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CAUSES OF TERRORISM: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature

LIA Brynjar with SKJØLBERG Katja

FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307

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8) ABSTRACT

This report presents a critical survey of the academic literature on the causes of terrorism. The study focuses primarily on theories that seek to explain why some societies are more exposed to terrorism than others, i.e. theories on a national or societal level of analysis. It also examines theoretical frameworks for explaining terrorism on an international or world system level of analysis.

The report underscores the importance of understanding terrorism in its political and societal contexts. By identifying the socio-economic conditions, political regime factors and international system characteristics that are most likely to generate high levels of terrorism, the study also provides useful tools for trend analysis and forecasting.

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CAUSES OF TERRORISM: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 A Note on This Report

This research report surveys and explores common theories and hypotheses about the causes of terrorism, drawing upon previous FFI-studies on the subject.[1] The survey is probably not completely exhaustive, but the reader will find all the key arguments and perspectives. This study was initially meant to serve as a research guide and toolbox for forecasting long-term trends in terrorism in my forthcoming book *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions* (London: Routledge, September 2005). Due to space limitations, only the main findings of this report appear in the book. Being a relatively comprehensive survey of theories on the causes of terrorism, the study will probably be useful for students and scholars in the field of terrorism research, as well as for policy-makers, involved in planning long-term counter-terrorism strategies. A list of the main theories on the causes of terrorism is presented at the end of the report in chapter 6.

1.2 Approaches to Explaining Terrorism

Discussions about the *causes* of terrorism are bound to be controversial. To many people, any focus on underlying causes, motivating factors, and grievances, implies a kind of justification for violence. While such objections are in some cases fully legitimate, any study of terrorism and its future potential must rely upon causalities, and explore dispassionately all significant factors leading to changes in its occurrence and manifestation. Furthermore, in the post-11 September era, it is more important than ever that one seeks to understand the driving forces behind terrorism; otherwise it will be impossible to devise balanced and effective long-term counter-measures.

Terrorism research literature has previously suffered from a dearth of solid findings about the causes of terrorism, empirically tested in quantitative cross-country studies. However, over the past years, there has been significant progress in testing hypotheses about the causes of terrorism. Hence, some theories reviewed here are well founded in theoretical and empirical studies. Others are admittedly not, and should be seen as hypotheses, frequently encountered in the research literature, rather than established theory. Quantitative armed conflicts and civil war-studies have progressed much further in the theoretical field than has terrorism research.

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[1] See Brynjar Lia and Katja H-W Skjølberg, 'Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism', *FFI Research Report* No.02769 (Kjeller, Norway: FFI, 2000), www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00004/Lia-R-2000-02769_4938a.pdf. This report also appeared in German translation in Brynjar Lia and Katja H-W Skjølberg, 'Warum es zu Terrorismus kommt: Ein Überblick über Theorien und Hypothese zu den Ursacken des Terrorismus', *Journal für Konflikt und Gewaltforschung* 6 (1) (Spring 2004), pp. 121-163.

New research on the causes of terrorism has demonstrated that causal relationships between economic and political conditions and terrorism are in several areas quite similar to those previously found in civil war-studies.[2] This should make us confident in drawing more upon this literature than have previous authors.[3] Relying upon findings from this field of research will allow us to fill gaps in terrorism research literature. Still, the relationships' applicability to terrorism studies is not necessarily direct and straightforward, and will have to be discussed in each case.

There is a multitude of situations capable of provoking terrorism. Terrorists may be deprived and uneducated people, or affluent and well educated. Even if young males are usually highly over-represented in most terrorist organisations, one also finds terrorists among people of both sexes and of most ages.[4] Terrorism occurs in rich as well as in poor countries; in the modern industrialised world and in less developed areas; during a process of transition and development, prior to or after such a process; in former colonial states and in independent ones; and in established democracies as well as in less democratic regimes. This list could easily be extended, but it suffices as a demonstration of the wide diversity of conditions one needs to consider when trying to develop an understanding of terrorism. Obviously, this diversity makes it difficult to generalise about terrorism, since there are many 'terrorisms'. Different forms of terrorism also have different causes. We may distinguish between international and domestic terrorism; socio-revolutionary terrorism; and separatist terrorism. Socio-revolutionary terrorism spans different ideologies, including leftist, rightist, and even religious trends. It is also important to recognise that what gives rise to terrorism may be different from what perpetuates terrorism over time.

When analysing the causes of terrorism, one is confronted with different levels of explanations. There are explanations at the individual and group levels, of a psychological or more often socio-psychological character, such as those that identify why individuals join a terrorist group. Explanations at the societal or national level primarily attempt to identify non-spurious correlations between certain historical, cultural, and socio-political characteristics of the larger society and the occurrence of terrorism. For example, the impact of modernisation, democratisation, economic inequality, etc., on terrorism falls into this category. Explanations at the world system or international level seek to establish causal relationships between characteristics of the international state system and relations between states on the one hand, and the occurrence of international terrorism on the other.

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[2] See for example Quan Li and Drew Schaub, 'Economic globalization and transnational terrorism: A pooled time-series analysis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2) (April 2004), pp. 230-258; Brian Lai, 'Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness: An Empirical Examination of International Terrorism', Research Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, April 2004, http://rubagalo.polisci.uiowa.edu/~fredb/workshop/lai2004-04-18.pdf Accessed July 2004; and Jan Oskar Engene, *Patterns of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-95* (Bergen, Norway: Univ. of Bergen, 1998, PhD-thesis).

[3] See for example Crenshaw's remarks on the lack of applicability of this literature in terrorism studies in Martha Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.) *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls* (NY, London: St Martin's Press, 1990), p. 114. See also Brian Jenkins, *Future Trends in International Terrorism* (St Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1985, RAND Report No.P-7176), p. 6.

[4] For trends in 'female terrorism', see Karla J. Cunningham, 'Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26 (3) (May-June 2003), pp. 171-195.

This study will focus mostly on the last two levels of analysis. There are several reasons for doing so. First, considerable attention has already been devoted to explaining terrorism on individual and group levels.[5] This is true even if terrorism can hardly be explained through psycho-pathological profiles (see below). The fact that external influences on the individual and the group appears to be far more decisive, also makes it more relevant to analyse the causes of terrorism beyond the individual level. Secondly, there exists no comprehensive review of academic works, explaining why some countries and regions experience more terrorism than others. This is evidently a knowledge gap that needs to be addressed. Finally, the societal/national and the world system/international levels are the most useful levels of analysis with regards to any attempts at forecasting and long-term prediction about terrorism trends.

2 PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

The individual and group levels of analysis draw mostly upon psychological explanations.[6] Major tasks in this field would be to identify why individuals join a terrorist group in the first place, and, secondly, why they continue to stay with the group.[7] Other related research questions at the individual and group levels of analysis would be: Who are the terrorists? Is there a specific 'terrorist personality'? What motivates individuals to carry out acts of terrorism? What are the psychological mechanisms of group interaction? Psychological research on terrorism can be divided into two main traditions: The psycho-pathological and the psycho-sociological traditions.[8]

2.1 Psycho-Pathological Theories

The first tradition treats the individual terrorist in isolation, searching for deviant character traits. The simple basic assumption of such pure psychological theory of terrorism is that non-violent behaviour is the accepted norm, and that those engaged in terrorist activities therefore necessarily must be abnormal. Based on behavioural studies and profiles, several researchers of psychology claim to have identified a distinguishable terrorist personality. Spoiled, disturbed, cold and calculating, perverse, exited by violence, psychotic, maniac, irrational and fanatic, are character traits frequently claimed to be typical to the terrorist.[9] Although he has dismissed the theory of a terrorist personality, Jerrold Post claims that there is a special logic of terrorist reasoning. He terms this the 'terrorist psycho-logic' – referring to his research proposition that 'terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of

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[5] See the review in Rex A. Hudson, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* (Washington: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1999).

[6] For two quite different reviews of the literature on psychological causes, see Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004), pp. 80-91; and Hudson, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism*.

[7] Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p. 125.

[8] For a discussion of these two traditions see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.) *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls* (NY, London: St Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 99-101.

[9] Alex P. Schmid, and Albert J. Jongman *et al*. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (Amsterdam: SWIDOC, 1988), pp. 7-98.

psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalise acts they are psychologically compelled to commit.'[10]

In diagnosing terrorists as mentally disturbed individuals, and portraying terrorism as violence just for the sake of violence itself, explanations like these de-politicise terrorism. Psycho-pathological explanations have been much criticised, not only for divesting terrorism of its socio-economic and political setting, but also on empirical grounds. For example, Corrado has concluded that 'political terrorists, overwhelmingly, are not viewed as suffering from mental disorders. With a few important exceptions, political terrorists are seen as being motivated by ideologies or values that justify the use of terrorism as a legitimate political tactic.'[11] Many other researchers concur, pointing out that 'the best documented generalization is negative; terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology'; on the contrary, the most outstanding characteristic of terrorists seems to be their normality.[12]
Even if terrorists are mostly normal, one has not discounted the possibility that there is 'a connection between an individual engaging in terrorist activity and developing a mental disorder' given the stress and strains of underground clandestine work.[13] Furthermore, as Sprinzak has pointed out psycho-pathological factors cannot be ruled out entirely: 'the evolution and activity of certain violent groups, especially those that are small and poorly organized, cannot be reduced to socio-political factors.'[14] The examples of ostensibly non-political religious cults engaging in terroristic violence against society, such as the *Aum Shinrikyo* in Japan and the *Rajneshees* in the US, suggest that psycho-pathological factors among the leadership must have played a significant role.

2.2 Psycho-Sociological Theories

In the second field of psychological terrorism research, the focus on individual characteristics and mechanisms is supplemented by recognition of the influence of the *environment* upon individual behaviour. There is a prodigious literature on psycho-sociological contexts for violence, drawing upon long historical research traditions.

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[10] Jerrold M. Post, 'Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces', in Walter Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), p. 25.

[11] R. Corrado, 'A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective of Political Terrorism', *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* 4/1981, p. 156.

[12] See for example Corrado, 'A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective of Political Terrorism'; Ronald Turco, 'Psychiatric Contributions to the Understanding of International Terrorism', *International Journal of Offender Theraphy and Comparative Criminology* 31 (2) (1987), pp. 153-161; D Weatherston and J Moran, 'Terrorism and mental illness: Is there a relationship?', *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology* 47 (6) (December 2003), pp. 698-713; and Charles L. Ruby, 'Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged?' *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 2 (1) (December 2002), pp. 15-26. The quotation is from K. Heskin, 'The Psychology of Terrorism in Ireland', in Yonah Alexander and M E Segal (eds) *Terrorism in Ireland* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), p. 26.

[13] Weatherston and Moran, 'Terrorism and mental illness'.

[14] Ehud Sprinzak, 'Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization', in Tore Bjørgo (ed.) *Terror From the Extreme Right* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 40.

2.2.1 Relative deprivation theories

The connection between human frustration and political violence was recognised in ancient times, and it is essential in Aristotle's classical theory of revolution. Later, these mechanisms were discussed both in Tocqueville's work on revolution and in Freud's early writings.[15] These theories connect individual mobilisation of aggression and political violence to social, economic and political circumstances. Dollard *et al.* first assumed that aggressive behaviour always originated in frustration.[16] Later, Galtung argued that the situation most likely to provoke aggressive behaviour is one in which individuals find themselves in a state of disequilibrium along various socio-political dimensions of status.[17] Davies, on the other hand, claimed that the probability of violent conflict is highest when improvements, either economic or political, increase the individual's expectations, only to be followed by a general deterioration, thus decreasing the ability to satisfy accustomed needs and expectations.[18] It is argued that tension based on the perception of *deprivation* is the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence. The line of argument follows the so-called 'DFA-linkage': deprivation produces frustration, which eventually turns into aggression against the state. Deprivation may be absolute, or alternatively, it may be *relative*, produced by an increasing gap between expectations and satisfaction. Or it may be relative in the sense that some social or ethnic groups are more affected than the general populace. Several systematic studies find support for deprivation theories at the micro- and macro-levels of society.[19]
The relative deprivation theory also seems valid for terrorism, but primarily for political deprivation, not socio-economic factors, targeting specific groups. In a quantitative cross-country analysis based on the ITERATE 2 dataset measuring transnational terrorism from 1967-77, Lai finds that 'the greater the political inequality of minority groups within a state, the more terrorism a state is likely to face.'[20] Economic measures of average individual deprivation in a state were found to be insignificant. Case studies of political violence in Northern Ireland also suggest that socio-economic changes are mostly irrelevant in explaining fluctuations in violence.[21] However, one recent study has found that economic contraction in democratic high-income countries has a significant effect on transnational terrorism.[22] This suggests that socio-economic deprivation at an individual level might also be significant (see our discussion on terrorism and poverty below).

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[15] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America Vol. II* (New York: Schocken, 1961 [1835]).

[16] J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Freer, 1939).

[17] Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Aggression', *Journal of Peace Research* 1 (2) (1964), pp. 95-119.

[18] James C. Davies, 'Toward a Theory of Revolution', *American Sociological Review* 27 (1) (1962), pp. 5-19; and James C. Davies, 'Aggression, Violence, Revolution, and War', in J. N. Knutson (ed.) *Handbook of Political Psychology* (San Fransisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1973), pp. 234-260. This hypothesis is illustrated in the well-known 'Davies' J-Curve'. See Davies, 'Toward a Theory of Revolution', p. 69.

[19] Håkan Wiberg, *Conflict Theory and Peace Research* [in Swedish] (Almqvist & Wiksell, 2nd edition, 1990); and Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970).

[20] Lai, 'Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness'.

[21] See J. L. P. Thompson, 'Deprivation and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1922-1985: A Time-Series Analysis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (4) (December 1989), pp. 676-699.

[22] S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess, and Akila Weerapana, 'Economic conditions and terrorism', *European Journal of Political Economy* 20 (2) (June 2004), pp. 463-478.

2.2.2 Social distance and mass casualty terrorism

Recent studies have used sociological theories of violence and social geometry to explain the occurrence of 'pure' or mass casualty terrorism. The point of departure is that long-standing grievances alone cannot explain extreme violence. Hence, one needs to identify the sociological interrelationships between the terrorists, their grievances, and their enemies, or 'social geometry' of the actors.[23] Senechal de la Roche has proposed that terrorism is most likely to occur under conditions of high levels of 'social distance'[24] or 'social polarization' between perpetrators and victims, including a high degree of cultural and relational distance, inequality, and functional independence.[25] Donald Black identifies other social distances as well, adding for example that terrorism has an 'inter-collective' direction: terrorists strike against civilians associated with another collectivity be it another ethno-religious group or foreign nationals. Terrorism also has an upward direction; terrorist attacks are directed against targets symbolising the central government, a dominant enemy regime, or a socio-economically or politically superior community. Thus, terrorism represents in a sense 'social control from below'.[26] According to Black, terrorism in its purest form 'arises inter-collectively and upwardly across long distances in multidimensional social space'.[27] In other words, terrorism in its most destructive form is most likely to occur when perpetrators are as socially removed from the victims as possible. Or as Black formulates:

'And the greater the social distances, the greater their destructiveness […] An excellent social location for highly destructive terrorism thus would be a grievance against a powerful nation-state by a group ethnically and otherwise extremely far away in social space, such as the indigenous people of a colonial society or members of another society.'[28]

Senechal de la Roche and Black's propositions are interesting in terms of explaining mass casualty terrorism, but remain to be tested in quantitative studies.

2.2.3 Sexuality, masculinity, and terrorism

After 11 September 2001, issues involving repressed male sexuality, gender segregation, and high sex-ratio societies have been discussed as possible avenues to understanding the new terrorism. Baruch has suggested that the 'traumatic' gender segregation in Islamic societies 'is a major cause of fundamentalism and the search for violent political activity. Suicide bombing

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[23] Donald Black, 'The Geometry of Terrorism', *Sociological Theory* 22 (1) (March 2004), p. 18.

[24] Social distance refers to difference between social locations, involving categories such as wealth, authority, integration, culture, intimacy, organisation, activities, etc.

[25] Roberta Senechal de la Roche, 'Collective Violence as Social Control', *Sociological Forum* 11 (1) (March 1996), pp. 118-122.

[26] Black, 'The Geometry of Terrorism', p. 19. See also *ibid* and Donald Black, 'Terrorism as Social Control', Parts I and II, American Sociological Association *Crime, Law, and Deviance Newsletter* (Spring 2002), pp. 3-5 and (Summer 2002), pp. 3-5.

[27] Black, 'The Geometry of Terrorism', p. 19.

[28] *Ibid*, p. 19.

is one result of hating one's sexual impulses.'[29] Lewis has suggested that anti-US terrorism by Islamist groups reflects 'a rising tide of rebellion against this Western paramountcy, and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness'.[30] A part of this struggle is the cultural clash over social mores, primarily related to the status of women and sexuality. Promiscuity and gender equality promoted through Western film and movies are seen as fundamentally threatening to a Muslim man and his honour, as they violate 'the sanctuary of his home', and jeopardize his 'mastery' over his family.[31] Kaufman has argued that the combination of the 'sexual titillation spread by western culture', and the social taboos on premarital sex for young men creates immense sexual frustration among young males. Those who are unable to cope with this tension turn to violence, either against local symbols of immorality, or against the West for having forced them into this difficult situation.[32]

However, none of these authors offers much evidence as to why this sexual frustration translated into transnational terrorism in some countries and not in others, and in recent years and not earlier. Yet the relevance of sexuality and gender-relations should not be entirely discounted. Kimmel has studied how lower middle-class men in extremist right-wing and Islamist groups use the discourse of masculinity as a symbolic capital to understand their world and depict their enemies, as well as for recruitment purposes. His study points to the enormous importance that such groups attribute to their masculinity and the need to restore a public and domestic patriarchal order.[33] It remains to be seen whether there is any systematic relationship between changes in gender relations, segregation policies, etc., on the one hand, and the occurrence of terrorism on the other. However, what seems clear is that skewed gender balance (high sex-ratio societies) and high proportions of unmarried males tend to be associated with intra-societal violence and social instability.[34] Both political and criminally motivated violence are overwhelmingly the work of young unmarried men.[35]

2.2.4 Ideologies and the tactical utility of terrorism

Pointing to the bulk of psychological literature that actually emphasises the *absence* of diverging personality traits among terrorists, as well as to the failure of socio-economic research to explain both the 'comings and goings'[36] of terrorism in relatively similar societies,

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[29] Elaine Hoffman Baruch, 'Psychoanalysis and terrorism: The need for a global 'talking cure'', *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 20 (4) (Autumn 2003), pp. 698-700.

[30] Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', *The Atlantic* 266 (3) (September 1990), pp. 47-60, www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm. Accessed July 2004.

[31] *Ibid*.

[32] National Intelligence Council, 'Social Identity and the Roots of Future Conflict', Paper by Stuart J. Kaufman for the Global Trends 2020-project, www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2003_11_06_papers/kaufman_panel2_nov6.pdf. Accessed July 2004.

[33] Michael S. Kimmel, 'Globalization and its mal(e)contents: The gendered moral and political economy of terrorism', *International Sociology* 18 (3) (September 2003), pp. 603-620.

[34] Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, 'A surplus of men, a deficit of peace: Security and sex ratios in Asia's largest states', *International Security* 26 (4) (Spring 2002), pp. 5-38.

[35] Mayra Buvinić and Andrew R. Morrison, 'Living in a More Violent World', *Foreign Policy* No.118 (Spring 2000), pp. 58-72.

[36] Accounting for the 'comings and goings' of a phenomenon means being able to explain why, in cases of similar conditions, some cases are exposed to the phenomenon while others are not. See Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 59.

Wilkinson argues that explanations of terrorism should concentrate on the social context of the terrorists' *ideologies and beliefs*. He asserts that the most powerful tool for understanding terrorism is to explore the individual political motivations of terrorists, and to relate them to the unique political, historical, and cultural context, and the ideology and aims of the groups involved.[37] (For a survey of the most common terrorist ideologies, see figure No.1 below).



Figure No. 1 - Terrorist incidents and ideologies 1968-2004.[38]

Crenshaw also argues that psychological variables must be combined with environmental factors at various levels in order to understand the causes of terrorism. Terrorism is initially a matter of individual motivations and perceptions of social conditions, and about the deliberate *choice* of the individual to join a terrorist group, to participate in acts of terrorism, and to continue engaging in terrorist activity. Hence, the phenomenon must be studied in relation to the social context in which it occurs. The central challenge is to determine *when and under what circumstances extremist organisations find terrorism useful.*[39]

There are many examples of this type of explanation of terrorism, and they basically draw upon the various strategic and tactical considerations that militant groups have made when deciding to launch terrorist campaigns. There is a vast body of literature available for students regarding motivations and justifications of political violence, seen from the perpetrators' own perspective.[40] For example, strategies of terrorism have been dealt with extensively in radical

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[37] Paul Wilkinson, 'Terrorism: An International Research Agenda?' in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (eds) *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1987), p. ix.

[38] Data from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, see http://db.mipt.org/mipt_rand.cfm.

[39] Martha Crenshaw, 'Questions to be Answered, Research to be Done, Knowledge to be Applied', Walter Reich, *Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 259.

[40] For an overview of European leftist traditions on the issue of political violence, see Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1995).

leftist and revolutionary writings from the mid-19th century. The influential booklet of the famous Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, written in June 1969, shortly before his death is a case in point. It outlined why and how their guerrilla war must be moved into the cities, and provided detailed tactical advice, emphasising that terrorism 'is a weapon the revolutionary can never relinquish.'[41] His book became extremely popular among various armed urban leftist groups, after the defeat of the rural guerrilla movements in Latin America in the 1960s. Copies of it were reportedly found among Weathermen militants in the US, the Basque ETA, the German Red Army Faction, the IRA and the Italian Red Brigades.[42] Similarly, Usama bin Laden's 'Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places' signed on 23 August 1996 somewhere in the Hindukush Mountains in Afghanistan provides good insight into why he and his followers consider global terrorism an indispensable tactic.[43]

Among the various explanations for why extremist groups find terrorism useful is the thesis that it results from the failure of other attempts to achieve influence, in particular the ineffectiveness of non-violent means of struggle to address political or ethnic grievances. Thus, the choice of terrorism represents 'the outcome of a learning process from own experiences and the experience of others.'[44] As many revolutionaries have experienced, the masses seldom rise spontaneously to the call for revolt. The failure to mobilise popular support for a radical political programme may trigger the decision to employ terrorism in order to engineer a violent confrontation with the authorities. Besides demonstrating that illegal opposition actually is possible, a successful terrorist attack can inspire the belief among perpetrators that terrorism might be a shortcut to revolution and that it may act as a catalyst for mass revolt.[45] The decision to employ terrorism may be ideologically grounded in revolutionary theories in which political violence plays an essential role in sparking off a mass uprising and a popular revolution. The Red Army Faction, for example, believed that their 'armed struggle' would sooner or later inspire mass support. They were heavily criticized by leftist intellectuals for their failure to build a mass organisation, but their response was that the effect of their campaign would in the end 'change peoples' attitudes to the state, following the government's antiterrorist measures'.[46]

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[41] Carlos Marighella, 'Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla', Brazil, 1969, www.military-media.com/download/mini.pdf. Accessed April 2004.

[42] Lenny Flank Jr., 'Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla: Introduction', *The Non-Leninist Marxism Webpage* http://web.archive.org/web/20000308014812/www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1587/miniman1.htm. Accessed April 2004.

[43] For a good collection of al-Qaida primary sources, see Thomas Hegghammer, 'Al-Qaida Statements 2003-2004 - A compilation of translated texts by Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri', *FFI Research Report* No. 2005/01428 (Kjeller, Norway, FFI, 2005); and Thomas Hegghammer, 'Documentation on Al-Qa'ida - Interviews, Statements and Other Primary Sources, 1990-2002 [all primary material in English, commentaries in Norwegian]', *FFI Research Report* No.2002/01393 (Kjeller, Norway, FFI, 2002), http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2002/01393.pdf. Accessed June 2005.

[44] Martha Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice', in Walter Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 11.

[45] Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism', p. 19.

[46] Quoted in David J. Whittaker (ed.) *The Terrorism Reader* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 190.

Another explanation is that the decision to employ terrorism stems from the 'useful agenda-setting function' of international terrorist acts. In the age of modern electronic media, spectacular acts of dramatic violence have the potential of bringing the world's attention towards grievances and tragedies that would otherwise have been forgotten. A good example of this is PFLP commander George Habash's statement from the early 1970s that by using terrorism, 'we force people to ask what is going on'.[47]

A third explanation relates to the perceptions of a 'window of opportunity' which sometimes may be influential in determining whether sub-state groups turn to terrorism against the regime, for example, when specific socio-economic or political circumstances have temporarily tilted the balance of resources in the government's disfavour.[48] Such influential resources might be new sources of funding, or changes in the climate of international opinion, which reduce the regime's legitimacy. Also, a sudden downturn in a dissident organisation's fortunes may prompt an underground organisation to act in order to show its strength and potential. Parliamentary elections are particularly attractive periods for attacks, since they present a golden opportunity for influencing the public ahead of their most important political act: casting the democratic vote. The al-Qaida bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004, only days ahead of the Spanish elections, were specifically timed to induce the Spanish electorate to vote in a new government, which had the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq on its election program.

A variant of this explanation is 'terrorism by spoilers', a thesis deriving from Stedman's writings on civil wars and peace processes. Stedman analysed the context of decisions to violate cease-fires during peace negotiations, and to re-launch insurgent or terrorist campaigns. He found that radical members of coalition groups will choose to resume and even escalate hostilities with a view to prevent a compromise between the moderate factions on both sides, and to undermine the government's confidence in ongoing negotiations. By discrediting its moderate coalition partners and preventing further progress in peace talks, radical factions regain the initiative, and avoid marginalisation.[49]

A prime example of this dynamic is the increased level of violence by rejectionist groups following the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993. Both secular and Islamist Palestinian factions vowed to launch an 'armed Intifada' to frustrate the Accords between the moderate PLO leadership and the dovish Israeli Labour party. The Israeli right responded in a similar manner: *Kach* and other militant settler groups vowed to set up their own militias to defy and shoot any Palestinian policemen in sight. The most dramatic act of violence was

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[47] Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism', p. 18.

[48] *Ibid*, p. 13.

[49] Stephen John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security* 22 (2) (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53. For a similar discussion, see Pierre M. Atlas and Roy Licklider, 'Conflict Among Former Allies After Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad and Lebanon', *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (1), pp. 35-54; Andrew Kydd, and Barbara F. Walter, 'Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence', *International Organization* 56 (2) (April 2002), pp. 263-296; and R. Williams Ayres, 'Enemies of Peace: Spoilers in Ethnic Conflict Peace Processes', Paper for International Studies Association Convention, Portland, Oregon, 26 February-2 March 2003.

perpetrated by a Brooklyn-born *Kach* activist Baruch Goldstein, who machine-gunned and killed 29 Muslim worshippers in the Hebron mosque on 25 February 1994. This massacre 'profoundly affected Hamas'' position on the nature of its targets in Israel and the occupied territories', and became 'a turning point in Hamas strategy', prompting the organisation to unleash its suicide weapon against unarmed civilians inside Israel.[50]

Vengeance as a motive in terrorism is perhaps more visible when the terrorist campaign is well under way, than it is at its onset.[51] Terrorist groups and their enemy government often become locked in a cycle of attacks and counter-attacks, and the driving force is less the logic of deterrence, but more their respective constituencies' demands that their victims must be avenged. Hence, terrorist attacks and counter-terrorist operations may assume an almost 'ritualistic' character.[52] This explains the protractedness of terrorist campaigns, rather than their beginning. In seeking revenge, terrorists may also fuse their ideological convictions with personal grievances. Jessica Stern noted in the case of Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed several US contractors outside the CIA Headquarters in Langley in 1993, that Kansi himself 'described his actions as 'between jihad and tribal revenge' - jihad against America for its support of Israel and revenge against the CIA, which he apparently felt had mistreated his father during Afghanistan's war against the Soviets.'[53]

2.2.4.1 The contagion theory of terrorism

An important variant of the psycho-sociological research tradition is the thesis that terrorism is 'contagious'. A contagion phenomenon is, for example, observed in the variance in terrorists' decisions to launch operations. A number of studies have demonstrated that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is far from random, but that there is a clear trend of periodical cycle in the occurrence of terrorist attacks, or waves of terrorism. A high level of terrorism in one month is likely to be followed by few incidents in the next month, suggesting that the decision by terrorist groups to launch an attack is influenced by similar attacks elsewhere, hence, the 'concept of contagion'. These periodic 'waves' of terrorism may be partly explained by the desire of terrorists to guarantee newsworthiness and consequently, media access.[54] According to Weimann and Brosius, there is 'accumulating empirical evidence pointing to the contagiousness of terrorism' with regards to the timing of terrorist attacks.[55]

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[50] Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 166-7.

[51] For a study on the importance of revenge as a motive in political violence, see Peter Waldman, 'Revenge without rules: On the renaissance of an archaic motif of violence', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24 (6) (November 2001), pp. 435–450.

[52] See for example John Soule, *A Case Study of Terrorism: Northern Ireland 1970-1990* (NY: Carnegie, 2004, Case Study No.5).

[53] Jessica Stern, 'The Protean Enemy', *Foreign Affairs* 82 (4) (July/August 2003), p. 34.

[54] Gabriel Weimann and Hans-Bernd Brosius, 'The Predictability of International Terrorism: A Time-Series Analysis', *Journal of Terrorism* 11 (6) (1988), p. 500.

[55] *Ibid.* See also Manus I. Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw and Fumihiko Yoshida, 'Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism', *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (2) (1980), pp. 262-298; Amy Sands Redlick, 'The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism', in Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson (eds) *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 73-95; and Tore Bjørgo, *Racist and Rightwing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1997), pp.249ff.

The contagion theory also refers to the observed phenomenon that high levels of terrorism in one country often are associated with increased incidents of terrorism in neighbouring states in the region, whether by the same organisation, by 'second-generation' groups, by foreign sympathisers and coalition partners, or simply by imitators.[56] In a cross-country quantitative analysis based on the ITERATE dataset for all countries in the period 1968-1977, Lai finds support for the hypothesis that 'the greater the amount of terrorism in a state's region, the greater the amount of terrorism a state is likely to face the next year.'[57]

A third aspect of the contagiousness of terrorism is that terrorist groups learn from each other, and successful operations in one country are imitated by groups elsewhere. For example, the spread of sky-jackings and other high-profile hostage taking incidents from the end of the 1960s was in no small measure a result of the stunning successes of the new Palestinian groups in gaining worldwide attention through their use of terrorism. It encouraged a wide variety of leftist-nationalist groups to employ similar tactics.[58] The wave of hijackings was only arrested when new security measures such as metal detectors were installed at airports worldwide. The next quantum leap in airborne terrorism, namely the September 11th attacks, was also quickly followed by a number of copycat incidents. In January 2002 an American teenager deliberately crashed a Cessna 172 aircraft into the 42 story Bank of America Plaza building in Tampa, Florida, leaving a handwritten note behind in which he praised the actions of al-Qaida and claimed to be 'acting on their behalf'.[59] Eight months later a suspected suicide bomber from the Colombian *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* ('Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia', or FARC) planned to crash an aircraft loaded with explosives into the Presidential Palace in Bogota.[60] Towards the end of the year, an Israeli-Arab citizen attempted to break into the cockpit of an El Al-plane with the intention to crash it into a high-rise building in Tel-Aviv.[61] Many other terrorist techniques are also communicated worldwide, including expertise in constructing the number one terrorist weapon: the improvised explosive device (IED). Recent investigations into the use of IED in cars by Islamist groups suggest 'a global bomb-making network', as the same designs for car bombs have been found at terrorist attack sites in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.[62]

Modern mass media is key to understanding the contagion of terrorism and terrorist techniques. The extensive media coverage of the terrorists attracts attention to the group's

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[56] Martha Crenshaw (ed.) *Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1983), p. 15. See also Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida, 'Why Violence Spreads'.

[57] Lai, 'Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness', p. 29.

[58] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1998)., pp. 67ff.

[59] See transcript of the two-page suicide note, released by investigators in February 2002 available at www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/tampasu1.html. Accessed October 2004. See also 'Police: Tampa Pilot Voiced Support For Bin Laden Crash Into Bank Building a Suicide, Officials Say', *CNN.com* 7 January 2002.

[60] Martin Hodgson, 'Thirteen Die in Bogota Explosions as Hardline President is Sworn In', *The Guardian* 8 August 2002,

[61] Dexter Filkins, 'Israeli Arab Charged in Hijacking Attempt on El Al', *International Herald Tribune* 19 November 2002, p. 3.

[62] David Johnston, 'U.S. Agency Sees Global Network for Bomb Making', *The New York Times* 22 February 2004.

cause. Since an increasingly large section of the world's population is exposed to international media coverage, information concerning specific terrorist tactics and *modus operandi* are thus communicated worldwide. Due to the information revolution, the ideologies, rhetoric and beliefs justifying the violence are transmitted transnationally with greater ease than ever before. Even back in the 1970s it was noted that 'informational flows, thus, seem to benefit militants or discontented individuals or groups in today's international system'.[63]

Extensive collaborative arrangements, transborder networks, and personal relationships of trust between terrorist groups are other key factors in explaining the contagiousness of terrorism. Crenshaw writes:

> 'Terrorist organizations frequently have direct, physical contacts with other terrorist groups and with foreign countries. Collaboration extends to buying weapons, finding asylum, obtaining passports, and false documents, acquiring funds, and sometimes rendering assistance in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. […] it means that transnational links among groups with shared aims make terrorism in one state likely to lead to terrorism in nearby states.'[64]

There are many examples of such transborder contacts, and collaborative relationships, sometimes forged by state sponsors, which facilitate joint training and financial support. For example, shared support from Cuba and the USSR was important in forging links between a number of left-wing guerrilla organizations in Latin America, such as the *Shining Path*, the *Tupamaros*, and others.[65] During the 1970s and 80s, several Palestinian and European leftist groups formed close transnational links, especially the German *Red Army Faction* (RAF), the Italian *Red Brigades*, and *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (PFLP), even if their goals did not always coincide. In these cases, personal contacts were established during joint training sessions in camps in countries such as Algeria, Libya and Lebanon, paving the way for 'joint operations' such as the hijacking of an Air France airliner to Entebbe, Uganda, and a Lufthansa plane to Mogadishu in the late 1970s.[66] In Europe, various leftist groups stayed in close contact, occasionally forming alliances, and learning from one another. The wave of terrorist attacks on NATO targets in the mid-1980s was a co-ordinated campaign launched by a number of European leftist groups, including the Italian *Red Brigades*, German *Red Army Faction*, the Belgian *Communist Combattant Cells*, and the French *Direct Action*. These were similar groups, both in terms of ideologies and recruitment patterns.[67]

The common need for arms and explosives has also induced terrorist groups of different ideological colours to work together and learn from one another. During the 1970s and 80s, the shipping of arms to Europe was reportedly a joint venture between Middle Eastern and

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[63] Redlick, 'The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism', p. 91. See also Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p.115; and Wilkinson, 'Terrorism: An International Research Agenda?' pp. xv-xvi.

[64] Crenshaw, *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power*, p. 17.

[65] Louise Richardson, 'Terrorists as Transnational Actors', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11 (4) (Winter 1999), p. 218.

[66] *Ibid*, p. 217.

[67] *Ibid*, p. 217.

European terrorist groups. According to one study, weapons were procured in Lebanon, and the Red Brigades transported the goods from there to Sardinia, where several European groups came to pick up their share and paid the Red Brigades handsome fees for the job.[68] Even strictly national-separatist groups such as the IRA and ETA took part in this weapons' trade. To improve their capabilities and survive as terrorist organisations, they both formed transnational links far beyond their areas of origin. The example of ETA is telling. According to Shabad and Ramo, ETA members

> 'have been given training in Third World countries such as Yemen, Algeria, Libya, and Cuba. Available data suggest that ETA's arms come from the Middle East, and some of its funds have been provided by the Libyan government. Purchase of weapons, mostly from Communist Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union, was coordinated with other European terrorist groups.'[69]

More recent studies have also found ETA links to Nicaragua and Lebanon, as well as to the Algerian *Armed Islamic Group* (GIA), the most active Islamist terrorist group in Europe in the mid-1990s. ETA is believed to have provided training for GIA 'in the production of explosives, guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism,' while ETA has 'obtained weapons, safe houses, and other logistics support from Islamic networks in Europe.'[70] However, reports of co-operation with al-Qaida have not been confirmed.[71]

The IRA in Northern Ireland was also known to nurture extensive transnational contacts with other groups, in addition to its international support network, especially its network in the United States. Beginning in the 1970s, the IRA established lasting ties with ETA, one of its closest foreign partners.[72] It also promoted itself by offering cutting-edge expertise in bomb-making to potentially sympathetic groups abroad. During the early 1980s, for example, members of the IRA's political wing approached the Norwegian Lapp activist movement with an offer to assist in sabotaging the Norwegian electric infrastructure in protest against a controversial construction of an electric power plant on Lapp territory in northern Norway.

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[68] Loretta Napoleoni, 'The New Economy of Terror', *Signs of the Time website* 1 December 2003, www.signsofthetimes.org.uk/Loretta.html. See also Ely Karmon, 'The Red Brigades: Cooperation with the Palestinian Terrorist Organizations (1970 – 1990)', *International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism website* 1 April 2001, www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=365.

[69] Goldie Shabad and Francisco José Llera Ramo, 'Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain', in Martha Crenshaw (ed.) *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, Pennsylvania**:** Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 444-445.

[70] 'Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)', *Center for Defense Information website* 15 March 2004, www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1135; 'Basque Fatherland and Liberty', at *Global Security.org website*, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/eta.htm. Accessed May 2004; and Ed Holt & Deirdre Tynan, 'Anthrax scares sweep country: Bio-terrorism panic hits Slovakia', *The Slovak Spectator* 22 October 2001, http://www.spectator.sk/clanok.asp?vyd=2001040&cl=2762. Accessed May 2004.

[71] Interview with a leading Spanish counter-terrorism official, September 2004. According to a study from 2002, Spanish authorities suspected that ETA and Islamists associated with al-Qaida had attempted to form a collaborative relationship: 'Representatives from ETA and Osama Bin Laden reportedly met in Brussels, but there were frictions after the Islamic fundamentalists refused to continue the meeting in the presence of a Basque woman who preferred to stay. Spanish sources claim that Mohammed Atta […] also tried to forge links between al-Qaeda and ETA terrorists'. See Emerson Vermaat, 'Bin Laden's Terror Networks in Europe' Toronto: The Mackenzie Institute, Occasional Paper, 26 May 2002, www.mackenzieinstitute.com/commentary.html. Accessed June 2003.

[72] Shabad and Ramo, 'Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain', pp. 444-445.

This offer was rebuffed, however.[73] More recently, three suspected IRA militants were jailed in Colombia, accused of training FARC guerrillas in advanced explosives and urban guerrilla warfare.

Even the close-knit and reclusive *Revolutionary Organisation 17 November* in Greece reportedly forged co-operative links with foreign Marxist movements, according to recent investigations, particularly with its counterparts in Turkey, the *Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front* (DHKP/C) as well as with the *Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK).[74]

3 SOCIETAL EXPLANATIONS

National and systemic levels of analysis are so far assumed to be the most applicable for this study. Higher-level analyses first and foremost have the advantage of not being constrained by too many situational and case specific factors, and may, as such, provide viable generalisable explanations. Societal explanations can therefore be more easily integrated into a more comprehensive and predictive model on terrorism.

At the societal level of analysis, explanations of terrorism are primarily sought in the historical development and culture of a larger society or system, and in its contemporary social, economic and political characteristics and environments. Research questions often focus on whether it is possible to identify a causal relationship between certain characteristics of a society, and the occurrence of terrorism within the same society. Systemic explanations might include virtually all developments in the global system, such as patterns of conflict and co-operation, international trade and investments, and distribution of wealth and power.

Treating terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon, analyses at this level usually acknowledge, from a theoretical perspective, the ultimate importance of the individual actors of terrorism. Terrorism *is* obviously dependent on motivated individuals and on psychological processes at the lower levels of analysis. However, practical integration of individual and societal levels of analysis has traditionally been a significant challenge for research on terrorism, causing theories to take the influence of psychological factors for granted, without further accounting for such influence in the analysis.

Authors of societal explanations frequently distinguish between *precipitants* and *preconditions* of terrorism.[75] Precipitants are the specific events or phenomena that immediately precede the outbreak of terrorism, while preconditions are the circumstances that set the stage for terrorism

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[73] Crenshaw (ed.) *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power*, p. 17. For the IRA offer to the Norwegian Lapp movement, see Tore Bjørgo, 'Norske dammer – i hvilken grad er de sannsynlige terror- og sabotasjemål?' Oslo, NUPI, April 2003, Research Paper, www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Terror_mot_dammer.PDF. Accessed December 2003.

[74] This co-operation reportedly included assistance in arms provision and training. See 'Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (17N)', *Center for Defense Information website* 5 August 2002, www.cdi.org/terrorism/17N.cfm.

[75] Harry Eckstein, 'On the etiology of internal wars', in Ivo K. Feierabend *et al*. (eds) *Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972); Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism*; and Crenshaw (ed.) *Terrorism in Context*; and Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism'.

in the long-run.[76] One example of a precipitant is the German police's killing of the 26-year-old student activist Benno Ohnesorg on 2 June 1967 during a demonstration, an episode that galvanized a group of radical leftist students to take up arms and form the Red Army Faction (RAF). Gudrun Ensslin, who later became co-founder of RAF and one of its key leaders, had reportedly stated at a student meeting shortly after the deadly clashes: 'This fascist state means to kill us all. We must organise resistance. Violence is the only way to answer violence. This is the Auschwitz generation, and there's no arguing with them!'[77] Another example of a precipitant was the 17 November 1973 student uprising in Athens, which was brutally subdued by the Greek military junta and which led to the formation of the 'Revolutionary Organisation 17 November', one of the most active terrorist organisations in Europe in the 1980s.

Preconditions include factors such as the vulnerabilities of modern open societies to terroristic violence, available physical opportunities for organising terrorist cells, as well as long-term motivational factors such as elite disaffection, the existence of grievances among a subgroup, discrimination, and lack of opportunity for political participation.[78]

3.1 The Impact of Modernisation

In the modernisation literature one finds an extensive field of theory relating political violence to the changes brought about by the processes of modernisation[79] and globalisation. These theories date back to the sociologist Emile Durkheim and his classical theory of the transition from the pre-modern organic solidarity to the modern mechanic society.[80] The basic classical argument in this tradition is that the modernisation process has a harrowing effect on the social fabric of society that may weaken the legitimacy of the state, and, ultimately, promote the use of political violence. Later, the so-called dependency school linked poverty and underdevelopment in the Third World to global economic exploitative structures, which caused the proliferation of predatory regimes and civil wars. More recently, globalisation critics have promoted similar arguments about a causal chain from economic globalisation to

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[76] Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p. 114.

[77] Gudrun Ensslin quoted in Stefan Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group* (London: The Bodley Head, 1987), p. 44.

[78] Crenshaw (ed.) *Terrorism in Context*, and Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism'.

[79] The concept of 'modernisation' has often been mistakenly defined as Westernisation. For example, Giddens, defines modernisation and modernity as 'the modes of social life and organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence'. In his writing on Islamism, Utvik offers a two-fold definition: '(a) historic processes of technological and economic change under way in some areas of Europe since the 16th century and in the Middle East from the 19th century, producing a society where market relations dominate production and exchange, where the cities contain the bulk of the population, and where industry is the dominant branch of production; and (b) the attendant processes of social and political change: at a social level, the break-up of tightly-knit traditional units dominated by family and patron-client relations within urban quarter, college, or kinship groups; at a political level, the increased mobilization of the population and the rapid growth and centralisation of the state apparatus'. See Anthony Giddens, *The consequences of modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 1; and Bjørn Olav Utvik, 'The Modernising Force of Islamism', in John L. Esposito and François Burgat (eds) *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East* (London: Hurst Publishing, 2003), p. 44.

[80] See for example Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953); Ernest Gellner, 'Nationalism and Modernization', in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994 [1964]), pp. 55-63; Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Univ. Press, 1968); and (1968), Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin (eds) *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism* (NY: Sage, 1982); and Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1985).

underdevelopment, and poverty to violent conflicts. For simplicity, I will term this school structuralist.[81]

Another line of argument, liberal theory, focuses less on the transitional problems of modernisation and more on its potentially positive end effects. Modernisation, based on free trade and an open economy, will foster a high level of economic development, which in itself lowers the potential for violent conflict. A prosperous, developed economy will also lay the ground for democratic rule, which again, together with a high level of economic development, has a stabilising effect on internal affairs and ultimately promotes domestic peace. It also promotes international peace as democracies very rarely fight other democracies. In short, the liberal school's view is that modernisation leads to prosperity, which in turn, reduces the chances of violent conflict, either directly or via political reform and democratisation.[82] However, in the literature on the causes of terrorism, one finds more support for the structuralist paradigm than for the liberal school.

3.1.1 Rapid economic growth and terrorism

Following the structuralist school, causes of political violence and terrorism may be traced to the process of economic modernisation and growth. The model proposes that industrialisation and economic modernisation influence society in such a way that individuals are willing to resort to terrorism. The hypothesised causal chain runs from the dissolutional effects of modernisation upon existing social norms and structures, through the rise of a society in which individuals find themselves alienated from social bonds, without any recognised structures of organisation and influence, to the mobilisation of frustration into terrorist activity. The line of reasoning can be traced back to classical psycho-sociological theories of frustration and relative deprivation.

A prominent example of the rapid modernisation equals violence-model is Samuel Huntington's classical study *Political Order in Changing Societies*.[83] Huntington argues that

> 'not only does social and economic modernisation produce instability but the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernisation […] for example wherever industrialisation occurred *rapidly*, introducing sharp *discontinuities* between the pre-

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[81] See discussion in Håvard Hegre, Rannveig Gissinger, Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Globalization and Internal Conflict', in Gerald Schneider, Kathrine Barbieri, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (eds) *Globalization and Armed Conflict* (Lanhan: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 252ff.

[82] Originally being a theory of causal mechanisms in interstate relations, as put forward and tested by Erich Weede and others, the liberal model has also proven to be valid for domestic relations, too. See Erich Weede, 'Economic Policy and International Security: Rent Seeking, Free Trade, and Democratic Peace', *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (4) (1995), pp. 519-537. Immanuel Kant's essay 'Perpetual Peace,' first set out the line of reasoning relating economic dependence to peace through the consolidation of a liberal republican state. See Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in Hans Reiss (ed.) *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991 [1795]), pp. 93-130. See also Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution, and Political Unrest', *Journal of World-Systems Research* 5 (2) (Summer 1999), pp. 274-300; and Ranveig Gissinger, 'Does an Open Economy Lead to Civil War?' Paper for International Studies Association Conference, Minneapolis, 17-21 March 1998.

[83] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

> industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist working-class movements emerged.'[84]

Huntington observed that the speed of modernisation has been much higher in the non-Western world, and argued that 'the heightened drive for social and economic change and development was directly related to the increasing political instability and violence that characterized Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the years after the Second World War.'[85] Hence, the causal direction tends to be for the occurrence and extent of civil violence to be higher in countries that have had the highest rate of economic growth. Another prominent example from the modernisation causes violence-school is Charles Tilly's classic study *From Mobilization to Revolution* where he explains food riots and other collective violence in early European history as defensive reactions to industrialisation and the rapid social changes that it generated.[86] Recent studies in criminology have also found that 'crime booms' are more likely to occur in industrializing than industrialized nations.[87]

To what degree are these theories valid for terrorism? There are no studies that I am aware of which explicitly examine the impact of rapid modernisation on *international* terrorism, which in itself is remarkable. As for its impact on domestic or intra-state terrorism, Engene finds that rapid economic modernisation, measured in growth in real GDP[88], has a strong, significant impact on levels of ideological terrorism in Western Europe. Engene's unique dataset, the TWEED, covers 18 Western European countries for the period 1950-95.[89] However, introducing a distinction between ethnically and ideologically motivated terrorism, Engene finds that there is nearly no systematic relationship between modernisation and ethnic terrorism.[90]

3.1.2 Resource wars

Modernisation processes are all very different, but some trajectories of economic development have greater propensity of fostering conflict than others. The literature on modernisation theories, rentier states, and resource conflicts, has highlighted that export of *natural resources*, especially oil, mineral resources, and diamonds, hampers economic development, impedes the creation of a democratic order, and increases the likelihood of civil war.[91] This is first and

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[84] *Ibid*, p. 45.

[85] *Ibid*, p. 47.

[86] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

[87] Gary LaFree and Kriss Drass, 'Counting Crime Booms Among Nations: Evidence for Homicide Victimization Rates, 1956 to 1998', *Criminology* 40 (4) (2002), pp. 769-799.

[88] Economic growth in real GDP is frequently used as an indicator of economic modernisation in research on conflict and violence.

[89] For more information on his dataset, see Engene, with Katja H-W Skjølberg, 'Data on Intrastate Terrorism: The TWEED Project', Paper for Uppsala Conference on Conflict Data, 8 - 9 June 2001, www.pcr.uu.se/conferenses/Euroconference/tweed-uu.pdf. Accessed May 2004.

[90] Engene, *Patterns of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-95* and Jan Oskar Engene, *European Terrorism: Violence, State, and Legitimacy* [in Norwegian] (Oslo: TANO, 1994).

[91] The oil-impedes-democracy thesis is found to be robust, and is also valid for non-fuel mineral wealth. For a review of recent studies concerning natural resources and civil wars, see Michael L. Ross, 'What do we know about natural resources and civil war?' *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3) (May 2004), pp. 337-356. See also Michael Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?' *World Politics* 53 (April 2001), pp. 325-361.

foremost the case in underdeveloped countries where political institutions are weak, corruption is pervasive, and elite groups fight over the spoils. While resource scarcity previously was believed to be a major conflict-generating factor, it is increasingly acknowledged that the very abundance of certain natural resources is perhaps more dangerous than scarcity.[92] Sudden influx of petro-dollars, diamond revenues, or profits from rare timber and gold mines, create dysfunctional economies ('the Dutch disease') and foster cleptocratic regimes and authoritarian rentier states.[93] Such regimes are associated with a higher likelihood for violent conflict.

However, different natural resources have different impacts. Oil and mineral resources appear to increase the likelihood of civil war, particularly separatist conflict.[94] The abundance of 'lootable commodities' such as gemstones and drugs in less developed countries do not necessarily cause civil wars in the first place, but tend to make armed conflicts more protracted since they are easily exploitable by rebel armies. Lootable commodities also play a role in financing international terrorism. The illicit diamond trade has been used to finance a number of insurgent and terrorist organisations, including al-Qaida and Hizbullah.[95]

The 'resource curse' is not limited to the Middle East, where all oil-rich countries are either authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, and many of them experience periodic waves of civil violence and terrorism. Oil-rich Nigeria has long ranked among the top countries in terms of exposure to petroleum-related terrorism.[96] It also suffers from most of the maladies associated with Third World petro-modernisation.[97]

Oil wealth has also become a factor in the recent surge of Islamist terrorism. Although Western 'theft' of Middle Eastern petroleum resources has been a theme in the ideologies of a number of terrorist organisations over the years, al-Qaida has specifically focused on this issue in its ideological literature and has, furthermore, devoted considerable resources to disrupting Middle Eastern oil supplies from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In a recently published study of

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[92] Indra De Soysa, 'Natural Resources & Civil War: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot?' Paper for the International Studies Association Conference, Los Angeles, 14-18 March 2000. On resources and conflict, see also Günter Baechler, 'Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis', *Environmental Change and Security Project* Issue 4 (Spring 1998, The Woodrow Wilson Center), pp. 24-44.

[93] See for example Giacomo Luciani, 'The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratisation', in Ghassan Salamé (ed.) *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, pp. 130-155; and Robert Looney, 'Iraqi Oil: A Gift from God or the Devil's Excrement?' *Strategic Insights* II (7) (July 2003).

[94] Ross, 'What do we know about natural resources and civil war?'.

[95] 'For a Few Dollars More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade', Report by Global Witness, London, April 2003, http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00041.html; and 'Hezbollah and the West African Diamond Trade', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 6 (7) (June/July 2004), www.meib.org/articles/0407_l2.htm

[96] Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kjøk, 'Energy Supply As Terrorist Targets? Patterns of 'Petroleum Terrorism' 1968–99', in Daniel Heradstveit and Helge Hveem (eds) *Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to Democracy and Development* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 100-124.

[97] The Lilliputian province of Ogoniland in Nigeria, home to six oil fields, is perhaps one of the most chilling examples: the past four decades of oil drilling have been described by an American anthropologist as 'a tale of terror and tears,' an 'ecological catastrophe, social deprivation, political marginalization, and a rapacious company capitalism in which unaccountable foreign transnationals are granted a sort of immunity by the state'. See Michael Watts, 'Petro-Violence in Nigeria and Ecuador', in Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, *Violent Environments* (Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 2001), p. 196.

patterns of terrorist attacks on petroleum-related targets worldwide, Åshild Kjøk and I found that nearly two per cent of transnational terrorism since 1968, as recorded in the ITERATE Chronology, has targeted the petroleum industry. The most important motivating factors appeared to be opposition to the regime, to foreign companies exploiting natural resources, and criminal extortion.[98]

3.1.3 From tribal societies to mixed market-clientalist economies

Another variant of the modernisation-causes-violence theory is found in the writings of Michel Mousseau.[99] He links social approval for terrorism with the difficult transition process of clientalist societies to modern market democracies. Autocratic clientalist states in the developing world today are increasingly exposed to pressures to adopt values and beliefs from liberal market democracies, giving rise to 'mixed market-clientalist economies of the developing world, triggering intense anti-market resentment directed primarily against the epitome of market civilization: the United States'.[100] Clientalist economies are characterised by collectivism, intense in-group loyalties, and dearth of empathy with out-groups, while market economies, through their widespread practice of entrepeneurship and exchange based on contractual relationships and fixed laws, promote values of individualism, universalism, tolerance and respect for equal rights. The transition from the former to the latter frequently entails civil violence and instability; as clientalist relationships are disrupted, the power of patrons is broken, and rent is redistributed in the favour of new elites. (Other authors have pointed out that clientalist systems, in which corruption is pervasive, do not necessarily promote conflict as long as they are stable and predictable. Le Billon has noted that violent conflicts 'may be engendered by changes in the pattern of corruption rather than the existence of corruption itself.'[101] Sudden changes in clientalist systems cause disruption in the traditional distribution of rent, and generate motivations for rebelling against the system.)

Mousseau's theory may explain the remarkable degree of approval, if not outright support, for al-Qaida's mass murder in New York and Washington, far beyond the radical jihadist movements.

3.1.4 Economic inequality and terrorism

Income inequality is another modernisation-related factor that has been claimed to be conducive to political violence, both in developed, as well as in less developed countries. Back in 1835, Tocqueville argued that '[a]lmost all of the revolutions which have changed the aspect of nations have been made to consolidate or to destroy social inequality.'[102] Tocqueville identified two opposing routes through which inequality might have an impact on revolution –

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[98] Lia and Kjøk, 'Energy Supply As Terrorist Targets?'

[99] Michael Mousseau, 'Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror', *International Security* 27 (3) (Winter 2002-3), pp. 5-29.

[100] *Ibid*, p. 6.

[101] Philippe Le Billon, 'Buying Peace or Fuelling War? The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflict', *Journal of International Development* 15 (4) (2003), pp. 413-426.

[102] de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 302.

through the aim of consolidating inequality and through the aim of destroying it. The theoretical argument is rooted in relative deprivation theory and related hypotheses.

With regard to violence of a non-political nature, economic inequalities are a critical explanatory factor.[103] Cross-country studies of violent crime have found a significant correlation with socio-economic inequalities.[104] The picture is less clear with regard to political violence. Several studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between inequality and armed conflict – that is, a tendency for countries with a high level of internal inequality to be more exposed to internal armed conflicts.[105] Other studies have found no correlation. Overall, there is 'a diverse and ambiguous range of findings' in this field and one finds more support for 'a relationship between average per capita income across countries and civil conflict, than between income inequality within a country and civil conflict.'[106] There is also evidence that many countries seem to tolerate increased inequality without greater exposure to violent conflict as long as there is economic growth.[107]

It seems clear that large socio-economic inequalities are more conflict generating if economic growth prospects are negative, and if they are reinforced by other grievances of a more political nature, such as ethnic discrimination (see previous section on relative deprivation). Recent research underlines the centrality of 'persistent horizontal inequalities' in explaining violent conflicts. Horizontal inequality refers to inequality between culturally defined groups in categories such as income, employment, as well as access to political participation, etc.[108] Conversely, countries where cultural and class divisions 'crisscross', where all cultural groups are significantly represented in both poor and rich social strata, are far less exposed to violent conflict.[109] In the case of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, Murshed and Gates find that 'horizontal or inter-group inequality is highly relevant' in explaining the conflict.[110] Not only are the economically most disadvantaged regions most involved in the fighting, but the insurgent movement also reflects the ethnic and caste dimensions of Nepalese society.

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[103] Based on UN surveys (the UN's Global Report on Crime and Justice), Buvinić and Morrison find that 'socio-economic strain measured by unemployment, inequality, and dissatisfaction with income is a major factor in explaining the variation in 'contact crimes' (such as assault, threats, sexual violence, and sexual harassment and robbery) among countries in the world'. Mayra Buvinić and Andrew R Morrison, 'Living in a More Violent World', *Foreign Policy* 118/2000, p. 65.

[104] Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, 'Inequality and Violent Crime', *Journal of Law and Economics* 45 (1) (2002), pp. 1-40.

[105] Volker Bornschier, and Christopher Chase-Dunn, *Transnational Corporations and Underdevelopment* (New York: Praeger, 1985); Edward Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Inequality and Insurgency', *American Political Science Review* 82 (2) (June 1987), pp. 425-51; and Terry Boswell, and William J. Dixon, 'Dependency and Rebellion: a Crossnational Analysis', *American Sociological Review* 55 (4) (1990), pp. 540-559.

[106] See discussion in Robert MacCulloch, 'The Impact of Income on the Taste for Revolt', *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4) (October 2004), forthcoming.

[107] Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 'Globalization and Internal Conflict', p. 272.

[108] Frances Stewart, 'The Root Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies' in Nafziger *et al* (eds) 2000, *War, Hunger and Displacement* Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[109] Bethany Lacina, 'From Side Show to Centre Stage: Civil Conflict after the Cold War', *Security Dialogue* 35 (2) (June 2004), pp. 197-98.

[110] S. Mansoob Murshed, and Scott Gates, 'Spatial-horizontal inequality and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal', Research Paper, World Bank website, 28 February 2003, www.worldbank.org/research/inequality/June18Papers/NepalConflict.pdf. Accessed April 2004.

With regard to the linkage to terrorism, the picture is similarly ambiguous. The impact of political rule on terrorism appears to be stronger than vertical socio-economic inequalities alone. In the case of Latin America, Feldman and Perälä find significant connections between political governance factors and the incidence of domestic terrorism, but not so with regard to 'economic performance or structural economic conditions'.[111] This is similar to the findings of Lai. His study finds robust results for a positive relationship between political deprivation of groups and the level of terrorism against the state, while economic measures of average individual deprivation in a state, such as low levels of GDP/capita or negative percent change in GDP/capita appeared to have little effect.[112] Lai's study uses data on transnational terrorism (ITERATE), not intra-state terrorism data, which might explain the results. In an important study of domestic political terrorism in Western Europe between 1950 and 1995, Engene finds a clear tendency for higher levels of ideological (non-separatist) terrorism in those countries in which income was most unevenly distributed.[113] However, the overall findings of his study point to political, rather than economic factors when explaining patterns of terrorism in Western Europe. Hence, it is likely that socio-economic inequalities do play a role, but mostly in conjunction with other aggravating factors of a political nature.

3.1.5 Poverty and terrorism

One of the most robust findings in quantitative peace research is that most violent conflicts occur within (and between) poor or underdeveloped countries, while hardly ever in rich states.[114] Also, cross-country studies surveying attitudes and norms, find that the level of wealth and economic development is highly significant in accounting for variations in support for political violence. Using micro-data sets based on opinion polls and value/attitude surveys from more than 60 countries from 1975-1995, MacCulloch finds that popular support for revolutions varies greatly with incomes. A rise in GDP significantly reduced the chances of supporting a revolt.[115]

The explanation for this is often rooted in the liberal model in peace studies, which argues a causal link between economic development, based on an open economy, and the absence of armed conflict. A liberal economic system, based on free trade, foreign investments, and export-oriented production, stimulates a high level of economic development, which in turn leads either directly, or indirectly via democracy, to peace.[116] Also, without democracy,

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[111] Andreas Feldmann and Maiju Perälä, 'Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America: Re-Examining Old Assumptions', Working Paper No.286, The Kellogg Institute, Notre Dame, Indiana, July 2001, www.nd.edu/~kellogg/WPS/286.pdf. Accessed April 2004.

[112] See for example Lai, 'Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness'; and Thompson, 'Deprivation and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1922-1985'.

[113] Engene, *Patterns of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-95*, p. 194.

[114] Gleditsch, 'The Future of Armed Conflict', p. 12.

[115] Robert MacCulloch, 'The Impact of Income on the Taste for Revolt'. MacCulloch has used The European Commission's *Euro-Barometer Survey Series* for 1976-1990 and *The Combined World Values Survey* for 1981, 1990, 1995, produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. The latter series 'is designed to enable a cross-national comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of norms and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe'.

[116] Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 'Globalization and Internal Conflict', pp. 253ff.

economic growth tends to foster a greater likelihood for domestic peace, probably because it produces higher levels of welfare, which in turn contribute to popular support and legitimacy of the state.[117]

While the liberal model proposes that economic growth and development work against the occurrence of civil violence and terrorism, the competing paradigm of modernisation, the structuralist school, also associates low levels of economic development with violent conflict, but from another angle. Structuralists point to the inability of periphery countries to sustain long-term economic development and provide welfare to citizens, given the structure of North-South relations and the global economic system. As a consequence, poverty becomes structural in periphery countries in the South and gives rise to predatory and praetorian political structures, which in turn fosters endemic social unrest and civil violence.[118]

A more direct explanation of how poverty promotes violence is the so-called 'predation theory' by Collier and Hoeffler. They argue that in any society there will always be greed-motivated conflict entrepreneurs willing to take up arms against a government *as long as it is financially viable*.[119] In societies where the level of welfare is high, the costs of participating in insurrections are much higher than in poor societies, higher economic incentives are needed, and hence, growing welfare radically reduces the economic viability of an armed revolt. Conversely, where poverty is extreme and widespread, little economic incentive is needed to motivate young people to risk their lives as guerrillas, if only for the monetary compensations involved.

Another factor also explains this causal link. Governments of rich countries have the financial wherewithals to pay and equip a strong police and army, thereby deterring armed insurgencies, while poor countries usually have ill-equipped, ill-trained, underpaid, and corrupt security forces, whose counter-terrorist or counter-insurgency efforts are not only ineffective, but also frequently outright counter-productive as their under-resourced security forces are either excessively violent, or too corrupt to subdue armed insurgents.

Fearon and Laitin find that poverty and state weakness are among the most robust risk predictors for civil wars, and are far more significant than factors like ethnic-religious diversity or measures of grievances such as socio-economic inequality, lack of democracy, or discrimination: 'What matters is whether active rebels can hide from government forces and whether economic opportunities are so poor that the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 to 2,000

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[117] Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics* (NY: Anchor Books, 1963); and Firebaugh, Glenn and Frank D. Beck, 'Does Economic Growth Benefit the Masses? Growth, Dependence, and Welfare in the Third World', *American Sociological Review* 59 (5) (October 1994), pp. 631-653.

[118] For the praetorian state model, see Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*; and Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (eds) *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1993).

[119] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars', World Bank Research Paper 21 October 2001, www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf. Accessed April 2004.

young men.'[120] However, they argue that the correlation between economic growth and fewer civil wars is explained by a causal link involving a well-financed and administratively competent government, rather than economic growth *per se*.[121]

The rise of a strong state has in many cases not only led to the defeat of rural insurgencies, but also transformed the remaining insurgent groups into urban terrorists, a tactic more suitable for small groups confronting a powerful state. Hence, while rural insurgencies are usually accompanied with terrorist tactics, their defeat and the end of civil wars might not eliminate the use of terrorism by an opposition, even though the general level of violence decreases. Still, there is some evidence that the poverty promotes violence thesis also holds for terrorism.

After September 11th, the debate about whether poverty causes terrorism has gained considerable momentum. The most well-known contribution is a study by Krueger and Maleckova refuting the existence of any provable link between poverty and terrorism, drawing *inter alia* upon case studies of the social background of Hizbullah members and Hamas suicide bombers, which show that these movements recruit from the middle classes, not from the poorest social strata of society.[122] Krueger and Maleckova write:

> 'a careful review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would, by themselves, meaningfully reduce international terrorism. Any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak.'[123]

Alan B. Kruger and Jitka Maleckova's study has received a tremendous amount of attention and has been widely cited by scholars, practitioners and politicians as evidence of the lack of linkages between poverty and terrorism.

However, other studies have found robust results linking poverty and terrorism. A quantitative cross-country study by Li and Schaub finds that economic developments in a country and among its major trading partners reduce the likelihood of transnational terrorism. They conclude that the effect of economic development in reducing transnational terrorism is significant and recommend that: 'promoting economic development and reducing poverty should be an important component in the global war against terrorism.'[124] Recent studies have

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[120] James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97 (1) (February 2003), p. 88.

[121] *Ibid.*

[122] Alan B. Krueger, and Jitka Maleckova, 'Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?' *NBER Working Paper* No. 9074 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER), July 2002). For a more popularized version of the argument, see Alan B. Krueger, 'To avoid terrorism, end poverty and ignorance. Right? Guess again!' *The New York Times* 13 December 2001; or Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, 'The Economics and The Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?' *The New Republic* 24 June 2002.

[123] Krueger & Maleckova, 'The Economics and The Education of Suicide Bombers'.

[124] Li and Schaub, 'Economic globalization and transnational terrorism', p. 253.

also have pointed out that the assumptions in Kruger and Maleckova's study are dubious.[125] The fact that terrorists themselves are often well-educated and even wealthy does not disprove any correlation between terrorism and poverty at *a country-wide level*.[126] Furthermore, the recruitment of operatives and suicide bombers by a terrorist organisation involves a careful selection and screening process, which most likely favours well-educated middle class youth. This does not disprove widespread support for the same organisations among the poor.[127] More importantly, ideologies embraced by terrorist organisations exhort the individual to act *on behalf of* the workers, the masses, the Islamic umma, the ethnic community in question, etc. Hence, societal ills and injustices suffered by the community, ranging from political oppression and humiliation to poverty and dispossession, become the driving forces for terrorist groups, even if the members themselves may be relatively prosperous within their own societies.

Krueger and Maleckova are right in pointing out that poverty reduction alone is not the only solution to reduce terrorism, but the validity of their research findings has been grossly overstated. With regard to intra-state conflicts, there can be little doubt that poverty is a powerful factor in fostering civil wars as well as terrorism, especially when it exists in conjunction with other conflict-generating causes.

TERRORISM AND POVERTY: Examples from the Middle East, India and Africa

A dubious argument against the poverty promotes terrorism explanation is the assertion that there is very little terrorism in the poorest part of the world, namely Sub-Saharan Africa.[128] Upon closer examination, this claim is patently false. It is widely acknowledged that terrorism databases are skewed in favour of developed countries and incidents involving Western citizens. Despite this, the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database (1998-2004) has recorded Africa as the continent with the highest number of injuries from terrorism for the past seven years, and as number two in terms of fatalities. This is the case even though terrorist attacks in and around civil war zones such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are heavily under-represented with only 1 – 11 incidents over a seven-year period.[129]

[125] See for example Homer-Dixon, Thomas, 'We ignore misery at our peril', *Toronto Globe and Mail* 26 September 2001; Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, 'The Quality of Terror', Unpublished Paper (St Louis: Washington Univ. in St Louis, 20 April 2004), www.artsci.wustl.edu/~ebuenode/PDF/terror_quality.pdf Accessed May 2004; and Christina Paxson, 'Comment on Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, 'Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?'', Princeton University, 8 May 2002, www.wws.princeton.edu/~rpds/downloads/paxson_krueger_comment.pdf. Accessed May 2004.

[126] Li and Schaub, 'Economic globalization and transnational terrorism', p. 237.

[127] Bueno De Mesquita, 'The Quality of Terror'.

[128] Karin von Hippel, 'The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths', *The Political Quarterly* 73 (1) (August 2002), p. 26

[129] For the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, see http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp.

The sheer number of terrorist and insurgent groups in countries with extreme poverty is overwhelming. According to the RAND-MIPT database India suffered 76 incidents of terrorism (international and domestic) in 2003, but other sources show that that this number is far too low. Data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) shows much higher figures. The SATP website provides an overview of terrorist and insurgent groups in seven selected provinces of India, providing names of more than 140 different organisations.[130] *A randomly chosen group, the* All Tripura Tiger Force*, founded in 1990 with the objective of expelling Bengali-speaking immigrant settlers in the province of Tripura, was involved in more than 25 incidents with fatalities in 2003 alone.*[131] *A high level of terrorism is nothing new to India. According to Paul Wallace, there were more than 15,000 terrorist-related deaths in the province of Punjab between 1985 and 1991.*[132]

Another example of a country combining high levels of terrorism with extreme poverty is Uganda. Several groups mentioned in the US Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism operate on its territory, including the Christian Lord's Resistance Army *and the Islamist* Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).[133] *For example, in 1998, the ADF carried out 'repeated attacks on civilian targets, trading centres, and private homes, resulting in hundreds of deaths and abductions', including acts of extreme brutality and mass terror such as the killing of 80 college students in Kabarole district by setting locked dormitories on fire.*[134] *An ADF-affiliated group also claimed responsibility for three bus bomb attacks in August 1998, killing 30 people.*

[130] See South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org/.

[131] In late 2004, there were more than 30 terrorist and insurgent groups in Assam province alone, while the Manipur province had 39, Meghalaya had 4, Hagaland had 3, Punjab had 12, Tripura had 30, Kashmir had 24, etc. Data from South Asia Terrorism Portal website, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/terrorist_outfits/attf.htm. Accessed November 2004.

[132] Paul Wallace, 'Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity', Martha Crenshaw (ed.) *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1995), p. 354.

[133] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998*, 'Africa Overview', www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/africa.html#uganda; and *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999*, 'Africa Overview', www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/africa.html#Uganda. Both accessed July 2004.

[134] 'Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)', *GlobalSecurity.com*, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/adf.htm. Accessed July 2004.

Despite claims to the contrary, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict also seems to confirm that poverty reinforces motivations for terrorism.[135] Living standards among Palestinians in Gaza are only a small fraction (less than 12 per cent) of that in Israel, and as many as 84.6 percent of Palestinian in Gaza and 57.8 percent in the West Bank live below the poverty line, according to data from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics released in early 2002.[136] In fact, poverty forces thousands of Palestinian bread-winners to take up employment in the numerous Israeli 'settlements' established throughout the occupied West Bank and Gaza, which in itself is seen as a deep humiliation as the Palestinian workers effectively assist the Israeli occupier in its colonisation project.[137] The suicide bombers themselves are not necessarily among the poorest families, but the growing squalor, poverty and misery of the community are undoubtedly a key factor, increasing the individual's desire to punish and retaliate against the Israeli military-colonial power, which is generally seen as the main source of evil in Palestinian society. As social scientists have long underscored, it is when socio-economic inequalities coincide with ethnic or regional divides ('horizontal inequalities') that the potential for violent conflict is greatest.[138]

Egypt also exemplifies the linkages between poverty and terrorism, especially in its southern provinces ('Upper Egypt'), which have an exceptionally high percentage of ultra-poor. Upper Egypt has been the primary recruitment base for the Egyptian militant Islamic groups since the time of Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, the founding father of modern political Islamist activism.[139] Between 1992 and 1997 Upper Egypt became the epicentre of a protracted violent struggle between militant Islam and the regime, with more than a thousand fatalities, including nearly a hundred foreigners. Poverty was a key grievance, couched in Islamist rhetoric about 'the oppressed on earth', 'the corrupt rulers', and the need for 'social justice'. As Nedoroscik has observed, the Islamist terrorism in Egypt was:

'not simply one based on religious extremism. Rather, this movement grew out of the socio-economic conditions as well as the cultural and political tensions existing for the poorest of Egypt's poor. […] While other groups tended to look beyond Egypt's borders at issues such as pan-Arabism and the liberation of Palestine as priorities, Upper Egyptian Islamists looked homeward at the dismal socio-economic conditions of the region and the policies of the government in power that perpetrated the status-quo.'[140]

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[135] Hilal Khashan, 'Collective Palestinian frustration and suicide bombings', *Third World Quarterly* 24 (6) (December 2003), pp. 1049-1067.

[136] Figures cited in Karla J. Cunningham, 'Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26 (3) (May-June 2003), p. 179.

[137] See for example Annika Hampson, 'Gaza's sweatshops: Palestinian workers have little choice but to work for Israeli settlers', *al-Ahram Weekly Online* No. 647 (17 - 23 July 2003).

[138] For a discussion of 'horizontal inequalities', see Frances Stewart, 'The Root Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies' in Nafziger et al (eds) 2000, *War, Hunger and Displacement* Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[139] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers 1928-42* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), pp.152-3.

[140] Jeffrey A. Nedoroscik, 'Extremist Groups in Egypt', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14 (2) (Summer 2002), p. 48.

3.2 Does Political Regime Matter?

3.2.1 Democracy, democratisation, and terrorism

In the post-September 11th period, the promotion of democracy in the Arab and Islamic world has been used as a way to counter the growth of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. The US Administration has presented the spread of democracy as part of the broader war on terror, asserting that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was a step in that direction.[141] Whether democratisation constitutes an effective 'antidote to terrorism', at least in the short term, remains uncertain, however.[142]

The basis for the belief that democracy reduces the prospects for terrorism is the well-known democracy-fosters-peace theory, which is originally based on the well-documented observation that democracies do not engage in war against one another. This is said to be something of the closest one will ever get to a law in social sciences.[143] Pointing to the observation that international terrorism often originates in already existing conflicts and wars, might the implications of the democratic peace be that more democracies, or a more democratic world for that matter, would lead to less terrorism?[144] Findings suggest an ambiguous relationship in this regard.

A democratic system of government is frequently associated with a lower likelihood of civil war.[145] Based upon freedom, openness and popular participation, democracies tend to enjoy greater legitimacy among their populations – hence dissatisfaction rarely reaches a level of serious threat to the existence of the regime itself. In addition, democratic systems have various alternative channels for expression and influence through which potential frustration and dissatisfaction can be directed. With the presence of such virtues, one would expect a high level of state legitimacy and a low level of terrorism in democratic regimes. Engene's study of patterns of domestic terrorism in Western Europe confirms this thesis. He finds that the occurrence of terrorism is systematically related to low measures of freedom and democracy.[146]

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[141] For an early assessment of these programmes, see Jennifer L. Windsor, 'Promoting democratization can combat terrorism', *The Washington Quarterly* 26 (3) (Summer 2003), pp. 43-58.

[142] Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy: Terrorism's Uncertain Antidote', *Current History* 102 (668) (December 2003), p. 403.

[143] See for example Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Toward A Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War 1816-1992', *American Political Science Review* 95 (1) (March 2001), pp. 33-48. For counter-arguments against the liberal peace theory, see Sebastian Rosato, 'The flawed logic of democratic peace theory', *American Political Science Review* 97 (4) (November 2003), pp. 585-602.

[144] Ted Robert Gurr, 'Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases', Walter Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism, Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), pp. 86-102.

[145] Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry* (NY: Wiley, 1975); Rudolph J. Rummel, 'Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (1) (March 1995), pp. 3-26; and Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution, and Political Unrest', *Journal of World-Systems Research* 5 (2) (Summer 1999), pp. 274-300.

[146] Engene, *Patterns of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-1995*, pp. 290-291.

This relationship is particularly strong for ideological (non-separatist) terrorism, but less so with regard to ethnic terrorism.

The difference between ethnic and ideological terrorism is also emphasised by Gurr. He argues that most terrorist campaigns in democratic societies are deemed to fail, because violence offends the public, creates a backlash among potential supportive constituencies, and generates increased general support for strong counter-measures by the authorities. Over time, support for terrorist groups will only remain among distinctive minorities such as militant Catholics in Northern Ireland and Basque activists in Spain.[147]

However, the longevity of both ethnic and socio-revolutionary terrorist groups in Western democracies suggests that democracy is in no way an easy recipe for eliminating terrorism. This is illustrated, for example, by the continued existence of the Corsican FLNC founded in 1976, the Greek 17 November group established in 1975, the Italian Red Brigades formed in 1968, the Basque ETA founded back in 1959, and, not least, the PIRA, created as a breakaway offshoot of the old IRA in 1970 in Northern Ireland. Many terrorist groups in Europe have continued to exist, even if the causes and grievances that prompted their establishment have since then largely disappeared. This is the case with regard to the Greek 17 November, and the Basque ETA, which were founded as a response to the Greek military coup, and the repressive policies of the Spanish Franco–regime, respectively.

While a lack of democratic governance and freedom may give rise to domestic terrorist groups, their longevity appears to be determined less by external factors, and more by intra-group dynamics. Due to their secretive nature and underground existence, terrorist groups may become very isolated from the constituencies they claim to represent, and they form an introverted organisation culture with its own rules and dynamics, often alienating the terrorists from society as well as from the social basis and the collective political movements they claim to represent. This process of introversion and alienation of terrorist groups from their social basis is explored by the French sociologist Michel Wieviorka.[148] Writing about the Armenian ASALA group, he has noted:

> 'Nationalist with no qualms about attacking its own community, Marxist-Leninist without a social base, ASALA was, in a word, a classic terrorist group, the product of an inversion. This inversion gave rise to both an unbridled violence and an ideology that championed specifically Armenian causes, in spite of the fact that the diaspora was sickened by its violence and its dreamlike calls for revolution.'[149]

It is commonplace for terrorism studies to blame democracy for terrorism, arguing that it is due to the open nature of democratic societies that, inadvertently, hospitable environments for

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[147] Ted Robert Gurr, 'Terrorism in Democracies: When It Occurs, Why It Fails', in Charles W. Kegley Jr, *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls* (NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), pp. 213-214. See also Gurr, 'Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases'.

[148] See for example Michel Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism* (Chicago and London: Chicago Univ. Press, 1993).

[149] *Ibid*, p. 256.

terrorism are provided.[150] This has undoubtedly been true for some types of *international* terrorist activities, such as support activities for groups operating overseas. This is not the case with domestic terrorism, which cannot be ignored, since the government is usually the primary target for such groups. A consolidated democracy may be able to defuse the potential for domestic terrorism on its territory, but not for international terrorism. The primary motivations of international terrorists are usually unconnected with the country in which they reside and on which territory they organize attacks. International terrorist groups generally establish support networks in and organise attacks from relatively 'safe havens' in democratic states, targeting authoritarian states from which they have been, in the majority of cases, evicted, or democratic states whose foreign policies they strongly disapprove.[151]

Democracies are by no way equal, and different types of democratic governments have different outcomes with regards to violent conflicts. Newly established or weak democracies may function as a necessary condition for the mobilisation of extremist political groups, incitement to violence, and the outbreak of civil war.[152] The democratic system, emphasising universal participation and majority rule, may also take the form of the majority's dictatorship in practice. This problem arises, for example, if or when the principle of majority voting repeatedly is perceived as a systematic assault on a minority and their wishes. Several studies have found that democratic regime type has an impact of the occurrence of terrorism. Skjølberg's study of ethnic conflict in Western Europe finds that ethnic terrorism is more likely in the less proportional democracies than in open proportional systems, suggesting that the threshold for using violence depends on the existence of alternative channels of influence.[153] Studies of right-wing extremism also seem to support this thesis.[154]

The difficult process of democratisation itself can in many cases explain the outbreak of internal conflict and civil war.[155] One finds that in periods of protracted democratic transitions, the outbreak of civil violence and internal conflicts is more likely. The reasons are that when the prevailing power structure changes, established elites may challenge the threats to their political status by stirring up ethnic, religious, or socio-economic disturbances to intimidate

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[150] Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986).

[151] For an empirical study, see Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kjøk, 'Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000', *FFI Research Report* No.2001/03789 (Kjeller, Norway: FFI, 2001), www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00002/Lia-R-2001-03789_2134a.pdf. Accessed June 2005.

[152] Kumar Rupesinghe, 'The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflict', in Kumar Rupeshinge (ed.) *Internal Conflict and Governance* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 1-26.

[153] Katja H-W Skjølberg, 'Ethnic Pluralism, Legitimacy and Conflict, West-European Separatism 1950-95', Paper for International Studies Association Conference, Los Angeles, 14-18 March 2000.

[154] In a cross-country study of racist and extreme right violence in Europe, Koopman argues that this type of political violence appears to be motivated more by the lack of opportunities, for example, through established political channels of expression, than by grievances. He finds that 'contrary to common wisdom, but in line with the expectations derived from the opportunity model, the level of violence tends to be low where extreme right and racist parties are strong and vice versa'. Ruud Koopmans, 'Explaining the rise of racist and extreme right violence in Western Europe: grievances or opportunities?' *European Journal of Political Research* 30 (2) (September 1996), pp. 185-216. Koopman's study has been criticised for methodological weaknesses, but his conclusions are generally seen as sound.

[155] Rupesinghe, 'The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflict'; and Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (NY: W. W. Norton, 2000).

opponents, create a climate of fear, and prevent further reform. This is especially so in countries where most economic and social opportunities are available only through state-controlled institutions.[156] Alternatively, political liberalization may encourage militant opposition groups to launch a campaign of violence in the belief that reform initiatives indicate weakness on the part of the government.

Transitional states, undergoing a simultaneous process of democratisation and market liberalisation, are particularly vulnerable. In addition to increased threats of ethnic and socio-revolutionary terrorism, they are also more exposed to both domestic and international forms of organised crime due to instability in the political power structure, weaknesses in the judicial institutions, and large-scale transfer of property from state to private hands.[157] Amy Chua has argued that many developing countries today are ravaged by ethnic violence and terrorism after embarking on a transition process to market democracy. The causal link runs from the new free market reforms, which allow ethnic minorities to accumulate disproportionate wealth, via political liberalization permitting the spread of violent propaganda and the empowerment of the impoverished majorities, to the proliferation of ethnic violence. New democratic liberties and a more relaxed state control permit majority mobs to strike back at the 'market dominant minorities' in their midst. For example, the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Jews in post-Communist Russia, the Lebanese in West Africa, or the Indians in East Africa, have become targets of ethnic hatred following transitions to market democracies.[158] While much of this violence assumes the form of riots and inter-communal violence, it also has a distinct international terrorism aspect, illustrated, for example, by the international jihadist participation in the Christian-Muslim sectarian conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines.

There is substantial empirical evidence that semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic countries, even without an ongoing democratisation process, have the greatest risk of experiencing violent conflicts and terrorism.[159] The theory argues that the relationship between conflict and the form of government is U-shaped – with authoritarianism at one end and consolidated liberal democracy at the other, and semi-democratic transitional governments in between.[160] For example, in a study of terrorism patterns in 17 Latin American countries between 1980 and 1995, Feldman and Perälä found that terrorist acts (by non-state actors) were more likely to

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[156] Windsor, 'Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism', p. 48.

[157] Louise Shelley, 'Transitional States and Organised Crime', Paper for 2nd World Conference on Investigation of Crime, ICC, Durban, 3-7 December 2001, www.crimeinstitute.ac.za/2ndconf/papers/shelley.pdf. Accessed April 2004.

[158] Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).

[159] Tanja Ellingsen and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Conflict in the Third World', in Ketil Volden and Dan Smith (eds) *Causes of Conflict in the Third World Countries* (Oslo: PRIO, 1997), pp. 69-81; and Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Toward A Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War 1816-1992', *American Political Science Review* 95 (1) (March 2001), pp. 33-48.

[160] J. Craig Jenkins and Kurt Schock, 'Global Structures, and Political Processes in the Study of Domestic Conflict', *American Review of Sociology* 18/1992, pp. 161-185. Using this theory, Michael Micalka, for example, argues that Romania may be more susceptible to internal conflict than its neighbours Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, since the latter made 'a quick transition from communism to a consolidated liberal democracy'. See Michael Mihalka, 'Enlargement Deferred: More Political Instability for Romania? A Rejoinder', *Security Dialogue* 30 (4) (December 1999), p. 501.

occur in states where widespread state human rights violations occurred, as well as in 'countries characterized by electoral and associational liberties than by restrictive dictatorships.'[161] Empirical observations also support this thesis. Notably, most highly authoritarian states are less exposed to internal civil strife and terrorism. Pluchinsky's study of terrorism in the Former Soviet Union noted, for example, that 'there [were] few reported political terrorist incidents carried out in the Soviet Union.'[162] In 2003, North Korea was classified as the least exposed country to international terrorism, according to the World Terrorism Index produced by the London-based World Markets Research Center.[163]

With regard to *transnational* terrorism, Lai finds that democracies as well as states 'undergoing incomplete regime transitions' are likely to experience more transnational terrorism than semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes, suggesting that the decisive factor is the opportunity afforded by democracies in organising attacks, rather than the availability of legal channels of protest.[164] He also finds some support for the thesis that regime transitions provide incentives for terrorist groups to increase the level of violence. These findings lead to the conclusion that '[f]ailed democracies that do not become consolidated authoritarian states are likely to experience tremendous amounts of terrorism.'[165] Hence, the impact of democracy on transnational terrorism does not entirely follow the u-shaped curve as outlined for domestic terrorism.

However, authoritarian regimes may cause more terrorism than these results indicate. True, authoritarian regimes are well placed to prevent both domestic and transnational attacks on international targets inside their borders. On the other hand, many autocratic states are believed to be involved in sponsoring terrorism abroad and carrying out assassinations of dissidents in exile, causing more terrorism to occur in democratic states. Furthermore, it has been argued that political liberalisation in authoritarian states reduces the prospects for terrorism 'spill-over' as it allows for the repatriation of opposition groups based abroad and encourages the channelling of militant protests and armed campaigns against national institutions.[166] Some authoritarian regimes are also exposed to protest attacks on their foreign interests since in-country oppositional presence and armed activities are very difficult. However, the empirical evidence varies. While Iran has seen numerous attacks on its embassies and other foreign interests, as well as numerous cross-border attacks from Iraq, 'there were […] few terrorist

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[161] Feldmann and Perälä, 'Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America'.

[162] Dennis A. Pluchinsky, 'Terrorism in the former Soviet Union: A primer, a puzzle, a prognosis', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21 (2) (April/June 1998), p. 119. However, there were exceptions, such as the Moscow subway train bombing on 8 January 1977, allegedly by Armenian nationalists, killing 30 people.

[163] The consultancy bureau used five main criteria in the assessments: the motivation of terrorists, their efficacy, their presence in the nation, the frequency of past attacks, and how many attacks were thwarted by the country concerned. See 'Terrorism now key business risk', *CNN.com* 25 August 2003.

[164] Lai, 'Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness', pp. 29-31.

[165] *Ibid*, p. 34.

[166] Dennis Pluchinsky, 'Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe in 1985: a diagnosis and prognosis', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds) *Contemporary Research in Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1987); and Omar A. Lizardo, 'The Effect of Economic and Cultural Globalization on Anti-U.S. Transnational Terrorism 1971-2000', Research Paper, Univeristy of Arizona, 16 June 2004, www.members.cox.net/~olizardo/terror_glob.pdf. Accessed June 2004.

incidents directed at Soviet targets outside the USSR'.[167] What is certain is that all regime types in strong states capable of repressing terrorist and insurgent groups on their territory, may do so only at the risk of transforming them into transnational terrorist organisations attacking targets abroad. This was the case with the PLO following defeat in the 1967 war, and of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement following the repression of the Islamist insurgency in the mid- and late 1990s.

In sum, democracy and intra-state terrorism seem to be related in a number of ways. Consolidated democracies and totalitarian states are less likely to experience the outbreak of domestic terrorism than illiberal and semi-authoritarian regimes. States in democratic transition are also more exposed to violent conflict and domestic terrorism, and the introduction of democratic rule may have limited impact on already ongoing terrorist campaigns. As for transnational terrorism, democracies and semi-democracies are usually, but not always, more exposed than are authoritarian states.

3.2.2 State legitimacy and terrorism

To explain the longevity of terrorist groups in democracies, it is more fruitful to examine theories of state legitimacy, which have been central to the study of the modern state and civil conflict. State legitimacy means, in general, that the state enjoys popular support and that the citizens consider the rule to be rightful and proper. The theory foresees, in short, that lack of such support may eventually result in domestic conflict and civil violence. Legitimacy can be anchored in various sources. Forsythe identifies some of these sources as legal traditions, established morals and norms, history, ideology, personal characteristics of leaders, and in functional factors such as efficient rule and satisfaction of needs.[168] Legitimacy also involves the capacity of the system itself to engender and maintain popular belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.[169]

Domestic political violence is a question of problems with state legitimacy. Lipset argues that the extent to which democratic political systems are legitimate depends upon the ways in which key issues that historically have divided the society have been resolved.[170] Engene finds that domestic terrorism in western democratic states is systematically related to problems of state legitimacy. Rather than being unrelated to conventional politics and operating on the outside of politics, terrorism originates from the same political issues and controversies that motivate the other actors of a political system.[171] Engene is inspired by Gurr's work on terrorism, in which it is argued that 'the campaigns of political terrorists in democratic

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[167] Pluchinsky, 'Terrorism in the former Soviet Union', p. 119. There were exceptions, however, such as the Moscow subway train bombing on 8 January 1977, allegedly by Armenian nationalists, killing 30 people.

[168] David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and Peace* (Lincoln, Nebraska: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1993), pp. 60-71.

[169] Lipset, *Political Man.*

[170] *Ibid.*

[171] Engene, *Patterns of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-1995*; and Engene, *European Terrorism: Violence, State, and Legitimacy*.

societies almost invariably emerge out of larger conflicts, and that they reflect, in however distorted a form, the political beliefs and aspirations of a larger segment of society.'[172]

The conditions for the emergence of terrorism are most favourable in countries where the public is fragmented into several opposing groups, polarised on a dimension ranging from acceptance to rejection of the state. Engene focuses on three main challenges to state legitimacy:

- unsolved ethnic demands;
- problems of continuity in the development of democracy;[173]
- problems of integrating politically marginalised groups into the political system.

Engene finds a strong association between ethnic diversity and ethnic terrorism. Furthermore, his results show a strong positive correlation between continuity problems and ideological terrorism, and a strong link between problems of integration and ideological terrorism. Ethnic terrorism, on the other hand, does not appear to be significantly related to these two latter factors. Hence, problems of continuity and integration are key factors in explaining patterns of *ideological* terrorism in Western Europe, while they have had a more limited impact on ethnic terrorism.

Engene also observes that levels of unionisation are negatively correlated with domestic terrorism. This suggests that the level of integration of politically marginalised groups should not only be measured in participation in party politics. Strong trade unions appear to play a significant role in restraining radical elements in their midst. Engene's study concludes that domestic terrorism is only sporadically present in states not affected by any of these kinds of legitimacy problems. However, the threat of international terrorism is mostly unrelated to these factors.

3.3 The Ecology of Terrorism

The term 'ecology of terrorism' is not widely used, but has been coined to describe facilitating circumstances, not motivations, experiences or ideology, usually from the perspective that modernisation has created new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism.[174] The ecology thesis 'sees modern terrorism occurring because modern circumstances make terrorist methods exceptionally easy'.[175] Significant technological developments, associated with modernisation, such as the rise and expansion of modern transportation and communications, as well as modern mass media, are seen as important, at least for the types and patterns of terrorist acts, though not as a motivation for employing terrorism in the first place. Wilkinson has argued

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[172] Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 86.

[173] Examples of 'continuity problems' are the authoritarian rule in Germany and Italy until 1945, and Spain until 1975.

[174] The term has been discussed more extensively in D. V. Segre and J. H. H. Adler, 'The Ecology of Terror', *Encounter* 40/1973, pp. 17-24. See also Kegley, *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, pp. 105ff.

[175] Kegley, *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, p. 105.

that the increase in international terrorism in the latter part of the 20th century was partly related to 'technological opportunities and the vulnerability of industrial societies and cities to terrorist techniques.'[176] Crenshaw has also argued that industrialisation and urbanisation in a more general sense have made societies more vulnerable to terrorism:

> 'Cities may be significant because they provide an opportunity (a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences) and a recruiting ground among politicised and volatile inhabitants […] The terrorists of *Narodnaya Volya* would have been unable to operate without Russia's newly established rail system, and the PFLP could not indulge in hijacking without the jet aircraft.'[177]

Kegley argues that modern technology empowers very small groups, and has summed up the argument as follows:

- Air communication has for a long time constituted an easy target for terrorists. Moreover, it provided worldwide mobility enabling terrorists to strike in other states and on other continents.
- Radio, television, and modern communication satellites provide almost instantaneous access to a global audience.
- Weapons and explosives are increasingly available, and a growing arsenal of sophisticated weapons is available to terrorists, including plastic explosives, and advanced remote controlled bombs.
- Modern industrial and urban societies present an almost infinite number of vulnerable targets.[178]

These new conditions do not create terrorism in its first place, but facilitate its spread and evolution.

3.3.1 Social norms and historical traditions

There is obviously a relationship between prevalent social norms and historical traditions in a society and its political culture, but its possible effect on the occurrence of terrorism has not been thoroughly studied. We have already seen that the lack of continuity of democratic regimes, such as a heritage of recent dictatorship or semi-colonial rule, tends to make them more exposed to ideological terrorism.[179] Furthermore, a robust finding in civil war research is that 'violence tends to breed violence'; societies experiencing civil violence are more likely to see more of it, while states without a history of civil wars are more likely to avoid future conflicts.[180]

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[176] Wilkinson, 'Terrorism: An International Research Agenda?' p. xv.
[177] Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p. 115.
[178] Kegley, *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, p. 105ff.
[179] Engene, *Patterns of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-95*, pp. 289ff.
[180] Gleditsch, 'The Future of Armed Conflict', p. 17.

Recent history of widespread political violence, be it civil wars, ethnic strife, widespread human rights abuses or genocides, leaves painful legacies, and has the potential to motivate terrorists long after such acts took place. Armenian terrorism is a case in point. The *Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia* (ASALA) and *Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide* (JCAG), both formed in the mid-1970s, had as one of their primary goals to force the Turkish government to admit responsibility for the genocide of Armenians during World War I, restore lands to the Armenians, and pay reparations.[181] Similarly, the Jewish *Dahm Y'Israel Nokeam* (DIN) or 'The Avengers', formed at the end of World War II planned a mass poisoning of the water supplies of several German cities to avenge the Holocaust, and succeeded in implementing a food poisoning plot against German POWs.[182] Later Jewish terrorist groups, such as the *Jewish Defence League*, embraced the principle of *Barzel,* or iron, which called upon them to fight 'the Galut image of the Jew as a weakling' and which obligated the use 'all necessary means – even strength, force and violence'.[183]

Several studies suggest a relationship between terrorism and social norms, but these are not very specific about what exactly such social norms might be. Mousseau writes that 'there is something about ingrained habits and historical traditions that renders terrorism a socially acceptable method for addressing grievances in some societies, but not others.'[184] Crenshaw suggests that the frequency of terrorism in a given area may be linked to 'social habits and historical traditions, which may sanction the use of violence against the government.'[185] Other writers find indications that the traditions of blood feuds have played an important role in providing a direct motivation for terrorist acts in certain regions. For example, Dennis Pluchinsky has found that the southern regions of the Former Soviet Union, especially in the Caucasus, have a history of clan-based social structures in which the code of the blood feud is significant, hence the term 'blood-feud terrorism'.[186] Students of radical Islamist movements have also noted that Islamist violence in Algeria and Southern Egypt may be partly explained by the strong traditions of revenge and blood feuds in these societies.[187]

The basic problem of cultural theories is that they cannot account for the 'comings and goings' of terrorism. As Crenshaw has put it 'why [did] the Muslim world not produce suicidal mass

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[181] Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2002), pp. 64-66, 260-261; and Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, p. 256.

[182] Ehud Sprinzak & Idith Zertal, 'Avenging Israel's Blood (1946)', in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.) *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 17-41.

[183] See JDL website on www.jdl.org/information/five_principles.shtml. According to the FBI, the JDL was behind nearly 37 terrorist acts in the United States between 1968 and 1983. The ITERATE database recorded some 50 incidents between 1968 and 1987. This makes the JDL the second most active terrorist group in the US in the period after the Puerto Rican FALN. See Anderson and Sloan, *Historical Dictionary Of Terrorism*, pp. 255. For more articles about the JDL, see Rick A. Ross Institute for the Study of Destructive Cults, Controversial Groups and Movements, www.rickross.com/groups/jewish_defense.html.

[184] Mousseau, 'Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror', p. 8.

[185] Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p. 115. See also Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (NY: John Wiley, 1974), p. 96.

[186] Pluchinsky, 'Terrorism in the former Soviet Union'.

[187] For example Emad Eldin Shahin, *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

murderers in, for instance, the 1950s?'[188] While it probably remains true that certain historical traditions and social norms may make civil violence and terrorism more acceptable in some societies than in others, this explanation only works in combination with other more direct factors generating terrorism in a society.

3.3.2 Mass media and terrorism as communication

The role of modern mass media in facilitating international terrorism is somewhat disputed. The classical theory of a symbiotic relationship focuses on the mutual benefits between terrorists who are given a pulpit for propagating their causes, and the media, which receives sensational news stories. Terrorists are dependent upon the 'oxygen of publicity', as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher put it. In its simplest form, this thesis blames irresponsible media outlets, if not for the emergence, at least for the spread and aggravation of international terrorism.[189] A recent study argues, for example, that 'by devoting extraordinary broadcast time and column inches to even minor violence and elevating them to the level of spectacular reality show, the mass media, especially television, play into the hands of terrorists.'[190] A frequently cited example is the controversial media coverage of a hostage situation in Beirut, where 39 US hostages on a TWA airliner were kept for 17 days, eventually forcing Israeli and US authorities to abandon their principle of not negotiating with terrorists, and to release some 750 Lebanese Shiite prisoners held in Israel as demanded by the hostage takers.[191] On the other hand, several studies have criticised government authorities for putting pressure on the media to reduce their coverage of terrorist incidents, arguing that there is no evidence that media exposure directly leads to more terrorism.[192]

There is obviously no singular relationship between terrorists and the media. Terrorist groups relate to mass media in very different ways, ranging from indifference, to media-savvyness, and outright hostility. Similarly, various mass media portray terrorism differently. Rarely do independent media portray the terrorists and their causes according to the terrorists' preferences.[193] Even if terrorist attacks prompt mass media to shift focus, this does not necessarily translate into greater public sympathy for the terrorists' causes. There was, for example, a huge increase in the quantity of news reports about the Muslim and Arab world following the September 11th attacks.[194] There is little evidence that these programs made the

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[188] Martha Crenshaw, cited in Mousseau, 'Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror', p. 8.

[189] Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage, 1982); and Paul Wilkinson, 'The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9 (2) (Summer 1997), pp. 51-64. For a counter-argument, see Wievorka, *The Making of Terrorism*.

[190] Brigitte L. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 194.

[191] Alex Schmid, 'Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 (4) (October 1989), pp. 539-565.

[192] See for example Robert G. Picard, 'News coverage as the contagion of terrorism: Dangerous charges backed by dubious science', *Political Communication and Persuasion* 3 (4) (Fall 1986), pp. 385-400.

[193] Wievorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, pp. 42ff.

[194] Brigitte L. Nacos has noted that there was 'a quantum leap' in programs addressing 'the roots of anti-American terrorism' following the 9/11 tragedy: 33 stories on the major TV networks and NPR broadcast while there were none in the preceding eight months. See Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, pp. 45-46.

American public or the public audiences in the Arab world more inclined to endorse Usama bin Ladin's objectives, or acknowledge the legitimacy of his grievances, compared to what was already the case before 9/11. In most cases, media coverage both facilitates and inhibits violence. Studies of racist right-wing violence show that the mass media, in addition to contributing to the 'contagion effect', also has important violence-inhibiting mechanisms, for example, by shaming perpetrators and their supportive constituencies, and by contributing to counter-mobilisation against violent groups.[195] Over the past decade, terrorist groups have developed their own media outlets, ranging from numerous interactive Internet sites to radio, and in some cases, TV-channels, underlining the fact that many terrorist groups are capable of bypassing the media and controlling their message to the outside world.

There seems to be relatively broad agreement, that modern mass media is not the cause of terrorism *per se*, but that it has considerable impact upon patterns of terrorism, once it has emerged. While there is historical evidence of pre-modern terrorism, where news of attacks was spread through the gossip of the taverns and the word of the marketplaces, the evolution of new technologies for mass media has had a dramatic impact on the effectiveness of terrorism in communicating a political message, and has increased its publicity potential immensely. There is some historical evidence to suggest that important shifts in terrorism have coincided with the emergence and proliferation of new media technologies. For example, the printing press in the 19th century, making newspapers widely available for the first time, was followed by the rise of anarchist terrorism in Russia, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe. The dramatic increase of *international* terrorism from the late 1960s was made possible in no small measure by the introduction of new electronic mass media, especially modern hand-held television cameras.[196] The TV revolution enabled media reporters to broadcast instantaneously and bring live coverage of dramatic events directly into the living rooms of millions of people around the world. This meant that terrorist groups gained access to unprecedented opportunities for media attention and publicity.[197]

The symbiotic relationship between modern mass media and terrorism is seen as a major force behind the rising lethality of international terrorism over the last decades. In a steadily more competitive global media world, with larger and more diverse audiences, terrorist organisations 'must go to extreme lengths to shock'.[198] The empirical evidence supporting this thesis is still somewhat uncertain. It is nevertheless a striking coincidence that the surge in *transnational* mass casualty suicide terrorism – as opposed to domestic and civil war related terrorism – has occurred precisely during a period of tremendous changes in communications, involving the Internet, and new forms of interactive media. This does suggest that in the era of

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[195] Bjørgo, *Racist and Rightwing Violence in Scandinavia*, pp. 270-1.

[196] According to Wilkinson, two major international developments triggered this outbreak of international terrorism in 1968: (i) the defeat of the Arab states in the June 1967 war with Israel (from 1968-1972 there was a tremendous upsurge in Arab-Israeli terrorism, and close to 15 percent of all international terrorist incidents were carried out by Palestinian groups), and (ii) resurgence of the neo-Marxist and Trotskist left among students in the industrialised West. See Wilkinson, 'Terrorism: An International Research Agenda?' p. xvi.

[197] See for example Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 136-137.

[198] Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p. 118.

a far more diversified media, more spectacular and shocking methods are needed to capture the attention of major media outlets, and that terrorists will adapt to this reality.

Nothing illustrates this better than al-Qaida's attacks on the United States. The 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, initially planned the hijacking of ten US airliners using suicide pilots. The tenth aircraft was to be reserved specially for what Muhammad envisioned as the ultimate media event: after the other nine aircraft had crashed into various US landmarks, including the Pentagon, the headquarters of CIA and FBI, nuclear power plants, and skyscrapers on the east and west coast, Muhammad would land the last plane himself, kill all the male passengers onboard, and give a public 'press conference', explaining the motives behind the horror show.[199]

3.3.3 Terrorism and technological evolution

One theme, which falls largely under the ecology of terrorism thesis, is the relationship between technology and terrorism. While there is a considerable bulk of writing on the relationship between technology and the conduct of war, there is surprisingly little research regarding how new technologies have influenced patterns of terrorism. There are, to our knowledge no well-established theories in this area, only empirical observation of a general nature.[200]

In studies of technology and war it is often admitted that the significance of technological innovations has been less revolutionary and more short-lived than often anticipated when technological innovations were introduced for the first time. Writing on information warfare in light of the history of military theory, Henry and Peartree find that military theorists, who linked their theories closely to the technological innovations of their age, have rarely produced lasting works.[201] Pointing to the human ability to find counter-responses, which reduce the effectiveness of new technology, they warn against believing that technological revolutions will ever revolutionise warfare.[202]

Even if theories of terrorism cannot be deduced directly from military theory, this gives reason for caution when looking at the long-term effects of technological innovations on the occurrence of terrorism. There are, nevertheless, technological developments that clearly

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[199] *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (NY: Norton & Co, 2004), p. 154.

[200] See Peter Hirst, 'New and Old Technologies: Choice of Strategy and Targets', Gunnar Jervas (ed.) *FOA Report on Terrorism* (Stockholm: The Swedish Defence Research Establishment, 1998), pp. 111-128; Brian A. Jackson, 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24 (3) (May 2001), pp. 183-213; Paul Wilkinson (ed.) *Technology and Terrorism* (London: Frank Cass, Special Issue of Terrorism and Political Violence 5 (2), 1993); and Bruce Hoffman, 'Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5 (2), (Summer 1993), pp. 12-29.

[201] Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree, 'Military Theory and Information Warfare', *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* 28 (3) (Autumn 1998), pp. 121-135. See also D. W. Craig, 'Asymmetrical Warfare and the Transnational Threat: Relearning the Lessons from Vietnam', Ontario: Canadian Forces College, 1998, www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc1/006.html. Accessed January 2000.

[202] Henry and Peartree, 'Military Theory and Information Warfare'.

appear to have had a significant effect on terrorism, if not on its occurrence, then at least on its manifestations. Technological innovations have provided terrorist groups with new means of destruction, first and foremost the introduction of dynamite and explosives.[203] They are still the most popular weapons used by terrorists. Despite the progress in harnessing technology to counter terrorism, the emergence of modern technology has often tended to 'tilt the balance in favour of the terrorists'.[204]

Hirst argues convincingly that throughout history, terrorist groups have proved to be pragmatic users of technology. They are seldom driven by technology, more often terrorist groups have been surprisingly conservative in their choice of weapons.[205] This line of thinking fits well into the terrorism-as-communication thesis, emphasising the choreography of the terrorist act rather than its effectiveness in causing killing and physical destruction.[206] Furthermore, there is a continuous development of new counter terrorist technologies that states now employ to different degrees, reducing the impact of new and innovative terrorist technologies. Hence, the relationship between technology and terrorism is dialectic. Writing before 9/11, Hirst warned against establishing a direct causal link between the 'growing ferocity' of terrorist incidents and advances in technology. The introduction of '[new] technology *per se* is not a fundamental factor in this trend.'[207]

However, with the rise of al-Qaida and its associated groups, terrorism has become both more lethal and more innovative. For this category of terrorist groups, the most realistic working assumption is that proliferation of new and commercially available technologies will be used to enhance the lethality of terrorism, as long as these technologies are operationally viable. At the same time, the acquisition of new and unfamiliar technology is a very complex process for any organisation, let alone clandestine cell-structured, illegal movements. If terrorists should successfully acquire and implement new and complex technologies in their organisation, such as the production capacity for biological weapons, they need to have sufficient human resources, appropriate leadership and support structure, a collaboration with sources of technology that transmits both explicit and implicit knowledge, as well as an environment that allows for experimenting and learning from failure. Brian Jackson has observed that 'no terrorist groups have truly possessed all of these technology-reinforcing characteristics'.[208]

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[203] Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p. 114.
[204] Wilkinson, *Technology and Terrorism*, p. 6.
[205] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism.*
[206] See previous sub-chapter on mass media and terrorism as communication.
[207] Hirst, 'New and Old Technologies: Choice of Strategy and Targets', p. 123.
[208] Jackson, 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups', p. 203.

3.3.4 Transnational organised crime and terrorism

One facilitating factor, which also falls under the ecology-of-terrorism thesis, is the so-called 'terrorism and organised crime nexus'.[209] The relationship between organised criminal organisations (TCOs) and terrorist groups is admittedly ambiguous and under-theorised. However, it seems clear that the occurrence of terrorism in certain regions is influenced by opportunities for transnational organised crime, and illegal global parallel trade, especially the drug trade, because of the huge returns of this trade.[210] Empirical studies from multiple regions, including the Western Europe, Latin American states of Peru and Colombia, Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Philippines, suggest that transnational organised crime has been an important source of income for terrorist and insurgent groups.[211] For example, the Columbian FARC guerrillas and the Peruvian Shining Path are known to have provided mercenary security support for narcotics production and trafficking lines in South America, while the Palestinian PFLP-GC has reportedly 'been using infrastructure in Lebanon to support drug trafficking'.[212] Terrorist fundraising through crime has also received greater attention in Western Europe recently, although the problem is not new (See case study of the Algeria GIA below). In some cases, terrorist organisations and criminal syndicates have co-operated. The Italian Red Brigades formed a short-term co-operative relationship with the Naples Camorra, the most organised Mafia group on mainland Italy, in the early 1980s, consisting of 'contractual or one-spot arrangements' such as assistance in jailbreaks, the assassination of police chiefs, and the facilitation of extortion practices.[213]

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[209] For a definition of organised crime, see Tamara Makarenko, ''The Ties that Bind': Uncovering the Relationship between Organised Crime and Terrorism', in Dina Siegel, Henk van de Bunt, and Damian Zaitch (eds) *Global Organized Crime: Trends and Developments* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2003), p. 161.

[210] There is a growing body of literature describing differences and similarities between organised crime and terrorism and presenting several theses of possible future evolution of interaction. See for example Alex Schmid, 'The Links Between Transnational Organized and Terrorist Crimes', *Transnational Organized Crime* 2 (4) (1996), pp. 40-82; Chris Dishman, 'Terrorism, crime, and transformation', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24 (1) (January 2001), pp. 43-58; and Phil Williams, 'Terrorism and Organized Crime: Convergence, Nexus, or Transformation?' in Gunnar Jervas (ed.) *FOA Report on Terrorism* (Stockholm: The Swedish Defence Research Establishment, June 1998), pp. 69-91.

[211] See examples in Makarenko, ''The Ties that Bind''; and Thomas M. Sanderson, 'Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines', *SAIS Review* 24 (1) (Winter/Spring 2004), www.saisreview.org/PDF/24.1sanderson.pdf. Accessed July 2004.

[212] Neal Pollard, 'Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: Implications of Convergence', September 1997 Essay, The Terrorism Research Center website, www.terrorism.com/terrorism/crime.htm; and Michael Brown, 'Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism', September 1997 Essay, The Terrorism Research Center, www.terrorism.com/terrorism/crime.htm, both accessed March 2000.

[213] Dishman, 'Terrorism, crime, and transformation', pp. 53f.

TERRORIST FUNDRAISING THROUGH CRIME - The Case of Algerian Armed Islamic Group in Europe

Since its establishment in Algeria in the early 1990s, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) devoted considerable efforts to fundraising efforts in Europe.[214] *One avenue for fundraising was the numerous mosques throughout Europe where money for charity were collected. A portion of these funds from certain mosques was apparently channelled to the GIA and other radical Islamist groups, often without the knowledge of Muslim congregations. The GIA has also demanded 'war taxes' from Algerian business people and ordinary workers. Some contributed voluntarily, while others were coerced. Several shop owners in immigrant suburbs of France brought charges against GIA activists for subjecting them to a strong 'moral pressure' by implying that they would lose clients and get in 'trouble' if they refused to pay. In addition, illegal immigrants have been blackmailed into giving away considerable portions of their wages; and people with relatives and/or property in Algeria were told to pay for their 'protection'.*

The GIA also raised money from a variety of black market activities. They received percentages from sales of pirated and black-market products throughout Europe, and probably also from smuggling of consumer goods from Europe to Algeria. The GIA also appears to have dealt with stolen cars. The GIA was further involved in more serious crime, such as dealing in drugs, arms and forged documents. Reports indicated that Algerian Islamist activists in France, presumably from the GIA, attempted to take over the lucrative drug trade in some areas by setting up their own 'Islamist anti-drug vigilante squads' ostensibly to combat drug dealing, but in reality to eliminate competitors. Some GIA-members committed armed robberies and thefts. For instance, Khaled Kelkal, widely believed to be a ringleader in the GIA-bombing campaign in France in 1995, reportedly plundered shops, dealt with hashish and stolen cars in order to finance the purchase of weapons for Algerian guerrillas. In early 1996 an armed gang operated in the Roubaix area on the Franco-Belgian border, where it committed a series of armed robberies of bullion vans and convenience stores. The gang, which by all accounts must have been a GIA cell, was not exclusively Algerian, but included also Moroccans and a French convert. The guerrilla-style operational patterns of the cell inspired local newspapers to write alarmist articles about this new phenomenon of 'gangsterterrorism'. Wearing hoods over military fatigue and armed with grenade launchers and Kalashnikov assault rifles, the group would stop a van with a grenade and then 'pepper it with sustained automatic fire with no attempt to spare bystanders'. An Islamist preacher, who had toured the Roubaix area at the time, had reportedly bestowed the necessary Islamic legitimacy on such heavy-handed fund-raising methods. He had sanctioned armed robberies and crime as justifiable emergency means when it was part of the 'holy struggle'.

[214] This account is taken from Lia and Kjøk, 'Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States'.

More recently, in particular in the republics of the Former Soviet Union, the distinction between terrorism and organised crime has become blurred, inspiring mixed terms such as 'criminal terrorism' and 'economic terrorism'.[215] The emergence of global criminal networks of illegal trade and transactions provides new opportunities for terrorist groups. Co-operation with TCOs may provide terrorist groups with an additional means of funding, access to weapons smuggled into the country, and other potential benefits. Or as Pollard has observed, this interaction 'offers smuggling routes long established and tested by crime syndicates for drug and arms running, potentially providing terrorists with logistical infrastructure to clandestinely move people, arms and material'.[216]

While some observers have gone as far to suggest that the similarities between terrorist organisations and organised crime are growing, and that it is becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate between the two,[217] this is disputed in the more authoritative literature. Phil Williams, the editor of the now defunct journal *Transnational Organised Crime*, finds that TCOs and terrorist groups are not converging into a single phenomenon. Even if there are examples of co-operative relationships, the distinction between terrorist and criminal organisations should not be blurred.[218] They still have different objectives; terrorists pursue political change while TCOs seek to maximize profit. These divergent aims and priorities represent a serious obstacle, and co-operation is more likely to be fragmented and temporary rather than systematic and long-term.

Others have supported this thesis. A recent expert conference on piracy, for example, concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that terrorist groups and pirates had forged operational links.[219] Dishman also finds less evidence of long-term co-operation. For a variety of reasons, terrorist and TCOs will only establish short-term co-operative arrangements, and instead rely upon their own ''in-house' capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts'.[220] However, what is more likely than close terrorist-TCO cooperation, is the transformation of terrorist organisations into TCOs.

While TCOs do not cause political terrorism to occur, linkages between TCOs and terrorist groups may occur, and terrorist groups may purchase services and products from TCOs as any other black-market customer. Pervasive corruption, in particular, provides a host of operational advantages for terrorist groups. Generally speaking, widespread organised crime weakens the state, threatens its institutions, and reduces its territorial control, which in turn facilitates the spread of transnational terrorism. We may therefore conclude that the presence of TCOs

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[215] For the term 'criminal terrorism' see Pluchinsky, 'Terrorism in the former Soviet Union', pp. 123-124 and for the term 'economic terrorism', see Glenn E. Schweitzer with Carole C. Dorsch, *Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (NY: Plenum Press, 1998), p. 35.

[216] Pollard, 'Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: Implications of Convergence'.

[217] Brown, 'Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism'.

[218] Williams, 'Terrorism and Organized Crime: Convergence, Nexus, or Transformation?'

[219] 'Piracy and terrorism should not be conflated', *Jane's Intelligence Review* August 2004, citing the latest tri-annual conference of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) on piracy and maritime security, held in Kuala Lumpur in late June 2004.

[220] Dishman, 'Terrorism, crime, and transformation'.

creates a more permissive environment for transnational terrorism. It may also ease the transformation of existing terrorist organisations into profit-seeking entrepreneurs when political changes have eroded the justifications for their existence.

4 CAUSES OF TERRORISM ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE

The literature on international terrorism has frequently assumed that the occurrence of terrorism, especially in its international and transnational forms, must be sought in external sources and the character of the international system, including interdependence, globalisation, foreign policies of states, and other aspects of the global system that generate motives and opportunities for terrorist activity.[221] There are various categories of explanations at this level.

4.1 The Impact of Economic and Cultural Globalisation on Terrorism

After September 11th it has been commonplace to blame globalisation for the new wave of transnational terrorism. Globalisation can be directly related to changes in international terrorism. However, in many cases, processes associated with globalisation impact only indirectly on patterns of terrorism, via changing the political, socio-economic and societal context for terrorist activities. Globalisation critics argue, for example, that globalisation exacerbates socio-economic inequalities, or at least enhances their visibility; it also changes the nature of armed conflicts and promotes the diffusion of technologies enabling terrorists to operate more globally and with greater lethality. Finally, globalisation tends to weaken the territorial state and strengthen non-state actors. All these factors may influence terrorism patterns in one way or another.

In the debate about globalisation and terrorism, there are various schools of interpretations. Most of them draw upon neo-liberal and structuralist interpretations of the impact of economic modernisation and globalisation on terrorist motivations, but also upon technical assessments by terrorism experts who point to the expanded opportunity structure provided by globalisation, technology, and open societies.[222]

While offering different solutions to the problem, both neo-liberals and structuralists seem to be in agreement that the new transnational terrorism occurs as a defensive, reactionary backlash against the pressure from globalisation, both in economic and cultural terms. Stanley Hoffmann argues, for example, that contemporary Islamic terrorism 'is fuelled by a resistance to 'unjust' economic globalization and to a Western culture deemed threatening to local religions and cultures.'[223] In the post-9/11 editions of his famous book *Jihad vs. McWorld* Benyamin Barber has similarly suggested that the new transnational terrorism must be understood in light of the ongoing collision between 'the forces of integrative modernization

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[221] Kegley, *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, pp. 97-98.

[222] For more on the latter interpretation, see Brynjar Lia, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions* (London: Frank Cass, 2005, forthcoming), pp. 170ff.

[223] Stanley Hoffmann, 'Clash of Globalizations', *Foreign Affairs* 81 (4) (July/August 2002), p. 112.

and aggressive economic and cultural globalization' (McWorld) and 'the forces of disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism' (Jihad).[224] The first represents a sterile 'cultural monism', a 'trivilialisation and homogenisation of values', a 'capitalism run wild' while the second manifests itself in 'a raging cultural fundamentalism', seeking insulation from external forces, and fostering acquiescence and acquittal for bloody deeds of terror.[225] The former begets the latter, and only the globalisation of civic and democratic institutions will provide safeguards against this vicious cycle.

While the structuralist school argues that globalisation must be checked, reversed or fundamentally changed to forestall its fostering of transnational terrorism, the neo-liberal school argues that in the long-run, economic globalisation will defuse motivations for anti-market and anti-systemic violence by spreading prosperity, higher standards of living, political and economic reforms. It is rather the incompleteness or unevenness of globalisation in parts of the world that creates motivations for transnational terrorism, not economic globalisation itself.

Despite the prodigious amount of literature written on globalisation and its opponents over the past years, very few studies have actually tested, in empirical and quantitative research, the linkages between globalisation measured in various economic, political or cultural variables, and the occurrence of transnational terrorism. We will therefore confine our review to two recent studies, where these relationships have been examined in quantitative research.

According to Li and Schaub, there is no direct, straightforward relationship between economic globalisation and transnational terrorism, but only an indirect relationship.[226] Analysing statistically transnational terrorist incidents from a sample of 112 countries from 1975-1997, they find that economic globalisation (measured here by trade, foreign direct investment, and portfolio investments) has no direct positive effect on the number of incidents. In accordance with the neo-liberal school, they find that economic developments of a country and its top trading partners tend to reduce the number of terrorist incidents inside the country.[227] Their conclusion is that economic globalisation may in fact contribute to reducing transnational terrorism, but only insofar as it promotes economic development. Other studies, examining the impact of economic globalisation on the levels of transnational terrorism against American interests collaborate these results.[228] However, if measured by debt transfer payments, one finds that economic globalisation appears to increase the level of anti-US terrorism. This result is not surprising, since debt transfers from poor to rich countries are perhaps the most predatory aspects of economic globalisation. It was most significant during the Cold War, when Marxist and ethno-nationalist ideologies were predominant among terrorist groups. The

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[224] Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy* (London: Corgi Books, 2003), p. xii.

[225] *Ibid*, pp. xiii-xiv.

[226] Li and Schaub, 'Economic globalization and transnational terrorism'.

[227] These results are stated to be 'robust to alternative specifications and statistical estimators'.

[228] Lizardo, 'The Effect of Economic and Cultural Globalization on Anti-U.S. Transnational Terrorism 1971-2000'.

rates of debt transfer payments do a much poorer job of accounting for variations in anti-US terrorism after 1990.[229]

In an attempt to go beyond the neo-liberal and structuralist frameworks of explaining terrorism simply in terms of their economic impact, Lizardo examines the impact of cultural globalisation, or what he terms, 'the globalisation of world culture', on levels of anti-US terrorism.[230] His point of departure is that while economic globalisation may generate grievances and resistance at a local level, it is the global diffusion of certain political cultures and ideas, such as concepts of individuality, organization, and social action that provide local aggrieved parties with a conceptual model for rebellion and violent activism.[231] Lizardo measures cultural globalisation by counting the number of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which has increased since the 1970s, but experienced accelerated growth since 1990. Using a time-series analysis of anti-US terrorism incidents between 1971 and 2000, he finds that cultural globalisation is more important than economic globalisation in accounting for variations in anti-US transnational terrorism. Especially in the post-Cold War period, when religiously inspired terrorism has been dominant, cultural globalisation, measured by the number in INGOs, is a very significant factor in accounting for the fluctuations in anti-US terrorism during the same period.[232]

This choice of INGOs density as a measure of cultural globalisation is rooted in the writings of Boli and Thomas on world cultures and the role of INGOs, where INGOs are seen as primary institutional vehicles for diffusing world cultures and global models for action.[233] One should probably view the correlation above not so much as a Third World resistance or backlash against globalisation as such, but instead as a result of the widening opportunity structure for transnational terrorism, provided by the growing transnational infrastructure of INGOs. (Lizardo also talks about the enabling effect of INGOs, and of transnational terrorism as a modern phenomenon.) As outlined below, INGOs form only a part of the wide range of transnational private support networks for terrorist and insurgent movements, which have eclipsed the state as the main provider of financial and logistic support for international terrorism.

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[229] *Ibid*, pp. 18-19.

[230] *Ibid.*

[231] In Lizardo's words, they provide 'requisite models of individual and organizational action and the interpretive schemas that 'empower' local actors […] to engage in high-risk acts of political violence'. *Ibid*, p. 1.

[232] Lizardo, 'The Effect of Economic and Cultural Globalization on Anti-U.S. Transnational Terrorism 1971-2000', p. 19.

[233] John Boli, and George M Thomas (eds) *Construction World Culture: International Nongovernmental organizations since 1875* (Stanford, CA: Standford Univ. Press, 1999).

4.2 State and Non-State Sponsorship of Terrorism

4.2.1 State Sponsors

In the literature on terrorism, one school of thought assigns great weight to the influence of 'state sponsored terrorism' as an explanation for the growth of international terrorism since the 1960s. The former Israeli Prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, whose book on *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network* is widely read in American neo-conservative circles, claims that 'there is no international terrorism without the support of sovereign states'; if this state support is removed, 'the entire scaffolding of international terrorism will collapse into dust'.[234] The thesis is that clandestine groups often face a funding problem, and 'substantial financing is both a precondition and a contributing cause of international terrorism.'[235] Hence, contemporary international terrorism is seen as being driven primarily by the material, financial, and propaganda assistance provided by government sponsors. This was a popular explanation during the Reagan administration, when the thesis drew evidence from works such as Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism,* which placed Moscow at the epicentre of state sponsored terrorism. However, this school has been heavily criticised, especially by the radical left, who viewed the US role in sponsoring a variety of anti-Communist movements, for example the anti-Allende forces in Chile, the Nicaraguan contras, or the anti-Castro forces in the 1970s and 80s, as the other side of the coin.[236] This said, both groups assign a significant role to state sponsorship.

In more recent literature, the complexities and the diversity of states' relationship to terrorist organisations have been emphasised, as well as the relative autonomy of terrorist organisations.[237] State sponsorship rarely explains the very occurrence of terrorism, with the important exception of state intelligence operatives perpetrating covert attacks abroad, such as the Iraqi assassination attempt on the former US President George Bush during his visit to Kuwait in 1993, the killing of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin's Mykonos restaurant in 1992 by operatives acting on orders from top Iranian leaders, or the Israeli Mossad's assassination of a Moroccan refugee in Norway in 1973, reportedly mistaking him for a PLO commander. However, in most cases, state sponsorship does not create, but facilitates already existing groups, which retain substantial operational autonomy. State sponsorship increases their effectiveness and, to a varying degree, influences their directions and *modus operandi*. Brian Jenkins argued back in 1985 that state sponsorship not only 'puts more resources at the disposal of the terrorists', but also 'reduces the constraints on the terrorists, permitting them to

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[234] Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network* (NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995/2001), p. xiii.

[235] Kegley, *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, p. 105ff.

[236] See for example Noam Chomsky, 'International Terrorism: Image and Reality', in Alexander George (ed.) *Western State Terrorism* (NY: Routledge, 1991), pp. 12-38; and Edward S. Herman, 'U.S. Sponsorship of international Terrorism: An Overview', *Crime and Social Justice* 27-28/1987, pp. 1-31.

[237] See in particular Richardson, 'Terrorists as Transnational Actors'.

operate at a higher level of violence'.[238] This view seems less convincing today; the lethality of the state sponsored groups of the 1980s in most cases pales compared to the unbridled violence of the new transnational terrorists of al-Qaida, and the religious cult members of Aum-Shinrikyo.

State support is, in many cases, still vital for the groups' operational strength. Indeed, the Iranian Mujahideen e-Khalq would have been blocked from making cross-border attacks into Iran during the 1980s and 90s without its military bases in Saddam's Iraq. The variety of Islamist insurgent groups active in Indian-controlled Kashmir would not be able to operate effectively had it not been for the support they enjoy from Pakistani authorities. The survival of the POLISARIO guerrilla movement, which previously perpetrated many acts of terrorism as part of its separatist struggle for an independent West Sahara, would have been in jeopardy had it not been for continuous support from Algeria, including the safe haven in Tindouf in southern Algeria. The meteoric rise of al-Qaida during the 1990s was greatly facilitated by its long-time sanctuaries in Sudan and Afghanistan. The Iraqi National Accord, whose campaign of car bombings against government targets in Saddam-ruled Iraq from 1992-5 recently came to light, would probably not have acted without explicit approval and support from the CIA and the PUK-Administered Sulaimaniya in northern Iraq.[239] The successive waves of vigilante violence and terrorist attacks on Palestinians by radical Jewish settler militias since the 1970s would have been difficult to imagine without tacit support from the Israeli government, manifesting itself in, for example, the issuance of weapons and extensive use of ostensibly 'civilian' Israeli settlers for military purposes, as well as an absence of effective law enforcement vis-à-vis militant settlers.[240]

The motivations for state-sponsored terrorism vary greatly. Strong states may resort to state-sponsorship due to the prohibitive costs of open warfare, while weak states that support terrorist organisations do so because they believe that it is the only effective weapon against a militarily superior enemy.[241] As for the timing of state sponsored terrorism, studies suggest that serious foreign policy setbacks tend to increase the propensity for state sponsored terrorism by authoritarian regimes.[242] State sponsorship may also be a burden for terrorist groups, constraining their operations and reducing their freedom to act. During its heyday in Afghanistan from 1997 to 2001, al-Qaida was troubled by the balancing act between the

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[238] Jenkins, 'Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?' p. 510.

[239] Joel Brinkley, 'Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks', *The New York Times* 9 June 2004.

[240] For recent examples of Jewish terrorist and vigilante acts against Palestinians, see 'Free Rein: Vigilante Settlers and Israel's Non-Enforcement of the Law', *B'Tselem Information Sheet*, October 2001; B'Tselem, 'Standing Idly By: Non-enforcement of the Law on Settlers: Hebron, 26-28 July 2002', *B'Tselem Case Study* No. 15, August 2002; Herb Keinon and Arieh O'Sullivan, 'Security services alert for vigilante action', *The Jerusalem Post* 1 January 2001; Chris McGreal, 'Israel fears growing terror threat by settlers', *The Guardian*, 20 September 2003; and '37 Names of Hatred & Terror', *Middle East Peace Report* 5 (14) (20 October 2003), www.peacenow.org/nia/peace/v5i14.html.

[241] Richardson, 'Terrorists as Transnational Actors', p. 212.

[242] Sean P. O'Brien, 'Foreign Policy Crises and the Resort to Terrorism: A Time-Series Analysis of Conflict Linkages', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (2) (June 1996), pp. 320-335.

imperatives of its global jihadist struggle and the need to avoid too much international pressure on its host, the Taleban regime.

State sponsorship may take many forms, from merging terrorist groups directly into the state security services, as seems to be the case with Hizbullah's Imad Mughniyeh and Iran, to tacit support from the state authorities, manifesting itself in an unwillingness to investigate thoroughly and prosecute terrorists operating on the state's territory. The inability of Greek authorities to capture a single 17 November Revolutionary Organisation member for more than 20 years, was in no small measure due to the considerable sympathy for the group, and reportedly, its links to influential Greek politicians, especially from the PASOK party. In 1990 a poll showed that 17 November enjoyed a 15% approval rating in the country.[243]

The importance of traditional state sponsorship in international terrorism is being undermined by the new unipolar world order, as well as by globalisation. The costs of supporting anti-US and anti-Israeli terrorist groups openly have increased immensely since the end of the Cold War, and even more so since September 11th. Several 'rouge states' have been forced to alter their policies while others have been overthrown. As a result, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Sudan have been fully or partially removed from official US lists of countries sponsoring international terrorism, while no new countries have been added.[244] Despite US and Israeli protestations to the opposite, even Iran, 'the most active state sponsor of terrorism' for many years, has reduced its direct involvement in international terrorism, in particular with regard to assassination of Iranian opposition members abroad and support for Gulf opposition movements.[245]

While certain forms of state sponsorship of international terrorist organisations continue, it is fair to say that over the past decade, state sponsorship of terrorism has declined. This trend is even more evident in view of the significant increase in the number of states over the past 15 years since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. (Theoretically, a growing number of independent states would create a greater potential for state sponsorship of international terrorism.) The net effect of the decline of state sponsorship has been undercut by several developments, making other sources of financing and support available for illegal sub-state organisations. The expansion of transnational communities, the proliferation of weak states, and the rise of non-state actors in international politics, have contributed to reducing the capability of states to control international terrorist organisations.

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[243] 'Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)', *Center for Defence Information website* 5 August 2002, www.cdi.org/terrorism/17N-pr.cfm.

[244] See for example 'U.S. removes Sudan from one terror list', *WorldTribune.com* 20 May 2004.

[245] A report to the US Congress notes that since 1997 when the moderate Iranian president Khatemi took office, 'no major international terrorist attacks have been linked to Iran'. Although material support from Iran to terrorist groups fighting Israel and the Israeli occupation continues, Iran has sharply reduced its support for opposition movements in the Gulf region, and has 'largely ceased attacks on dissidents abroad that were so prominent during the tenures of Khatemi's predecessors'. See Kenneth Katzman, 'Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002', Congressional Research Service Report for the US Congress, 13 February 2002, Order Code RL31119, pp. 30-31.

4.2.2 NGOs and the Rise of Transnational Private Support Networks

State sponsorship has not become irrelevant, but alternative sources of sponsorship have emerged and increased in importance. These include various forms of private transnational support networks, and involve a multitude of contexts and actors, such as immigrant communities, NGOs, refugee camps, religious organisations, sympathetic guerrilla movements, and wealthy private individuals. Support networks run propaganda efforts in order to mobilise political support, and moral sympathy. They also raise financial aid, and contribute to a host of logistical activities. In many conflict areas, the rise of private support networks has contributed to transforming intra-state wars to 'transnational' or transborder wars, involving territory and nationals of more than one state without the permission or involvement of their governments. An illustration of the transnational character of contemporary armed conflicts is the insurgency against the US-led coalition forces and their Iraqi allies in post-Saddam Iraq. This armed campaign has involved not simply Iraqi nationalists, former Iraqi officers, and disaffected local tribesmen, but also an array of Islamist fighters, both Iraqi and foreign, supported by extensive networks in the Middle East and Europe. There is also ample reason to believe that the insurgents have received tacit support from wealthy businessmen, clerics, and perhaps also sympathetic government officials in Saudi Arabia, and from Syrian and Iranian security agencies, even if such support is contrary to their governments' declared policy.[246]

Transnational support networks for international terrorism consist of a number of avenues for financing, political advocacy, as well as logistical support, ranging from commercial front companies, illegal organised crime, to different kinds of NGOs, such as charities, welfare organisations, as well as various advocacy groups. The latter category is particularly important. The role of NGOs in international politics has grown steadily since the 1970s, and has become an embedded part of local and international politics. Hence, the worldwide existence of NGOs puts an international institutional infrastructure at the disposal of sub-state actors. While being first and foremost a force of good, a small, but not insignificant number of NGOs has been knowingly or unwittingly involved in financing and facilitating international terrorism in a number of ways. In some cases, NGOs have served as political fronts for terrorist organisations; in other cases funds are siphoned off from legal donations to NGOs for charity purposes. For example, a long list of Islamic NGOs, mostly charities, figures on the U.S. Treasury Department's list of 374 individuals and entities designated (by June 2004) under the President Bush Executive Order for the purpose of freezing the assets of terrorists and their supporters after 9/11. According to one study, as many as 'one-fifth of all Islamic NGOs worldwide have been unwittingly infiltrated by al-Qaida and other terrorist support groups'.[247]

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[246] See for example Michael Howard, 'Syria and Iran aiding militants, Iraq says', *The Guardian* 20 February 2004; Neil MacFarquhar, 'Saudis Support a Jihad in Iraq, Not Back Home', *The New York Times* 23 April 2004; Philip Sherwell in Najaf and Jessica Berry, 'Iranian agents flood into Iraq posing as pilgrims and traders', *The Telegraph* 28 September 2003; Ahmed Janabi, 'Iraq: Militias' law rules', *Al Jazeera* 11 March 2004; 'Ex-intelligence officer says Tehran deploying agents in Iraq', *Summary of Iran News - BBC Monitoring* 3 April 2004; Mouna Naim and Sophie Shihab, 'Spiral of Attacks [in French]', *Le Monde* 14 Nov 2003; and 'CIA: Saudi Arabia Helps Sunni Insurgency', *Middle East Newsline* 26 August 2003.

[247] CIA sources, cited by Rohan Gunaratna in his *Inside al-Qaida: Global Network of Terror* (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), p. 6.

4.3 Hegemony, Bipolarity, and Unipolarity in World Politics

Is there a connection between the power structure of the international system and the occurrence of international terrorism? Will a world order dominated by one or two strong hegemons[248] be more exposed to terrorism than a multipolar world system? During the Cold War the conventional wisdom was that the military stalemate between the superpowers and the existence of nuclear arms made conventional warfare prohibitively costly, and 'pushed guerrilla uprisings, low intensity conflict and terrorist activities to center stage'.[249] State sponsorship for rebel groups and international terrorists became a convenient tool for putting pressure on the other side. Hence, superpower sponsorship for violent opposition groups worldwide played a crucial role in sustaining a high level of international terrorism.[250] Conversely, after the Cold War ended, the funding and resources previously provided to terrorist groups from the former Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent from the United States and its allies, largely dried up, causing a significant and observable decline in the number of international terrorist attacks. This thesis receives considerable support from recent quantitative studies.

4.3.1 The impact of hegemony and bipolarity

A 1997 study by Volgy, Imwalle and Corntassel examined the impact of hegemony and bipolarity on the occurrence of transnational terrorism.[251] The study found that both hegemony and bipolarity are significant variables, but that hegemony is more important. For example, changes in 'hegemonic control', which is measured by the hegemon's share of the world's economic and military capabilities, demonstrate a strong effect on both the frequency and the intensity of transnational terrorist incidents.[252] Even for incidents where the hegemons were not the direct target of terrorism, hegemonic control remained a significant factor in accounting for the frequency of attacks. Another measures of hegemony, 'hegemonic support', defined as support for the two superpowers, measured by surveying patterns of voting in the UN, also accounted significantly for variation in transnational terrorism. In the case of governmental targets, the study found that both bipolarity and hegemony were significant factors.

Volgy, Imwalle and Corntassel used data covering only the period from the late 1960s until the 1990s, and could therefore not explain the changing patterns before that period. However, they observed a remarkable reduction in both the frequency and intensity of transnational terrorism after the end of the Cold War in the period 1987-1992, when it declined by 45.4 and 74.2

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[248] Hegemony refers to 'the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system, so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic relations are conducted'. See Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (NY: Addison-Wesley Longman, 2003), p. 32

[249] Kegley, *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes and Controls*, p. 105.

[250] See for example Wilkinson, 'Terrorism: An International Research Agenda?' p. xv.

[251] Thomas J. Volgy, Lawrence E. Imwalle and Jeff J. Corntassel, 'Structural Determinants of International Terrorism: The Effects of Hegemony and Polarity on Terrorist Activity', *International Interactions* 23 (2) (1997), pp. 207-231.

[252] *Ibid*, p. 219.

percent respectively.[253] This decline is mostly explained by the disappearance of bipolarity. World systemic factors do not necessarily account well for patterns of terrorism at a regional level. Feldman and Perälä have found that in the case of Latin American terrorism, the Cold War had far less impact upon levels of terrorism in comparison to the impact of internal factors related to governance.[254] However, Feldman and Perälä looked primarily at domestic terrorism.

A more recent study has examined to what degree American hegemony is a key driver in anti-US terrorism. Analysing US Department of State data on terrorist attacks against American interests between 1968 and 1996, Sobek and Braithwaite find that the level of US hegemony or 'dominance', conceptualised as 'a state's military, economic, and diplomatic influence', is a significant factor in accounting for the level of terrorist attacks against American interests.[255] In other words, the more powerful the United States becomes, the more exposed it will be to transnational terrorism. The explanation for this paradox seems to be that increased US dominance constrains the options for revisionist actors to alter the status quo through traditional means of influence, making terrorism a more attractive choice.[256]

4.3.2 Unipolarity, empire, and blowback

The post-Cold War world has increasingly been described as a sort of unipolar world order, a US global empire, albeit with many multipolar characteristics. The long-term impact of unipolarity upon international terrorism is not entirely obvious. One possible clue can be gleaned from the historical experience of previous empires and terrorism. Hardly any empire in modern times has entirely eluded terrorism in one form or another. Crenshaw has observed that resistance groups facing colonial powers often staged terrorist campaigns whenever wars and insurgencies elsewhere had weakened the empires, such as the IRA and the Irgun did against Britain after World War I and World War II respectively, and the FLN against France after the latter's defeat in Indochina.[257] Whenever they were perceived as weak, the Habsburg Empire, Czarist Russia, and the Ottoman Sultanate, all faced waves of terrorism from rebellious minorities. These included Armenian nationalist groups of the 1880s and 1890s, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Army (IMRO) formed in Thessaloniki in 1893, the various Serbian secret societies such as the *Narodna Obrana* ('National Defence'), formed in 1908 and the *Ujedinjenie ili Smrt* ('Union or Death'), commonly known as 'Black Hand', formed three years later.[258] While terrorist groups have been largely ineffective in defeating modern nation-states, they have been far more successful in defeating empires by attacking their overseas colonies and protectorates, and triggering foreign interventions. The British Empire was gradually forced to abandon its post-war plans for Egypt and Palestine due to terrorist and

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[253] *Ibid*, pp. 225-226.

[254] Feldmann and Perälä, 'Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America'.

[255] David Sobek and Alex Braithwaite, 'Victim of Success: American Dominance and Terrorism'. Paper for the International Peace Science Society Annual Meeting, Tucson, AZ, www.personal.psu.edu/users/d/a/das292/SobekandBraithwaite_JOP.pdf. Accessed July 2004.

[256] *Ibid*.

[257] Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', p. 119.

[258] For more on IMRO, Narodna Obrana and Black Hand, see Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 93, 111, 169-171.

guerrilla attacks on its presence; France finally gave up Algeria for the same reason, while by shooting Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a 'Black Hand'-conspirator, succeeded not only in assassinating the heir to the Habsburg throne, but also in triggering a world war that, in addition, brought down the empire of his victim.

Several authors have argued that the United States' role in world affairs is not very dissimilar from previous 'empires'.[259] Contemporary international terrorism must be seen as 'a strategic reaction to American power', and is part and parcel of the costs of being an empire.[260] They point to the interesting parallel in 19th century globalisation and the wave of anarchist terrorism at the end of that century.[261] The United States wields significant power in overseas territories and countries through direct occupation and via indirect client state relations. US exercise of power in international affairs is widely seen as blunt and heavy-handed power politics, and it is reasonable to assume that it invites international terrorism, simply because such tactics have proved to be very effective against empires in the past. The term 'blowback' refers not only specifically to the well-known, and often misrepresented story of US support for the mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the creation of al-Qaida at the end of the Afghan war for liberation. It also suggests a general time-lag between the rise of an empire and the occurrence of international terrorism against it: 'the projection of military power plants seeds of later terrorist reactions, as 'retaliation for previous American imperial actions'.'[262]

Bergenen and Lizardo have proposed a 'globological model' for explaining the linkages between terrorism and world systems, in which contemporary terrorism is seen as part of the 'systemic chaos', produced by 'the unravelling of the post-war neo-liberal order' under conditions of US hegemony.[263] Their model only speaks of broad background conditions, not specific circumstances or mechanisms that directly influence the occurrence of terrorism. Drawing upon a comparison of Pax Americana post-1945 with historical parallels, primarily the British and Spanish Empires, it suggests a set of four international conditions that can explain waves of terrorism in the international system.[264] According to this explanation, terrorism originates in autocratic semi-peripheral zones of the global system in periods when three characteristics coincide: globalisation, empire/colonial competition, and hegemonic

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[259] See for example Eliot A. Cohen, 'History and the hyperpower: empire's new clothes', *Foreign Affairs* 83 (4) (July/August 2004), pp. 49-64. He defines empire as 'a multinational and multiethnic state that extends its influence through formal and informal control of other polities', (p.50). For a review of this literature, see Stein Tønnesson, 'The Imperial Temptation,' *Security Dialogue* 35 (3) (September 2004), pp. 329-343.

[260] Martha Crenshaw, 'Why America? The Globalization of Civil War', *Current History* 100 (650) (December 2001), p. 425. See also Chalmers A. Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (NY: Metropolitan Books, 2000).

[261] John Gray, 'Why Terrorism is Unbeatable?' *The New Statesman* (25 February 2002); Niall Ferguson, 'Clashing Civilizations or Mad Mullahs? The United States between Formal and Informal Empire', in Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda (eds) *The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11* (NY: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 115-141; and Chalmers A. Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (NY: Metropolitan Books, 2000).

[262] Albert J. Bergesen and Omar Lizardo, 'International Terrorism and the World System', *Sociological Theory* 22 (1) (March 2004), p. 45.

[263] *Ibid.*

[264] *Ibid.*

decline.[265] The latter term refers to decline of the dominant state in economic terms, prompting it to impose order by military means instead of relying on consent. If indeed the US is an empire and it is retreating as a global power, this explanation fits into observed historical patterns where weak empires have become exposed to terrorism from national liberation movements wishing to force the empires to abandon their colonies. In this view, the contemporary wave of Islamist terrorism should be seen as an anti-colonial insurgency, rather than a religious backlash against modernity.

The significant regional differences in terms of contemporary anti-US terrorism also fit into the globological model. Most incidents have occurred in semi-peripheral regions, such as the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of South-East Asia, or have been perpetrated by people originating from these regions. The 'anti-imperialist' orientation is evident in al-Qaida's campaign, not only by its specific targeting of the United States on a global scale, but also by its threats and attacks against countries almost exclusively on the basis of their co-operation with 'the imperial power', the United States, in the 'war on terror' or on the basis of their participation in direct 'imperial rule', i.e. the US-led occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the thesis also finds support in that fact that the region most affected by US direct 'imperial' interventions, manifested in, for example, military campaigns, economic and military aid, political pressure and sanctions, diplomatic action such as veto in the UN Security Council, etc., over the past decades is the Middle East, the region that has spawned the most deadly anti-US terrorist groups over the past decades. Interestingly, public opinion polls from the Middle East also show that while Arabs overwhelmingly view US foreign policies (i.e. 'imperial America') extremely negatively, they do have 'much more nuanced and often quite positive, attitudes towards American society and culture'.[266] Following the previous argument that terrorism often reflects in a distorted way broader political currents, this suggests that the current anti-US Islamist terrorism emanating from the Middle East is not primarily a religious counter-cultural movement, but is motivated by the same anti-imperialist sentiments that previously spawned leftist and pan-Arab terrorist groups.

The discussion of unipolarity and terrorism can also be extended further. The rise of al-Qaida and the US Administration's decision to elevate al-Qaida, a shadowy terrorist network, to its counterpart in a 'global war', have prompted observers to suggest that the US, as the only global hegemon, desperately needs an enemy to sustain and legitimise its hegemonic rule. While this sounds conspiratorial, there is little doubt that after the fall of Communism, enemies of the United States have searched for a focal point for their resistance to US hegemony. The classical realist school in international relations asserts that power generates counter-power, that unipolarity is inherently unstable, pushing other states to join forces to balance the power

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[265] *Ibid*, p. 47.

[266] Abdel Mahdi Abdallah, 'Causes of Anti-Americanism in The Arab World: A Socio-Political Perspective', *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7 (4) (December 2003), p. 70. In fact, one researcher summed up the responses that Americans in the Middle East were met with in one-to-one conversations by the statement: 'When you return to the U.S., give my love to the American people and tell your president to go to hell!'. See Mark Tessler, 'Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43 (3-5) (June 2002), pp. 229-249.

of the hegemon. While this school is often seen as ill-suited to explain non-state actors in international relations, realist theory may nevertheless alert us to the possibility that al-Qaida's remarkable empowerment on the international scene has something to do with the imbalance in the current world order. Since no state actor in the world system is capable of fulfilling the role of counterweight, al-Qaida is able to portray itself as the only powerful entity in the world system willing and able to confront the hegemon. According to this interpretation, unipolarity promotes a new form of stateless transnational anti-hegemonic terrorism; it is a new global phenomenon, created by a temporary anomaly in the international state system. It will remain so as long as the throne of the counter-hegemon state is vacant.

Summing up, one may conclude that an international system dominated by hegemonic powers is likely to experience high levels of terrorism. A bipolar system is more likely to foster high levels of international state-sponsored terrorism, while a unipolar system tends to invite transnational anti-systemic terrorism. A possible implication of this is that increased multilateralism and institutionalised international co-operation, which tempers the hegemonic character of the system, might eventually reduce the level of terrorism.

4.4 State Strength: Weak and Collapsed States

While state sponsorship and hegemonic rivalry may have encouraged the growth of international terrorism during the Cold War, the existence of weak and collapsed states in the post-Cold War period has increasingly become a cause of concern as potential 'breeding grounds for instability, mass migration, and murder', as well as 'reservoirs and exporters of terror'.[267] Following September 11^{th,} the United States deployed troops in or close to number of weak states where suspected al-Qaida terrorists and Islamist guerrillas had strong footholds, including Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti (due to its proximity to Somalia and Yemen), Georgia, the Philippines, and Western Africa.

Studies suggest that the proliferation of states has a facilitating influence on terrorism. In particular, it is shown to have a positive effect on the rate of transnational terrorist incidents against US targets.[268] The reason for this is probably complex: the existence of more states increases the opportunity structure for terrorist groups; state formation processes are violent and are often accompanied by terrorism; and finally, new states are often weak, their political legitimacy is uncertain, and their territorial control may be limited.

Although it seems intuitively relevant to speak about a connection between the existence of weak and collapsed states and international terrorism, there are few systematic studies in this field. Weak and collapsed states, whose main characteristic is the absence of a central government authority controlling most of its territory, often attract both domestic and foreign insurgent groups. In some cases, they have also become training grounds for international

[267] Robert I. Rotberg, 'Failed States in a World of Terror', *Foreign Affairs* 81 (4) (July/August 2002), p. 128.
[268] Lizardo, 'The Effect of Economic and Cultural Globalization on Anti-U.S. Transnational Terrorism 1971-2000', p. 17.

terrorist organisations.[269] However, as von Hippell and others have cautioned, there is no reason to assume that any collapsed state will attract transnational terrorists.[270] After all, terrorist organizations also need a safe and secure environment around their training bases and their operatives. Lawless areas ruled by capricious and deceitful warlords are not the kind of environments in which political terrorists thrive. Indeed, al-Qaida's return to Afghanistan only came after the Taleban had secured firm control in Kabul and most of the countryside, while al-Qaida's infrastructure in Somalia, the most classic example of a collapsed state in recent years, has never been considerable. Stevenson noted in the case of the DRC that the country has been so rife with violent conflict that al-Qaida would not have considered it a secure base.[271]

On the other hand, it remains true that transnational terrorism thrives on armed conflicts (see our discussion on armed conflicts below). This makes state capacity a critical factor due to the fact that civil wars occur most frequently in weak states. According to Lake and Rothchild, '[s]tate weakness […] is a necessary precondition for violent ethnic conflict to erupt.'[272] Fearon and Laitin find that state weakness is among the most robust risk predictors for civil wars.[273]

State capacity does not simply affect the chances of armed conflict occurring, but also the nature of the armed challenge. Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana argue that armed opposition groups select their tactics based upon an evaluation of the government's strength. Hence, states with strong institutions and defence capabilities will rarely have to face widespread armed insurgencies, but are more likely to see urban terrorism. Weak states, on the other hand, tend to experience civil wars, coups, and widespread insurrections designed to overthrow the government.[274] This does not necessarily mean that there will be less terrorism in the latter case, but instead, that it will form part of a larger picture of insurgent violence.

As for transnational terrorism, quantitative studies find that state strength is a significant factor in reducing its scope. In a cross-country analysis based on the ITERATE dataset for all countries in the period 1968-1977, Lai finds that the greater the government's share of the state's GDP is, the lower the level of transnational terrorism against its interests.[275] There are probably several reasons for this. Strong states are more capable of providing security to their populace and disrupting terrorist networks. They are also more capable of counteracting terrorism by reducing recruitment to radical groups through the provision of necessary services to society.

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[269] For a classical study of collapsed states, see I. William Zartman (ed.) *Collapsed States The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[270] von Hippel, 'The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths', pp. 25-39.

[271] Jonathan Stevenson, 'Africa's Growing Strategic Resonance', *Survival* 45 (4) (Winter 2003-04), p. 158.

[272] David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', *International Security* 21 (2) (Fall 1996), pp. 43f, 47-9; and Rachel Bronson, 'Cycles of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa', in Michael E. Brown (ed.) *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 205.

[273] Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', pp. 75-90

[274] Blomberg et al, 'Economic conditions and terrorism'.

[275] Lai, 'Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness', p. 36.

Hence, state strength appears to be a central factor in accounting for levels of both transnational and domestic terrorism. One is therefore tempted to agree with Rotberg's appeal to Western governments that 'if state building is done on the cheap, or if the big powers walk away from the failed states too soon […] then the real war against terror will not have been won'.[276]

4.5 Armed Conflicts as a Source of Terrorism

A central characteristic of terrorism is that terrorist acts often occur as part of a wider armed conflict. Hence, studying patterns of armed violence is an avenue to understanding future patterns of terrorism. While there is no single explanation of how armed conflict causes terrorism or influences its patterns, one may identify a typology of overlaps and inter-linkages.

4.5.1 Terrorism as armed conflict

First, when reaching a certain level of intensity, a terrorist campaign is an armed conflict in its own right.[277] The protracted ETA assassination and bombing campaign against Spanish authorities since the 1970s is a case in point. Since the Spanish state was too strong for any armed insurgency to succeed, urban terrorism became the preferred tool in ETA's armed separatist struggle. Conversely, in less developed and weak states, terrorist campaigns often constitute merely a subordinate tactic used in a wider armed rebellion. Both the Kashmiri insurgents and the Nepalese Maoist guerrillas perpetrate many acts of terrorism while waging a guerrilla war against the government's military forces.[278] Before the recent ceasefire and peace agreement talks resumed, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE) in Sri Lanka were notorious for being the world's most prolific users of suicide bombings, even if their main method of warfare was a protracted guerrilla campaign.

The rise of modern international terrorism has been closely associated with the new Palestinian resistance groups emerging after the 1967 war. Still, this tactic was only a new face of the ongoing Palestinian 'armed struggle', which had begun long before the creation of Israel in 1948. Even with increasing resort to international terrorism tactics after 1968, the Palestinian 'war of liberation' was simultaneously pursued by a variety of military means and guerrilla tactics too. There were, for example, numerous armed cross-border infiltrations into Israel from neighbouring states and from the sea, targeting both civilian and military targets. The PLO participated militarily in the various Arab-Israeli wars, a protracted guerrilla war has been mounted from the Palestinian camps in Lebanon since the late 1960s, and semi-armed

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[276] Rotberg, 'Failed States in a World of Terror', p. 140.

[277] The lower threshold for defining 'minor armed conflicts' in conflict studies is usually 25 deaths a year. See new data material on armed conflicts in Mikael Eriksson, Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflict, 1989-2002', *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (5) (September 2003), p. 597.

[278] Rohan Gunaratna, 'Nepal's insurgents balance politics and violence', *Jane's Intelligence Review* October 2001; and John Mackinlay, 'A military assessment of the Nepalese Maoist movement', *Jane's Intelligence Review* December 2002.

insurgencies were launched in the Occupied Territories in 1968-70, 1987-93 and in 2000, the latter Uprising ('al-Aqsa Intifada') being far more bloody than the former.

Terrorism also occurs as part of widespread civil violence during inter-communal or sectarian conflicts when, for example, two or more ethnic communities engage in a vicious cycle of revenge attacks. One example is the bombings of the Hazara mosque in the southwestern city of Quetta in July 2003, where 47 Pakistani Shiites were killed. This was the hitherto most deadly attack in the sectarian conflict between the 77 percent Sunni majority and the 20 percent Shiite minority, which has troubled Pakistan for more than 15 years and killed thousands of people.[279]

4.5.2 Terrorism as spillover, by-product, and reminder of armed conflicts

In its international and transnational forms, terrorism occurs perhaps most frequently as part of or as a by-product of, armed conflicts. In an influential article published in 2002, Michael Doran argues that transnational terrorism reflects a civil war taking place between a government and its opposition movements, while foreign nationals and interests are targeted because of their assumed politico-military alliance with or intervention on behalf of the government in question.[280]

While the degree of spill-over of international terrorism from domestic conflicts varies greatly, there is little doubt that armed conflicts have been a major source, both directly and indirectly. Consider, for example, the global reach of Palestinian and Arab terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s. It occurred precisely against the background of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, which repeatedly escalated to a full-scale war (1967, 1973, 1978, 1982-85), and in between it simmered as a low intensity conflict inside and around Israel's borders, primarily along its Northern borders with Lebanon.

Armed conflicts frequently create powerful ideological and psychological motivations for individuals and groups to launch terrorist attacks outside the area of conflict. This may occur in several ways. A common strategy by terrorist groups is to broaden or internationalise their campaign by targeting enemy targets outside the immediate area of conflict, or abroad. The Chechen insurgents have staged numerous terrorist attacks in Moscow, sending a powerful signal of their determination to escalate and 'internationalise' the conflict with the central government. The PIRA has not confined its 'armed struggle' to Northern Ireland, but frequently carried out attacks against British targets in London, in Germany, and in the Netherlands.

The internationalisation of a terrorist campaign also occurs when terrorist groups decide to launch attacks on foreign nationals residing in the conflict area. The *Ejército Popular*

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[279] David Rohde, '47 Pakistanis die in attack on Shiite rites', *The New York Times* 5 July 2003.

[280] Michael Doran, 'Somebody else's civil war', *Foreign Affairs* 81 (1) (January/February 2002), pp.22-42. See also Tony Addison and S. Mansoob Murshed, 'Transnational Terrorism and a Spillover of Domestic Dispute in Other Countries', Helsinki, United Nations University, World Institute of Development Economics Research, December 2002, Discussion Paper No.2002/120.

Revolucionario ('Popular Revolutionary Army'), based in Guerrero, Mexico, has repeatedly threatened to target American interests in Mexico if the United States is found to support Mexico militarily against their rebel army.[281] The Algerian *Groupe Islamique Armée* (GIA) conducted a terrorist campaign against foreigners in Algeria, justifying their atrocities with the claim that they all assisted the Algerian military regime politically and economically, and threatened the Islamic character of Algeria. Since most governments usually nurture close ties with other states from which they receive political, diplomatic, and sometimes military support, it is perhaps inevitable that radical armed opposition groups will consider many foreign states as hostile and view their representatives and interests as legitimate targets.

A third type of internationalisation occurs when a terrorist group decides to expand their armed campaign against the enemy regime by striking against its foreign allies abroad. There may be specific tactical reasons for doing so. The series of terrorist strikes by the Algerian GIA in France in the mid-1990s took place during a critical stage in the Islamist insurgency-cum-terrorist campaign in Algeria, when Algerian security forces were recapturing areas previously lost to the rebels. The Islamist insurgents had previously escalated their campaign against the military government by targeting foreigners in Algeria and decided to up the ante further by taking the war to France, Algeria's main foreign supporter and provider of nearly US$1 billion in annual aid to the country.[282]

If insurgent groups are unable to establish a domestic front, and are forced to flee, international terrorist attacks – whether on targets associated with the enemy regime or on its foreign allies – may often be the only possible way in which 'armed struggle' can be pursued. This was the case with regards to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which proved unable to establish guerrilla bases inside the Occupied Territories after the Israeli army crushed the Gaza uprising in 1970-71.

International attacks may also occur for agenda-setting purposes related to past or ongoing wars. Throughout the history of modern international terrorism a common motive of perpetrators has been to bring their forgotten war and grievances to the world's attention. The series of kidnappings and hijacking operations carried out by South Moluccan, or Ambonese, militants in the Netherlands between 1975 and 1978, were all aimed at putting pressure on the Dutch government to support their struggle for independence from Indonesia.[283]

4.5.3 Armed conflicts as inspirational sources, radicalising catalysts, and training arena for terrorism

Armed conflicts have an immense impact on human minds and create socio-political repercussions far beyond the war-torn society. An important inspirational source of modern

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[281] Mark R. Wrighte, 'The real Mexican terrorists: A group profile of the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR)', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (4) (July 2002), pp. 207-225.

[282] Lia and Kjøk, 'Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States'.

[283] V. Herman and R. van der Laan Bouma, 'Nationalists Without a Nation: South Moluccan Terrorism in the Netherlands', *Terrorism* 4 (1-2) (1980), pp. 223-258.

international terrorism was the Vietnam War, even if it hardly exported any Vietnamese terrorism to the international arena.[284] Instead, it inspired attacks on US government and business targets by a plethora of militant groups in Latin America, Europe, and Asia.[285] Behind the scenes, North Vietnam and the Communist bloc played an important role in encouraging militant leftist groups opposed to the war. In the United States, this was done through the formation of the 'South Vietnamese People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People' and numerous conferences in Bratislava, Havana, and elsewhere, where close connections between the Vietnamese resistance and militant leftist activists in the West were forged.[286] One of these groups was the Weather Underground Organisation, originally termed 'Weathermen', which took great inspiration from the Vietnam resistance movement.[287] Hence, the war in Vietnam appeared to contribute both directly and indirectly to the rise of radicalised leftist movements in the West, from which numerous terrorist groups emerged, many of which outlived the causes that had propelled them into action.

Cross-country quantitative studies of patterns of transnational terrorism in this period have found support for the thesis that participation in war intensifies social-political relations in a state, which in turn fosters radicalisation of politics and the emergence of political violence groups. Analysing data from the ITERATE dataset on global transnational terrorism for the period 1968-1977, Lai found that states participating in wars were likely to experience higher levels of terrorism.[288] The lagged dependent variable in his model was also statistically significant, pointing to a time-lag between the participation in war and the emergence of terrorist movements.

Another type of impact on terrorism from armed conflicts is the war veteran phenomenon. The most typical example is the Mujahidin veterans from civil war zones in Afghanistan during the 1980s; Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Somalia, Kashmir and the Philippines during the 1990s; to Iraq in the post-millennium period. (Palestine is ideologically-speaking extremely important for the internationalist jihadist movement, but with a few exceptions, it has not been an arena for foreign jihadist fighters.) These conflicts invariably involved Muslims fighting non-Muslims, or Islamists fighting secular Muslim governments, and fuelled

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[284] In the RAND-St Andrew's Chronology 1968-1997 there are 19 relevant incidents (found by using search terms 'Vietnam' and 'Vietnamese'). Nearly all of these incidents were perpetrated by non-Vietnamese, mostly in protest of the US war in Vietnam, or in protest against the Communist regime in Vietnam. A possible exception is the machine-gunning of a USIS office in Rosario, Argentina on 8 March 1968, where the attackers left a note identifying themselves as the *Frente de Liberacion Nacional del Vietnam del Sur* (The National Liberation Front for Southern Vietnam).

[285] For example, in June 1968, the offices of IBM, Honeywell and the Bank of America were bombed in Milan, by perpetrators who left leaflets at the site hailing 'the struggle of the Vietnamese people against American imperialism'. Similarly, in May 1972, a series of bombs went off in Paris, targeting the offices of the American Legion and the US consulate, as well as the offices of the two American airliners TWA and Pan American World Airways. The group claiming responsibility stated it was in protest of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam. RAND-St Andrew's Chronology 1968-1997, via www.mipt.org/.

[286] See for example a 420 page declassified summary of the main activities of the Weathermen prepared by the Chicago Office of the FBI in 1976, http://foia.fbi.gov/weather.htm. Accessed July 2004.

[287] Ehud Sprinzak, 'The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen', in Walter Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terror: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), pp. 65-85.

[288] Lai, 'Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness'.

the global spread of militant Islamism. The genocidal sufferings of Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya gave some credence to the militant message that Islam was under a global military attack, which had to be repelled at all costs. While the particular circumstances of the Afghan liberation war of the 1980s played a key role in the rise of al-Qaida, there can be little doubt that the various civil war zones also contributed significantly in consolidating a global network of volunteer Islamist fighters, many of whom were, or later came to constitute, the core of Usama bin Ladin's organisation. The civil war zones were portrayed as 'lands of jihad' and attracted Muslim youth from around the world with a mixture of adventurism and ideological commitment, a parallel to the stream of European volunteers to the Spanish civil war in the 1930s. However, a minority of them became battle-hardened war veterans, joined al-Qaida's network, and ended up as perpetrators of international terrorism. For example, most of the dozen or so Turkish Islamists suspected of plotting an attack on a NATO summit in June 2004 were reported to have 'been trained or fought alongside Islamic militants' in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Pakistan.[289]

There are also other ways in which armed conflicts contribute to terrorism. As already alluded to, states have facilitated international terrorism by fighting proxy wars through open or tacit support for insurgents and terrorist organisations operating in or against a foreign state (or states).[290] In addition, armed conflicts by themselves create propitious environments for international terrorist organisations, not only because such conflicts are rallying cries for the mobilisation to militant groups, but also in the numerous refugee camps created by the conflict, as well as among sympathetic diaspora communities. Areas ravaged by armed conflict and civil strife often emerge as no-man's-land, controlled by non-state entities be they rebel groups, warlords, tribal chieftains, or drug cartels.

Under certain circumstances, these lawless zones may provide international terrorist groups with safe havens, training camps, etc., and may also assist them in establishing long-lasting relationships with like-minded groups.[291] Consider the following examples: prior to and during the Lebanese civil war (1975-89), the PLO established its own proto-state in Lebanon. In their various camps in Lebanon and elsewhere, many Palestinian resistance organisations hosted a plethora of terrorist and rebel groups, including revolutionary leftist groups such as the Japanese *United Red Army*, and the German *Red Army Faction*, and a number of ethno-separatist groups such as the *Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK), the *Basque Homeland and Liberty* (ETA), and the *Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia* (ASALA), in addition to a number of Arab, Iranian, Latin American, and other Third World groups.[292] Perhaps as many as three dozen different rebel and terrorist groups had some of their members trained in these camps at one time or another.

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[289] Amberin Zaman, '9 Held in Alleged Plot in Turkey', *Los Angeles Times* 4 May 2004.

[290] Daniel L. Byman *et al*., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Washington: RAND, 2001).

[291] For more on the relationship between terrorism and armed conflict, see SIPRI/PRIO, 'Terrorism and Armed Conflict', Report on a Seminar co-organized by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Voksenåsen, Oslo, 8-9 December 2002, www.sipri.se/taac.htm. Accessed December 2003.

[292] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 84.

Afghanistan under the Taleban regime, from 1996-2001, hosted numerous militant Islamic groups which sought refuge and training, including Pakistani, Kashmiri, Uighuri, Uzbeki, Chechen, Algerian, Egyptian, Moroccan, Lebanese, Turkish, Kurdish-Iraqi, Saudi, and Yemeni groups. With the influx of Islamist militants and fighters from around the world, the country was, in the words of Rohan Gunaratna, turned into 'a 'terrorist Disneyland' with about 40 Islamist groups receiving both guerrilla and terrorist training throughout the 1990s'.[293]

Afghanistan was not the only civil war zone where Islamist militants have been trained. There were several training camps and bases for foreign Islamic militants in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo during the 1990s, despite heavy international pressure on the Bosnian Government and the *Kosovo Liberation Army* (KLA) to expel them.[294] In the rebel-controlled zones in the Southern Philippines, there were, until very recently, training camps controlled by the *Moro Islamic Liberation Front* (MILF), in which among others Arab-Islamist fighters were hosted and trained.[295] In the Pankisi Valley in the war-torn post-Soviet state of Georgia, a number of al-Qaida affiliated Islamic militants trained with Chechen rebels. Some of them, a small group of Algerians later dubbed 'the Chechen network', returned to Europe with specific plans to bomb the Russian embassy in Paris in solidarity with the Chechen resistance.[296] There can be little doubt that ongoing civil wars in the Islamic world have been key to al-Qaida's success. As Gunaranta has put it: 'For Al Qaeda, regional conflicts are healthy green houses to rebuild, regroup, and strike'.[297]

4.5.4 The ebb and tide of armed conflicts and international terrorism

If, for a moment, one disregards the uncertainties in existing databases on international terrorism, one finds that the rise and decline of international terrorism has followed a pattern, not very different from that of armed conflict. In light of the observed inter-linkages, it is reasonable to suggest that one will find a relatively coinciding pattern of ebbs and tides of armed conflicts and international terrorism. This is also the case. The number of violent conflicts increased steadily from the 1960s and declined sharply after a peak from 1990-1992. In terms of the number of incidents, international terrorism rose sharply at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, and declined significantly from 1989 onwards. The trend has continued

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[293] Rohan Gunaratna, 'The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda', Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9 July 2003, www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_gunaratna.htm. Accessed December 2003.

[294] Marcia Christoff Kurop, 'Al Qaeda's Balkan Links', *The Wall Street Journal Europe* 1 November 2001; Chris Stephen, 'US Tackles Islamic Militancy in Kosovo', *The Scotsman* 30 November 1998; Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, 'Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?' *The Washington Quarterly* 25 (3) (Summer 2002), pp. 98-9; and Petar Skrbina, 'Under the Threats of Jihad [in Macedonian]', *Aktuel* (Skopje) 13-20 February 2004, pp. 24-26, via FBIS.

[295] For an account of the terrorist training bases in the Southern Philippines, see Maria A. Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (NY: Free Press, 2003), pp. 7-10.

[296] 'The Chechen Network [in Arabic]', *Al-Majallah* 2 February 2003; and 'Islamists' target were Russian interests in France, Ministry says', *Agence France Presse* 28 December 2002. See also Petter Nesser, 'Jihad in Europe: A survey of the motivations for Sunni Islamist terrorism in post-millennium Europe', *FFI Research Report* No.2004/01146 (Kjeller, Norway: FFI, 2004), http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/01146.pdf, pp. 61-68.

[297] Gunaratna, 'The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda'.

downwards, with 2002 hitting a record low level, measured by number of attacks.[298] While fatalities from international terrorism reached an unprecedented climax during 2001, with more than 3,500 casualties, there has been an uneven, but downward trend in fatality rates since the late 1980s until 2001. According to the RAND Terrorism Chronology, the years 1985 and 1988 recorded the highest number of fatalities (704 and 636 respectively) from international terrorism. State Department figures show a similar peak in terrorist incidents during the same period, with more than 600 incidents a year. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, the RAND figures for fatalities were down to 231, 487 and 266 respectively, while the State Department recorded much fewer incidents, well below 400 incidents annually for the latter part of the 1990s.[299]



Figure No. 3: Transnational terrorism: Events 1968-2001

The new and innovative terrorism tactics introduced by al-Qaida in New York and Washington seem to have reversed the overall downward trend. According to *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, the US Department of State's annual report, the fatality figures for 2002 were as high as 725, and a similar figure was expected for 2003.[300] The likely prospect of new mass casualty attacks has ensured that prevailing threat perceptions have remained largely unaffected by the overall declining incident rate from international terrorism. The rising casualty patterns in international terrorism appear to be the result of new *modus operandi* by a limited number of

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[298] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*; and RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968-1997, accessible from www.mipt.org/. According to Cofer Black, the US antiterrorism czar, there were 198 acts of international terrorism in 2002, compared to 346 attacks in 2001. The initial edition of the State Department report for 2003 has subsequently proved to be based on inaccurate data, leading to a too low number of recorded attacks. At the time of writing, the exact numbers for 2003 were still unknown.

[299] See table in Todd Sandler, 'Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism', *The World Economy* 26 (6) (June 2003), p. 783.

[300] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*.

groups, and are not caused by a 'mushrooming' of terrorist groups. In fact, studies show a declining rate of terrorist group formation over the past decades. Most terrorist groups were formed during the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, 'the pace of terrorist group formation has slowed substantially', and during the 1990s, most new groups 'have been largely reflective of religious concerns, Islamist ones in particular'.[301] Hence, even if terrorism has grown more lethal, when measured in terms of number of incidents and number of active groups, there has been a downward trend since the end of the Cold War, corresponding to the evolution of armed conflicts during the same period.

Although terrorist tactics are used in one form or another during nearly all armed conflicts, only a minority of today's armed conflicts contribute *heavily* to international terrorism. When they do, factors such as direct foreign military presence or involvement (or in some cases lack of involvement) in the conflict appear to be critical, in addition to ideological and identity factors, such as the existence of politicised diasporas and refugee communities, and radical ideologies providing theoretical justifications for international attacks. One may therefore speculate as to whether the growing interconnectivity and interdependence of the world produced by globalisation will make distant armed conflicts a more direct and significant contributors to international terrorism in the future.

As is evident from the discussion above, armed conflict and terrorism are interlinked in multiple ways, and trends affecting the former will also impact on the latter. Therefore, patterns of contemporary armed conflicts are a central avenue for understanding and explaining international terrorism.

5 CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN BRIEF

The following list summarises the discussion from the preceding chapters:

- *Relative deprivation and inequality*: Widespread perceptions of deprivation and inequality, especially among culturally defined groups, serve as the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence. Terrorism may be part of this violence.
- *Terrorism by spoilers*: Peace processes based on negotiated settlements are frequently accompanied by increased levels of terrorism by rejectionist groups.
- *The contagion theory*: The occurrence of terrorism in one country often leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in neighbouring countries. Terrorists learn from one another, and new tactics are usually quickly emulated. Spillover occurs in a variety of ways.
- *Terrorism and mass media*: Paradigmatic shifts in modern mass media appear to influence patterns of terrorism, by enhancing its agenda-setting function, increasing its lethality, and by expanding its transnational character.

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[301] A. Pedahzur, W. Eubank, and L. Weinberg, 'The war on terrorism and the decline of terrorist group formation: A research note', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14 (3) (Autumn 2002), pp. 141-147.

- *Rapid modernisation* makes societies more exposed to ideological terrorism. Societal changes associated with modernisation create new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism such as a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences. Socially disruptive modernisation may also produce propitious conditions for terrorism, especially when it relies heavily on the export of natural resources, causes widespread social inequalities and environmental damage, and creates mixed market-clientalist societies.
- *Poverty, weak states, and insurgencies*: Poor societies with weak state structures are much more exposed to civil wars than wealthy countries. Economic growth and development undercut the economics of armed insurgencies. Economic growth and prosperity also contribute to lower levels of transnational terrorism.
- *Democratisation*: States in democratic transition are more exposed to armed conflict and terrorism than democracies and autocracies. Because of pervasive state control, totalitarian regimes rarely experience terrorism. States with high scores on measures of human rights standards and democracy are less exposed to domestic ideological terrorism. Levels of transnational terrorism also seem to be highest in semi-authoritarian states, especially when undergoing a democratisation process.
- *Political regime and legitimacy*: Terrorism is closely linked to a set of core legitimacy problems. Lack of continuity of the political system, and a lack of integration of political fringes, tend to encourage ideological terrorism. Ethnic diversity increases the potential for ethnic terrorism. A high density of trade union membership in a population has tended to contribute to a lower level of domestic ideological terrorism.
- *The ecology of terrorism*: Technological developments offer new and more efficient means and weapons for terrorist groups, but also increase the counter-terrorist capabilities of states. Transnational organised crime and terrorism are partly inter-linked phenomena, and growth in transnational organised crime may contribute to increased levels of terrorism.
- *Hegemony in the international system*: An international state system characterised by strong hegemonic power(s) is more exposed to international terrorism than a more multi-polar system. High levels of bipolar conflict in world politics invite the use of state-sponsored terrorism as a means of war by proxy. A strongly unipolar world order or a world empire system, on the other hand, will experience high levels of transnational anti-systemic 'anti-colonial' terrorism.
- *Economic and cultural globalisation*: Economic globalisation has mixed impacts on transnational terrorism, depending on how globalisation is measured. Cultural globalisation, measured by the rate of INGOs, tends to cause higher levels of transnational terrorism, especially against US targets.
- *The proliferation of weak and collapsed states* seems to have a facilitating influence on terrorism. Failed or collapsed states, caused by civil wars, underdevelopment, corrupt elites, etc., may contribute to international terrorism in a variety of ways.
- *Ongoing and past wars*: While terrorism in some cases is an armed conflict in its own right, terrorist motivations are often rooted in ongoing or past wars in one way or

another. Armed conflicts also have various facilitating influences on transnational terrorism.

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