the CSTO will demonstrate how a pooled effort could have been more efficient than the two organisations operating separately in the Central and South Asian region. It remains beyond doubt that some challenges are better met jointly than alone. The nature of the threat is such that only a multilateral approach will be efficient, and NATO and CSTO will at some point experience this as they approach the same area of operations, Afghanistan. Still, both organisations' calculations of the reasons to cooperate are in essence based on realpolitik. Russia will want to control the developments in the CSTO area, and NATO will uphold its realist assessment of how bilateral relations and balancing Russia's power in the region will maximise its relative gains, at least in the medium term.

Despite such apparent realist calculations, however, statesmen in NATO capitals do most likely not construct foreign policy on the basis of the theories of Waltz and Morgenthau. To them, the differences between the two organisations might remain the number one inhibiting factor for mutual cooperation to be achieved. In addition, changes in the foreign policy orientation of key NATO members might alter the calculations herein portrayed. Although the empirical evidence herein presented to a great extent matched the expectations of realist theory, NATO policy cannot be said to be wholly realist in terms of cooperating with potential partners. Foreign policy formulation is too pragmatic for that to be the case.



## Bibliography

- [1] "Foreign Minister pushes NATO-CSTO cooperation," 2005.
- [2] R. Allison, "Regionalism, regional structures and security management in Central Asia," *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 463-483, 2004.
- [3] Trenin.D., "The Post-Imperial Project," 2006.
- [4] "Collective Security Treaty," 2006.
- [5] M. Kaszmarksy, "Russia creates a new security system to replace the CIS," *Eurasia Insight*, Jan.2006.
- [6] V. Socor, "From CIS to CSTO: Can a "core" be preserved?," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, June2005.
- [7] "CIS Security Chief Supports Closer Ties With NATO," 2005.
- [8] V. Panfilova, "S utchetom strategicheskovo znacheniya," , Dipkur'er ed 2006.
- [9] V. Socor, "CSTO Summit: Military bloc not yet cemented," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 3, no. 125 June2006.
- [10] V. Mukhin, "Kollektivnykh silovikov v SNG stanet bolshe," 2006.
- [11] Interfax, "Gensek ODKB vyskazyvaetsya za aktivizatsio vsaimodyeystviya NATO v bor'be s narkofrafikom i terrorismom," 2005.
- [12] D. Litovkin, "Voyennye nashli svouyu "podyshky"," 2003.
- [13] L. Ivashov, "NATO-ODKB: Est' li perspektivy ravnopravnovo partnerstva?," *Voенno-Promyshlenniy kur'er*, vol. 023 June2005.
- [14] "CSTO wants to cooperate with NATO," 2005.
- [15] "Postings and chronology of events," 2006.
- [16] B. O'Rourke, "NATO: Alliance Praises Efforts of CSTO States, But Cool To Offer of Cooperation," 2003.
- [17] Y. Baykova, "Nikolay Bordyuzha sozdaet svoj spetznaz. V voенno-politicheskom soyuze shesti stran SNG usilivayot voennuyu sostavlyayushchuyu," 2004.
- [18] "Ivanov for NATO-CSTO interaction in fighting terrorism," 2006.
- [19] C. Bigg, "Russia: NATO Chief in Moscow for talks with Putin," 2005.
- [20] Ivanov.S., "Maturing Partnership," *NATO Review*, vol. Autumn 2005.
- [21] I. Plugatarev, "Nikolay Patrushev: Spetsluzhby dolzhny rabotat' na operezhenie," 2005.
- [22] S. Permyakov, "Sblizhat'sya s ODKB ne khotyat," *Voенno-Promyshlenniy kur'er*, vol. 002 Jan.2006.

- [23] N. Poroskov, "Bezopasnyi Kollektivizm," 81 ed 2007.
- [24] S. Blagov, "CSTO seen as a shield against outside meddling," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 2, no. 225 Dec.2005.
- [25] "Russia Creates Own NATO," 2005.
- [26] F. Bordonaro, "Kazakhstan and 'the new great game,'" 2006.
- [27] R. Axelrod and R. O. Keohane, "Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The contemporary debate*. D. A. e. Baldwin, Ed. New York: Columbia University press, 1993.
- [28] B. Buzan and O. Wæver, *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- [29] R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Co-operation*. London: Penguin Books, 1984.
- [30] K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- [31] J. M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The contemporary debate*. D. A. e. Baldwin, Ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- [32] Burchill.S., "Liberalism," in *Theories of International Relations*. Burchill.S.et al., Ed. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- [33] "NATO ignores all CSTO cooperation proposals - CSTO Secretary General," 2005.
- [34] "Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the meeting in the NATO-Russia Council," 2005.
- [35] S. Blagov, "Collective Security groups seeks to establish its identity, avoid mergers," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 2, no. 213 Nov.2005.
- [36] J. B. Spero, "Paths to peace for NATO's partnerships in Eurasia," in *Limiting institutions? The challenge of eurasian security governance*. J. Sperling, Ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 166.
- [37] S. J. Main, J. Sherr, and M. Smith, "The Pattern of Russian Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," Conflict Studies Research Centre,101, Dec.2003.
- [38] G. Pulin, "ODKB-NATO: Soyozniki ili vragi?," *Voенно-Promyshlennyi kur'er*, vol. 027 July2005.
- [39] Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
- [40] "NATO Seeking to Weaken CIS by Expansion - Russian General," 2005.
- [41] "NATO Istanbul Summit Communiqué," 2004.
- [42] V. Valilyeva, "Nas nastorazhivaet situatsiya v nekotorykh rayonakh Tsentral'noy Azii," 2006.
- [43] S. Blagov, "CSTO seeks ways to better secure Central Asia," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 4, no. 103 May2007.
- [44] I. Plugatarev, "Novoe vkozhdenie v Afganistan," 2007.

[45] V. Socor, "Russia returning to Afghanistan with not-so-soft power," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 4, no. 53 Mar.2007.

[46] R. E. Hunter and S. M. Rogov, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant. The next stage of NATO-Russia relations," RAND Corporation,2004.